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NOTICE

Effective 1 January 1983, this report series is being reorganized and retitled the NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT. In addition to material on the Near East and North Africa, it will contain material on the South Asian countries--Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka--that presently appears in the JPRS SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT.

22 December 1982

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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PETROLEUM INVESTMENT POLICIES DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 40, Oct 82 pp 47-51

[Interview with Nur-al-Din Farraj, general manager of the Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation [APICORP] in Paris: "The Arab Oil Industry Is Still Tied to the West"; date of interview not specified]

[Text] 1982 projects: Financing the purchase of four offshore drilling rigs in Saudi Arabia for \$100 million, and expansion of the Moroccan refinery.

There is no harm in having numerous joint Arab business establishments if they work together. We are both like and unlike Arab funds and commercial banks, and we must resemble the Arab Investment Corporation.

The petrochemical detergents industry project in Iraq is in the process of being established, and \$500 million of investments and loans have been provided.

The Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation [APICORP] is considered to be one of the most outstanding of the ambitious enterprises established by OAPEC in 1975. The objective of establishing it was to have it be the fundamental base for developing the Arab petroleum industry and achieving ideal utilization of the sources of energy available in the Arab world. Under very difficult circumstances, embodied in particular by the virtually total domination by the Western nations of petroleum technology and the petroleum industries as well as the resistance shown by Western corporations to having the Arabs enter the various petroleum industries fields, APICORP had to go forward firmly and move with carefully planned steps. APICORP in particular has concentrated on financing and supporting Arab regional and national projects having the objective of developing and utilizing sources of energy, and has done so through providing better commercial [and financing] terms than it has been possible to obtain from foreign banks. In order to strengthen APICORP's ability to finance petroleum industry projects or to participate in them, its capital was increased at the beginning of 1982 from \$350 to \$400 million. In the realm of financial achievements, during 1981 APICORP earned revenues amounting to about 196 million [Saudi] riyals (about \$50 million), that is, there is an increase of 48 percent over 1980. It should also be mentioned that APICORP's headquarters is in Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia.

APICORP's board held its most recent meeting in Paris, where it decided upon the matters to be included in its plan of operations--in particular, APICORP's work program and its investments during the upcoming stage of its operations. AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL met with APICORP's general manager, Dr Nur al-Din Farraj, and in the interview held with him he provided an assessment of the development of APICORP's operations. He also touched upon the situation of the establishments which engage in joint Arab ventures, investment trends, and the future of the petroleum industries in the Arab world. Dr Farraj is considered to be one of the foremost Arab experts who have worked in the field of petroleum economics. He studied economics and the economics of raw materials in 'Ayn Shams University, and then he worked as an expert in Kuwait for 10 years. Then in 1976 he was chosen to be the first general manager of APICORP, and it was in this capacity that he was entrusted with the job of forming the corporation.

The following is the text of the interview:

[Question] What are APICORP's basic objectives?

[Answer] APICORP was founded in 1975 and began operations in early 1976 as a company specializing in petroleum industries and industries related to petroleum industries in the broad sense of the word. APICORP also undertakes investments on a commercial basis. It is not one of the funds which provide easy or facilitated financing. But it does provide commercial financing for some well-planned projects on terms which are slightly easier than those of the purely commercial financing which is provided by foreign banks. APICORP also differs from commercial banks in that it participates in the capital of some projects, and consequently we assume some of the risks involved. We do not merely engage in granting traditional commercial loans.

[Question] In other words, your position is one which is in between the Arab funds and the commercial banks, especially the foreign ones which operate in this field?

[Answer] This is perhaps an accurate way to put it. The difference between us and the foreign commercial banks lies in our assessment of the risks, particularly the risks of financing and investing in the Arab world.

APICORP, the Funds, and the Arab Investment Corporation

[Question] In other words, your view of matters is one which involves a commitment?

[Answer] Yes, it involves a commitment, and it is realistic. The reason for this is that we, as a joint Arab financial company or corporation, are perhaps not subject to the same political risks that European, U.S., or Japanese banks are subject to.

This allows us to provide loan terms which are somewhat better than those of foreign banks. These advantages which we have are much the same as those of the other Arab financial establishments such as the Arab Investment Corporation,

it company which is most like our corporation. In practice, there is no difference between us except for our fields of specialization. We are a company which specializes in petroleum financing, whereas they specialize in investment and financing projects of all type in various sectors.

We Work Together With the Private Sector

[Question] The Arab Investment Corporation, for example, participates in private sector financing, whereas we notice that your activities are concentrated on government projects.

[Answer] APICROP has no restrictions concerning private sector financing. Actually, at the beginning of this year, we began financing private sector projects. We have participated in financing the purchase of our drilling rigs for a Saudi private sector company. This operation has been the first and largest operation of this type in the field of private sector financing. The amount involved is estimated at about 400 million [Saudi] riyals (about \$100 million). We participated along with Saudi banks and the Gulf Bank in the financing of this operation. As I have said, in its articles of association APICORP has no restrictions which prevent private sector financing.

[Question] Do you believe that there are important areas for cooperation [between APICORP and] the private sector?

[Answer] So far we have only been involved in the operation which I have mentioned. The difficulty in this regard is that petroleum sector projects, because of their size, require enormous amounts of capital. So far the private sector has not seen the emergence of companies which are either large or specialized enough to require having us work together with them. What we find is that most of the projects in the field of manufacturing some petroleum products such as plastic are small-size projects. APICORP has no significant role to play in this area because these projects are able to obtain enough available financing from commercial banks. In most cases these industries receive aid and support from specialized banks. In Kuwait, for example, all of these industries receive direct support from the Industrial Bank of Kuwait. In Saudi Arabia they receive support from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund. So they already have easily available financing. We are trying to concentrate on large industrial projects which require [the services of] larger financial establishments which, in addition to this, are specialized in terms of their knowledge of the economics of this industry. Furthermore, most petroleum business and activity in the Arab world is dominated by public corporations, and this does not leave much room for working together with the private sector.

1982 Projects

[Question] What new projects have been completed recently and during 1982?

[Answer] I have already referred to one of these projects in which we provided financing to the Saudi National Drilling Company so that it could buy four off-shore drilling rigs to use in Saudi territorial waters for ARAMCO. The size of

the loan involved was over \$100 million. APICORP participated in arranging and preparing the loan along with other Arab financial establishments.

Our second project during the year was that of providing financing to the Saudi company called (NDRICO). There was also another project during the first half of this year which involved financing, and it was the completion of the project to expand the Moroccan refinery at al-Muhammadiyah [Mohammedia]. This project is being undertaken by the company called SAMIR. We have also engaged in financing the joint project of the Saudi Basic Industries Company (SABIC) as well as the joint petrochemicals project in Yanbu'. We have also financed the Qatar Petrochemicals Industries Company project, and work will begin on this project during October of this year. In all, the total volume of investments and financing operations which we have engaged in so far have amounted to about \$500 million.

The Effects of the Recession on the Oil Markets

[Question] How much has the decrease in oil production affected your operations at the present time, and what are the prospects for the future?

[Answer] There has been no direct effect on the financing capability of APICORP. In fact, I could go so far as to say that APICORP's financing capability is increasing and has not declined at all. Our subscribed capital which has been fully paid in amounts to 1.2 billion [Saudi] riyals. Furthermore, although we have distributed good dividends lately, we are still developing our own financial capability.

However, it could be that those who are active in projects in the petroleum industries sector are being affected somewhat. Since 1981 people have clearly begun to revise a number of investment decisions which were made on the basis of a continuing rise in the prices of crude oil and, by extension, a rise in the prices of refined petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, and chemical materials. There is perhaps an inclination toward either postponing these investments for a while or even cancelling them. This also means that we will be indirectly feeling the effects of this because it will be affecting our clients. One thing we must understand is that the petroleum industries run the same risks that other industries do, and that investment decisions, whether made in connection with petroleum industries or other industries, are made on the basis of long-term considerations. There are many theories concerning this, and according to some of them it might be safer to make long-term investment decisions during the weakest period of an economic cycle because such investment decisions, by their very nature, require a definite period of time for the implementation of the projects themselves [associated with the investments].

Furthermore, in the case of petroleum industry projects, if one has decided to start a project in 1980, it will be between 1985 and 1987 before the project is fully prepared--and this includes preparing the study, designs, and details of the project as well as inviting bids from contractors who will be implementing the project. So one must realize that these investment decisions are not investment decisions which can be made immediately and the results of which appear overnight.

The Future of the Arab Petroleum Industry

[Question] A lot of people are talking about the present situation and future of the petrochemicals industries in the Arab world. How do you currently assess this situation?

[Answer] We have been following the articles and opinions which say that the petrochemicals industries in Europe and the U.S. are not producing up to capacity and that the refining industries in Europe are suffering from the same problem. All of this is true. However, we believe that the current situation must be exploited in order to transfer the centers of these industries from the advanced Western nations--during a given phase of this [petroleum] industry--to the centers of oil and gas production [in the Arab world]. One of the best approaches to be used would be to exploit this period of time--in which there is an excess of production capacity and a decrease in demand, and which is a period of time which may last as much as 2 years or longer--to build up our own enterprises so that when the economic cycle once again reaches its peak, we will be in a strong position.

[Question] But is it not true that there remains the problem that they are the ones who have created the technology and we will remain technologically dependent upon them, and this will force us to develop the industries which they, for reasons of their own, wish to see transferred to us?

[Answer] This is true. The fact is that, for a certain period of time, we will remain at the mercy of the multinational corporations until we undertake a serious and well-planned effort to create research establishments and develop scientists and a generation of technicians. This is a process which is both difficult and long. However, it must be done on the various levels--beginning with our educational system and ending with study missions in various fields of specialization and ambitious scientific training programs. There is nothing wrong with continuing to admit that, in this advanced sector, we are technologically dependent upon the West--as long as this provides us with an incentive to move forward rather than to retreat and accept the status quo. Our future is up to use to create as long as we actually have the desire to create it.

[Question] What are the most outstanding features of APICORP as a joint Arab enterprise?

[Answer] APICORP, within the framework of these industries, is interested in Arab economic integration. It is attempting to encourage projects which involve more than one Arab nation, whether the projects relate to the market or to the raw materials necessary for this industry. Everything must be within the framework of industrial specialization. We are working toward having APICORP, as time goes by, transformed into a center which provides technical and financial expertise and information within the scope of the petroleum industry.

[Question] What are the technical elements which you have at your disposal, and does the preparation of studies take place within the scope of your corporation?

[Answer] We have arrived at the stage where we can rely upon ourselves to do economic studies and financing studies. As for technical matters, we attempt to do initial studies of a narrower scope, and then they are completed by international consulting firms. We believe in the necessity of cooperating with international consulting firms as long as they are the ones that have the expertise and technology. If we had the expertise that they do, then we would be advanced nations rather than developing nations.

Duplication of Studies and Cooperatin With Arab Establishments

[Question] Is there cooperation concerning making studies and on the technical level between APICORP and other Arab establishments?

[Answer] Of course there is. Such cooperation has existed ever since our corporation began its operatins. We have striven to achieve this in order to deal with the complaint about the existence of too many studies and the duplication of studies. We consider that there is a duplication of studies if they are done at the same time. But if one study is done after another, then there is no duplication, especially if the establishments and individuals involved are aware of the fact hat studies have been done prior to those which they are preparing concerning the same subject. Even so, duplication might sometimes still occur.

One of the establishments which we have worked together with is the study center called (ADGAS). Its headquarters was in Egypt, but now it has been transferred to Baghdad. It is one of the Arab League's organizations. We have also cooperated with the Gulf Organization of Industrial Consultation [GOIC]. Cooperation takes place between us in the field of making studies. We attempt to complete existing studies with the cooperation of other establishments, or else we participate in financing them, and sometimes we even finance them by ourselves. We mainly work together with OAPEC. Our cooperation with OAPEC is something which has been going on in all fields. Right now we are undertaking a joint study with the study center in Baghdad. We are also cooperating with the Arab Fertilizer industry Federation--the headquarters of which is in Kuwait--to prepare a comprehensive survey of the Arab chemical fertilizer industry and its future till the year 2000.

Naturally we are fully prepared to cooperate with any Arab establishment which is interested in preparing a given project which involves our field of interest.

[Question] There have been complaints that, in certain sectors, there is duplication in the case of some joint Arab establishments and there are too many such establishments. Do you consider this to be a healthy phenomenon?

[Answer] It is difficult to give an unequivocal answer to this question. Actually, when we view the development of the modern Arab world, we could consider this to be phenomenon of growth and proliferation which is being accompanied by the efforts of every establishment to achieve development and improvement. But in order to guarantee the positive effects of [having] this large number [of such organizations], it is necessary to maintain constant communication and coordination between these establishments in the realm of ideas and information.

[Question] But the problem is that this large number [of such establishments] serves to scatter and split up qualified personnel and to create a type of competition to attract the highly qualified technical and administrative personnel.

[Answer] There is no way to avoid this, and this is perhaps because the large number of private sector establishments and the fact that they compete with each other is something which is related to the objectives and nature of the private sector. The large number of specialized public corporations is also something which is related to their objectives. We, for example, began with four technical personnel in 1976. Now, however, we have about 40 people who are specialists in the operations of banks, financing, law, administration, and accounting. Actually we are not annoyed by the fact that there is this large number of such specialized Arab establishments because this is a natural link in the chain of development and it will lead to expansion of the base of Arab expertise. These establishments are tantamount to being schools for preparing the Arab world's future generations of technical personnel.

[Question] The fact is that this phenomenon is quite common in the field of finance and investment, especially when it comes to higher administration. In this case we are not talking about the field of commercial banking. For example, Mr 'Abd al-Latif al-Hamad, the Kuwaiti minister of finance, recently criticized this phenomenon in London.

[Answer] I still believe that it is not in the interest of the Arab world to concentrate these establishments [in one place] during the present stage. The reason is that many of these organizations bear the imprint of the nation which they stem from. For example, Kuwaiti establishments are going to be Kuwaiti establishments, and Saudi establishments are going to be Saudi ones. Inevitably each one of these establishments was created to meet a certain need, otherwise the market would have condemned them to extinction shortly after they were established. The only organization which can continue to exist is one which meets or fills certain needs in the market. Specialization is the basis of such establishments being able to continue to exist. In the final analysis it will perhaps be a matter of survival of the fittest. And perhaps the establishments--whether they continue to exist only for a short time or a somewhat longer period of time--will participate in the creation of Arab personnel who will have expertise in fields in which we have been very deficient.

[Question] So would you say that joint Arab work, in terms of its activity and course of action, is something which is certain [to continue]?

[Answer] There is some anxiety, particularly concerning joint Arab industries and the financing and sponsorship of such industries, especially when they begin their operations. From the very beginning these industries have had to deal with foreign competition from long-established organizations. It was necessary to at least protect them from fierce competition and dumping. We have felt this type of pressure in our work. There are some realms of technology which are not available to us. If our industries are to grow, then they will have to reach the stage where they can compete with foreign goods in foreign markets. We must deal with this conflict in a serious manner and with a desire to achieve development.

[Question] The APICORP board recently held a meeting. What decisions were taken at that meeting?

[Answer] We only dealt with routine matters. Basically our discussions centered around follow-up work some operations and projects. Today we are particularly concerned with the Arab Detergent Chemicals Project. Right now we are at the stage of inviting bids for the implementation of the project. We hope that the Arab nations will participate [in financing the capital of] the company and other establishments.

[Question] How much will its capital be, and has the capital been totally covered?

[Answer] The project's capital totals \$100 million, but the [total] capital cost will be between \$200 and \$220 million. Technically the capital is considered to be totally covered and financed by the Republic of Iraq and APICORP by virtue of the fact that they are the two founders of the project. Consequently the latter is suffering from a lack of financing. However, the fact that it is being opened to [capital] participation on the part of the Arabs--both nations which are and are not participating in [the capital financing of] APICORP--means that [the project] is being given a real regional dimension. The project is an Arab regional one which will undertake to supply Arab industries with chemical detergents. We thus want to give it strong support in the Arab markets, with the participation of the Arab nations and their industries which will be utilizing the materials produced by this enterprise.

The Neutralization of Joint Work

[Question] What are the chief difficulties which you are facing?

[Answer] One of the chief difficulties is the slowness with which the Arabs make decisions concern joint Arab industries, even though we believe that we devote a great deal of time and sustained effort to these studies of the projects which we submit and are objective in our assessments of the projects and our preparation of their implementation. Also, it takes a long time to get someone to decide to participate in these projects.

I believe that the studies which we undertake for joint Arab industries are pioneering studies because they are not based on making a study of a project for only one nation. We attempt to choose the ideal location for a given project.

In the final analysis, our objective is [to develop] the Arab economy in the long run. In our work, we attempt to avoid the negative effects of some of the circumstances which dominate inter-Arab relations. We believe that the common interest of the Arabs is something which should be far stronger than the vicissitudes [of inter-Arab relations] and disputes [among the Arabs] rather than vice-versa.

WESTERN CHARITIES' AID BYPASSES STILL SECLUDED WOMEN

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 17 Nov 82 pp 28-30

[Report by Cheryl Benard and Edit Schlaffer]

[Text] The attitude of Europeans towards people of other cultures has for centuries swung back and forth between two extreme positions. The cliché image is negative and dark: Other peoples are barbarian and brutal; they embody evil and sexual instability; they are backward and must be civilized. The other [picture] is romantic and idealized: These others may be backward, but they are also more original, purer, unspoiled. Proud, noble and natural, they embody the ideal counterpart to the corruptions of civilization. These clichés can be traced back to medieval and earlier times, but they hardened in the epoch of enlightenment and colonialism. The backward heathens and noble savages became elemental parts of Western political consciousness.

At present, the topical variant of these archetypes are the Afghans. They are superbly suited to this role: in a world which has become an open book, they are one of the few remaining unknown elements. In a brilliant mixture of racial romanticism and cold war the media have created the image of the Afghan: a fighter, stubborn to the point of suicidal heroism, dressed in the best folkloric style, and armed with weapons just antiquated enough to make war manageable again, pre-industrial armament matching the disarmament longings of our continent. As a topical substitute for lost adventure locales, the Afghans have appeared in the nick of time.

What picture appears before your eyes when you imagine "the Afghan?" Probably an armed man in tribal costume before a background of a mountainous landscape. This is also what European charitable organizations and aid committees, and the numerous international establishments for refugee aid see. They all overlook the majority of refugees: "The Afghans," that is also the women and children.

Let's just look at the usual services of refugee aid for the more than 2 million Afghans who in the meantime constitute a state within a state in Pakistan: food, clothing, child care including schools, medical care. All these services reach the male refugee population to a satisfactory degree, but much less so the female population, almost fatally less. The reason for it is partly the repressive order of values of Pashto society, partly the faulty planning of European aid offers. And partly the interaction between Pashto

refugees and their European helpers who prove to be true brothers surpassing all boundaries when it is a matter of disdain for the life of women.

A few examples: Mother and infant mortality at birth is among the highest in the world in Afghan camps, despite the convenient availability of doctors and clinics. Men and boys wear shoes or sandals, they possess sweaters and wool blankets for the winter months. Women and girls go barefoot, and year after year wrap themselves in the same tattered cotton shawls. In the camps are a total of 250 boys' schools--and 5 girls' schools. For boys and men there are crafts projects, apprenticeships and workshops, so that they can become more independent. But little girls are often married off at the age of seven if their fathers have died or were killed fighting and they were thus deprived of a means of support. It is similar with widows: since refugee papers are issued only to men, they are dependent on the voluntary dole of male relatives. In the case of a population which in large part comes from the most remote regions of Afghanistan, the brutal laws of a tribal structure which only recognizes physical superiority are not surprising. But from the enlightened Europeans who direct the aid program, more could be expected than instant regression into the thought structures of tribal society. If they prove themselves to be good brothers of the Pashtos, there are four reasons for it:

1. Women are invisible.

If one enters the refugee camp in a jeep of the Pakistani refugee commission or in the car of one of the aid committees, within seconds hundreds of boys and men congregate around the car. The crowd parts to make room for the arrival of local leaders and immediately closes again in a huge circle around the guests. The settlements are dispersed far and wide; as far as the eye reaches, one sees mud walls surrounding the five or six tents of relatives who fled together. Refugees everywhere, and ... they are all men.

For the men from the West, this is the realization of their youthful daydreams; here they are, surrounded by a group of wild Afghans, mysterious figures wrapped in wool blankets and carrying exotic weapons. It is conceivable that a glimpse of a totally veiled woman disappearing in fright behind a mud wall gives them a momentary feeling of archaic satisfaction, they who at home are beleaguered by the militant figures of women's liberation. At any rate, it never occurs to them, men among men, to give thought to the special problems and needs of women and children in a refugee situation, or to let their imagination dwell on how it must feel not to be allowed to leave the area of five tents surrounded by a mud wall for a year and a half because the lords, the freedom fighters, do not permit a woman to move about freely, not even as far as the center of the camp.

2. Women and children are boring

If within the charitable organizations an occasional voice is heard with remarks about women and children, it is considered a faux pas by all those present. To be shot by the Russians as a rebel is uplifting and moving. For a pregnant woman to bleed to death because of complications due to a lack of medical care is not.

we attended a meeting of all aid organizations in Peshawar where the subject was baby food. As a matter of fact, Afghan men do not allow women and children, especially daughters who are less valuable, access to eggs and meat. This has led to a protein deficiency which is especially dangerous to the health of pregnant women and children. For this reason the aid organizations bought up Australian protein biscuits which look like dry bread and are therefore left to the women as having no value while the men attack meat, eggs and occasional vegetables. Unfortunately these biscuits are very hard and dry, and must be crushed and mixed with liquid if they are to be eaten by very young children. The feeding of children is without doubt a central task of refugee aid. But the German organization GTZ, for instance, is concerned about "inputs" and the "workshops," with which one hoped to bring about a "raising of motivation" of the refugees--for example, through the psychological trick of building the "entertainment offers" (a literal quote) at a half hour's distance from the camp, and the clinic, too. It was never, ever mentioned that, although this might raise the motivation of those willing to accept the distance, at the same time it would also completely destroy even the slightest chance of female patients to avail themselves of health care. Grandiose strategies are much more exciting than baby food, of course.

It seems to be a burden on the ego of many European helpers to be involved in refugee aid. The current jargon among them points up the hierarchies, the differentiation between the "gun runners" (the heroic people who smuggle weapons to the rebels) and the "blanket runners" (the weaklings who only distribute vaccines and woolen blankets).

3. The man is master in the (mud) house.

The demand of the Pashtos to do with "their women" as they please is acceded to in a suspiciously expeditious manner. That they thereby, with one breath, accept the stronger's right to force, while with the other (in the case of the Soviet Union towards the weak neighbor state) they condemn it shrilly, apparently does not seem paradoxical to the gentlemen, the helpers.

Afghan women who die a few hundred yards from the clinic because their men forbid them to leave the limits of the mud wall; the marriage of seven-year-old girls to 30-year-old men; the woman whose arm was broken by her father-in-law and whose husband refused to take her to the hospital because it would mean an hour's trip and that seems too much trouble "for a woman": these daily occurrences hardly elicit more than a tolerant shrug of the shoulders from the European men there.

They consider these occurrences as part of the "private sphere." And besides, they consider it to be in bad taste to talk about it at all in public. After all, "the Afghans" are the victims of an invasion and it is a tactical error to curtail international sympathies for them by disclosing their less attractive cultural mores. The mystical totality of "Afghans" for whom we are supposed to feel solidarity does not include the women.

4. Woman has two places: in the home, and in the grave.

Into the rigid social structure, which is the foundation of the massive restrictions on the living and survival chances of women and girls among the refugee population, innovations can be introduced only with the greatest of difficulties. The Pashto proverb which says that "a woman fits only into two places: the home and the grave" is fulfilled in a macabre way in the refugee situation. Little girls must not go to school, and at the health clinic on "mother-child day," the fathers bring a lot more sons than daughters for an examination.

The shy little girls with their forever slipping shawls, who flee in fright behind a wall at the appearance of a stranger, have already learned their place in the Afghan structure. Outsiders do not even have the consolation that this state of affairs appears natural, and therefore, bearable, to the women concerned.

Dr. Janata, ethnologist and Afghan-expert, in talks with Pashto men time and again came across the sentence: "If we don't lock up our women, they'll run away from us." As a reason why girls are not allowed to go to school, not even Koran school, local leaders gave us to understand that [if they did] they would no longer be willing to live the way Pashto women are supposed to live. Education means breaking away--the traditional leaders of Afghan society understand that as quickly as traditional authorities of the European Middle Ages had recognized education as their enemy. Under normal circumstances one could hold the view that every culture must find its own road toward development, without outside instruction and force. But this condition cannot be produced in our world; interventions, influences, forces have stamped the international system, and the Afghans are not exempt from it. This intervention is all the more intensive in a refugee situation where all basic survival needs are guaranteed through the constant presence of people from an entirely different cultural background. In such a situation, one cannot speak of "nonintervention." Intervention is extremely strong, but selective; and if we accept the concept of "structural force" to be valid and convincing (according to which, force is also used if one could improve the living conditions of others but one refrains from doing it), then the intervention by the European aid organizations and by UNHCR is an utterly brutal one towards women.

If one were not exclusively occupied with rebels, one could, for instance, train midwives. One could send female health teams on house calls, to satisfy the separation rules of Afghan society. One could help women turn their existing capabilities into a minimal earning capacity so that they are not totally helpless in case of widowhood. One could introduce girls to those activities which traditional thinking permits them--for example, instruction in hygiene and training in child care. Thus, at least small inroads into the monotony of daily camp life could be made.

In the two camps under the medical care of the Austrian aid committee, an initiative in this direction is being made under the direction of two refugee women, a teacher and a nurse.

Formerly, in the rural regions of Afghanistan one could measure the success of a women's project by the fact that, as soon as it was accepted by the women and they were stimulated to cooperate, it was forbidden by the men. Whoever is familiar with the history of medieval and modern times will not give in, faced with this state of affairs, but hopes that the worried Church was right at the time in its estimation of education as the irresistibly growing force of free thought.

Otherwise, in the Third World we shall have to be satisfied with an extremely narrow concept of liberation: the absence of troops of a superpower.

9917

CSO: 4620/10

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES 1983 DRAFT PLAN

LD091518 Algiers APS in English 1054 GMT 9 Dec 82

[Text] Algiers, 9/12/82 (APS)--The annual plan draft bill for 1983 was at the center of the Peoples' National Assembly (APN) deliberations which took place on Wednesday in a plenary session under the chairmanship of Mr Abderahman Belayate, CC member, APN's deputy chairman and in presence of the government's representative Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi, CC member, minister of planification and territory improvement who presented this project to the deputies.

When presenting the annual plan, the minister of planification and territory improvement indicated that the government will examine the project concerning the raising up of the salaries.

He also underlined that 160,000 new jobs will be created in 1983.

He further added that the whole actions and measures of the 1983 annual plan is aimed principally at achieving the essential projects of the 5 year plan, in the field of the organisation of the economy, and he noted that at the level of the internal resources, the national production may witness an important widening 10 (?percent) apart from hydrocarbon and more than industry. [Sentenced as received]

As concern the new opportunities of investments Mr Brahimi underlined that a program of 140 billion da had been identified and will be deeply analysed as for the degree of priority of the different projects and their level of maturation.

At the level of the measures linked with the organization of the economy, the minister of planification, said that the organization of the productive and commercial system will constitute a basic concern.

Concerning the enterprises restructuration the government's representative said that it will make it possible for the new enterprises to be set up in the meantime it will be committee to the purification and operations of financial restructuration on clear bases. [Sentenced as received]

In this context, Mr Brahimi, called about the restructuration of the banks.

CSO: 4500/39

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

LEADERS TO HOLD SUMMIT--Kuwait, 11 Dec (QNA)--Press reports has noted here that Morocco is currently preparing to hold a summit conference between His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco and Algerian President Chedli Bedjedid in Spain--which His Majesty King Fahd of Saudi Arabia visited last week within the framework of preparations for this summit. Kuwaiti paper AL-WATAN carried this report. The paper added that Moroccan Foreign Minister M'hamed Boucetta currently is paying a visit to Algeria in order to prepare for this summit. [Text] [GF111356 Doha QNA in Arabic 1030 GMT 11 Dec 82]

CSO: 4500/39

MILITARY LEADER DISCUSSES POLITICAL, POLICY VIEWS

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 3029, 29 Oct 82 pp 16-19

[Interview with Minister of Defense Marshal 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah by Salah-al-Din Hafiz: "Israel, by Its Conduct, Still Constitutes the Imminent Threat to the Arab Nation"]

[Text] By special arrangement, AL-MUSAWWAR is publishing the interview which Marshal 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah gave to Salah-al-Din Hafiz, the managing editor of the Qatar newspaper AL-RAYAH. In his interview, Marshal Abu Ghazalah emphasized the need to establish a unified Arab defense strategy against the dangers threatening the Arab East and the Gulf. He said, "Israel has armed itself 'to the teeth' to gain military supremacy over all the countries of the region and in spite of that it is now insisting entry demanding 75 F-16 aircraft, which means that it is determined to continue to resolve disputes by war and invasion." Marshal Abu Ghazalah also said, "Massive dangers are threatening collective Arab security, such as the Iran-Iraq war, the problems of the Horn of Africa, and the attempts to take over the Strait of Bab El Mandeb."

In his conversation, Marshal Abu Ghazalah concentrated on the importance of exploiting all Arab resources and powers to provide an Arab-Egyptian deterrent force to achieve Arab security. He stated, "The peace treaty signed by Egypt and Israel cannot impede Egypt from helping to achieve Arab security." He also said, "Iran must remain within its borders and we are therefore helping Iraq in the face of the Iranian invasion, which is also threatening the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula." Marshal Abu Ghazalah explained a strategic viewpoint regarding matters which occurred in conjunction with Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the position of the Syrian deterrent forces, which did not fight with the Palestinian resistance forces. Herewith is the text of the interview:

The Threats Looming over Us

[Question] Your excellency the marshal, let us start this discussion by casting a wide-angle strategic glance at the conditions enveloping the Arab nation now. What is your opinion about what is going on in the framework of a number of factors, most importantly Israel's escalating policy of aggression, especially after the invasion of Lebanon, the continuation of the Iraqi-Iranian war, the tension prevalent in the Horn of Africa, and, finally, the anxiety over Gulf security?

Marshal Abu Ghazalah: The period we are now living in, and also the near future, is in my opinion one of the most dangerous periods in the history of the Arab

nation. I believe that this nation, especially in the area known as the Arab East, which, I consider, includes the territory from the borders of Iraq to the Arab Gulf, Syria and so forth up to the Nile Valley, is now in a zone surrounded by common future dangers and pressing threats. Perhaps the threats directed against the Maghreb are somewhat less urgent and can be dealt with in stages.

I also consider that I can break down Arab security, although it is a unit, into two segments:

1. The security of the zone of the Arab East.
2. The security of the zone of the Maghreb.

Although we are supposed to be talking about Arab security as a whole, we contend that since the threats directed at the Arab East are urgent and serious, this zone, that is, the Arab East, has very serious common security interests. What are these dangers?

Let us start with the dangers arising from the Iraqi-Iranian war, especially their effects on the Arab Gulf. There is no doubt that all Arab countries take a special view of this war from the strategic standpoint.

If we imagine that Iran is successful bring its forces into Iraq one way or another, the situation will pose a special threat to the whole area, especially the countries of the Gulf. I imagine that this has become totally clear in the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council meetings that are going on, the comprehensive view that is being developed, and the recent agreement we have also heard about on the establishment of a unified defense system to protect the area, which includes a joint air defense system. This issue is primarily of concern to the Gulf countries.

However, it constitutes a clear signal and indication that the whole Arab region is concerned with Gulf security, because of the effects that could arise from the Iraqi-Iranian war.

Therefore we demand that this war end immediately and that there be no threats to the security or borders of Iraq.

How is that to be done? It would take a long time to explain this.

However, there is no dispute over the fact that the Iraqi-Iranian war is a very serious one and poses a direct threat to Gulf security.

We hope that all Arab countries, indeed the whole world, will cooperate to stop this war and keep Iran from moving beyond its borders, and that there will be no kind of direct threat to the security of Iraq.

That is what prompted us in Egypt to offer every form of aid to our brother Iraq, because we will not allow any threats to the security of Iraq, since that would entail a threat to the security of the Arab nation as a whole, and Iran must stop at its borders and not penetrate Iraq's borders.

There also is a serious point on Gulf security, in my view, and that is that a foreign invasion or foreign intervention in this region will affect Egypt. There is no dispute over that, because we are a single nation and consider that there is a very strong relationship between Egypt and the Gulf countries, since we are an element in the Arab nation and have common interests. We are concerned that this area remain stable and not be faced with any threats.

Israel Is the Imminent Threat

The other threat which I consider a grievous and imminent one as far as the Arab nation goes is Israel. There is no dispute over this either.

The reason why Israel is now doing what it is doing may be attributed to two things:

First, Israel sensed a lack or absence of military balance in the area, in the sense that it realizes today that it enjoys military superiority. Plainly, any country's military superiority normally one way or another will entice that country to resolve its problems by military force, because that is faster and more decisive than sitting down at the negotiating table.

If there are two countries between which there is balance, and a problem arises between them, they sit down together at the table and settle it through negotiation. However, if one party feels that it is stronger than the other, its strength can entice it to solve its problems by military force.

This is what Israel is doing now in the region, because it has felt that it has military superiority over its neighbors. This military superiority is enticing the Israeli government to solve its problems through military force, on grounds that that is faster.

That is the first reason. The second reason in my opinion is the absence of Arab will, Arab decisionmaking and also coordination.

The Lack of an Arab Strategy

[Question] What does that mean, your excellency the marshal?

Marshal Abu Ghazalah: That means that we do not have a unity of Arab decision-making or a unified Arab strategy. Moreover, the internal disputes in the Arab nation are very strange. They are escalating to a degree of intensity that inspires one to believe they are more dangerous than the struggle with Israel.

Take the relationship between Syria and Iraq. What do you see? Syria is supporting Iran against Iraq! Likewise the relationship between Iraq and Libya, although they are members of the Arab League -- we see that Libya is also helping Iran!

The situation is extremely strange. Arab parties are helping Iran threaten the security of Iraq and the security of the Gulf!

Stranger than that, for example, although the Arabs know that Syria is helping Iran against Iraq, it is receiving great Arab support along with tremendous amounts of money.

This means that there is an abnormal phenomenon in the Arab nation, which Israel is of course exploiting in the absence of a unified Arab will and in the context of this fragmentation. It is normal that Israel should do anything it wants!

However, I can assure you that if the Arabs had reached agreement, in spite of disagreements among themselves, that would not have happened, because disputes within a single family are not supposed to inhibit agreement over higher, comprehensive strategy.

That is the premise from which we proceed. Why shouldn't we have a comprehensive Arab strategy through which to look at Arab security, and see how to neutralize all foreign forces that affect this strategy, how to cope with the threats directed at us, how to coordinate all the resources available to us on the strategic level, and so forth?

If we could arrive at that sort of unified strategy, I can assure you that all the forces picking quarrels in the area would become aware of their real size and stop at their borders.

Reducing Israeli Contentiousness

That is because if we look at the Arab nation, we will find that it has terrific powers, military, financial, economic and human, which will enable it to reduce Israeli rebelliousness and contentiousness in the area, because Israel likes to do everything according to its own whim.

Without such coordination, Israel will continue to do what it wants. I would like to add that the first thing that anyone who thinks about his national security and about setting out a unified national security strategy must do is to look around himself, that is, at the neighboring countries, regardless of whether the relations with them are sound, and stable or are fraught with tension, because wars today do not necessarily start in a state of tension; they can start in a state of peace.

For example, the war between Iraq and Iran started in a state of peace that existed between the two, because there was a treaty between them, signed in Algeria in 1975, which established relations between them. Nonetheless, war between them broke out.

In the modern era, we do not often see states of war preceded by states of tension that continue to rise in a curve until things come to a head in war. However, we now see war suddenly flaring up between two neighboring countries at peace, because the old circumstances of previous wars are no longer in existence. Therefore, when people start to set out plans for their national security, they must look around themselves and think:

Why should my neighbor be developing militarily in an unpleasant manner? Is there a direct threat causing him to arm himself, because he is afraid? We must take all this into account. I wonder why Israel, now that it has managed to arm itself to the teeth, is insisting on asking for 75 F-16's. Really, why?

Israel and the Imposition of Wills

Israel has acquired a strong military position and has started to solve some problems by force. It actually started to "impose its will" by invading Lebanon. Why then does it want these new airplanes?

We must consider that Israel is still embracing the strategy it pursued before the peace was signed, namely that it should have a military force which is superior to that of all its neighbors as a group, even if these neighbors have been won over to peace, for a very clear purpose, which is to solve problems that might arise between it and its neighbors militarily.

In this case we must look around ourselves and state that there is a threat.

In Egypt, also, when we look to our left, we find Libya. Its security needs are very limited but we find that it has 3,000 tanks, 500 airplanes and other weapons. We must ask ourselves why. Who will it be fighting with all these weapons? Will it be fighting Israel, from which it is very distant?

Although there are no security problems of any kind, strategic or regional problems, or problems that call for tension between us and Libya, we must nonetheless give thorough consideration to why this military force is growing.

Then again, if we move over to the region of the Arabian Peninsula, we will find a small country like South Yemen also developing militarily. It has more than 200 airplanes and it has a fleet and a large number of tanks. We should wonder what threat is being directed against South Yemen that it should build up this sort of military force.

Therefore that country's neighbors must take heed, make calculations and be wary.

In summary, when any strategy is propounded for the region of the Arab East, we find an abnormal phenomenon, which is that there is an abnormal growth in military forces in various countries.

We must ask ourselves why these forces are being developed and what the goal behind that is.

Here we must be anxious to say that we must strengthen our armed forces and that we must have an armed force that is capable, strong, deterrent and so forth.

Therefore, the Arab nation also looks at Israel and its increasing military expansion as a threat to its security. It must think of ways to neutralize this Israeli military force. It is not a matter of my wanting to invade, to strike or to fight. Rather, it is enough for me to neutralize this force, at least, so that it will not be a contentious force or a force of aggression.

Naturally everyone has the right to grow and the right to defend himself, but not the right to grow to a point that will cause him to commit aggression and expand.

This is the most significant serious threat directed against the Arab nation.

The Problems of Arms Imports

At the same time, we, as Arab countries, are importing weapons in large quantities. The political will of any country that imports weapons must to some extent or another be subject to the arms supplier. Political decisions of course are affected by that. In any country that imports arms from the Soviet Union, for example, some sort of inhibitions in its political decisionmaking will arise very rapidly if that decision conflicts with the interests of the Soviet Union to one degree or another. Otherwise, the supplies will be reduced and suspended! The same is the case with respect to imports from America or any other country.

Therefore we are faced with another phenomenon, which is that we are all arms-importing countries, and Arab security must start to think about ways of getting out of the arms suppliers' circle or blockade until we become producers of arms that in one way or another are less costly, so that our political will and our national decisionmaking will not be subject to any foreign influence, as we are contending.

Let us start to effect strategic coordination and view the necessary requirements, in the circumstances that surround us. We will find that the countries that surround us are importing foreign forces! One country is importing 15,000 or 18,000 Cubans! Why are the Cubans going there, to a country that has its own people and its own forces? Why doesn't it rely on itself?

This also prompts us to be anxious and wonder, why? We must come up with a specific, significant answer to that.

This all prompts us to sit down together as Arabs, study what is around us, and set out a unified strategy, because we are all exposed to danger, since we are living in an area which has been and still is an arena of international conflict for very many reasons. It has oil, the main source of energy, and the area still contains the most suitable, best bases that are needed for fleets.

Let us look at the map of international conflict. What do we find?

There is a confrontation in Europe on land between the Warsaw and Atlantic Pacts. However, this is a specific confrontation, and the international game has its rules. They are playing in a carefully calculated manner, in order to maintain a balance.

There is a confrontation on land on the Soviet-Chinese borders.

There was another confrontation in the Falklands.

There are other confrontations at sea in the Mediterranean, where the American Sixth Fleet faces the Soviet fleet, which moves out of the Black Sea; in the Indian Ocean the American Seventh Fleet stands against the Soviet south force.

All these naval forces in a state of confrontation are looking for harbors and facilities all over the world, and our region still is the most suitable area for the fleets operating in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. The area which goes from Morocco to the Strait of Malacca, that is, the region of the Middle East and the third world, is the stage.

They want facilities or bases in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Sea of Oman, which makes our Arab region the region the world is trying to get into one way or another, in order to realize its objectives, especially since it has 60 percent of the energy in the world, although a quest for other means and new sources of energy is underway.

The principles of the international game have not yet become stabilized in the region we are in. We will always be faced with threats from outside, and inside from Israel, the Iranian threats, and the war in the Horn of Africa. Look for example at what is happening in Somalia today, close to the Bab El Mandeb area. There are people who want to take over that strait or narrow passageway, if it is taken over, what will happen in the Red Sea?

We want the Red Sea to be a peaceful, free waterway which only the countries that surround it control; for foreigners to come and take it over is a major catastrophe. How can our trade pass through it? Fifty-five percent of the world's oil passes through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. What would happen if foreigners took over the Strait of Bab El Mandeb? That would freeze the artery of the Red Sea, the Suez Canal would die, and oil would pass through only under conditions and control.

Doesn't that constitute a strong bond and a motive for Arab security, and for the need for strategic coordination among ourselves?

The Peace Treaty Is Not a Restriction

[Question] Your excellency the marshal, you spoke at length about integrated Arab security and Egypt's national view of it. However, let us ask a blunt question, which is, doesn't the peace treaty with Israel affect Egypt's integrated Arab security role?

Abu Ghazalah: I can assure you that the peace treaty is not a restriction on Egypt's will in any case. Since the treaty is not a restriction on this will, it thus has no effect on the advancement of a unified Arab strategy.

That is to say, what is now preventing Egypt, the Gulf countries and the Arab countries involved from having a higher united security strategy? The Fez summit conference and the resolution it passed, to the effect that a peaceful solution is the only solution, means that the issue of peace and the resolution of the Palestinian cause through peace has become an Arab decision, not just an Egyptian one. The Arabs have agreed to that unanimously and no one has violated this unanimity.

Thus the peace treaty cannot be a restriction on setting out a higher unified Arab security strategy -- to the contrary, we want to proceed from the current state of peace and start to prepare and make calculations for what might happen 20 years from now. The start must be made now, immediately, because if we wait and the Arabs do not set out a unified security strategy where they will set forth powerful security regulations and security arrangements, the situation will be more serious in 10 years' time than it is now and it will develop into a more serious situation. New threats which I can expect in the future will appear.

New Threats to the Area

[Question] What is the specific nature of these new threats?

Abu Ghazalah: The world today is in transition from the era of oil politics and conflicts over oil to the era of water politics and conflicts over that. Whereas all policies had been connected to oil, they today are beginning to be linked to problems of water and water boundaries and resources. The search for energy sources in water has started. There is an agreement setting out economic territorial water [limits] at 200 miles. With that, struggles and problems will start in small seas, since the large oceans can accomodate everyone without difficulty.

The small seas - the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Sea of Oman, and the Arab Gulf - are ones that will witness the increased tension. We must pull ourselves together, starting now, prepare ourselves and strengthen ourselves to cope with these coming threats. Otherwise, the situation will be more serious in 10 years and we will be in a worse situation than we are now.

Solving the Palestinian problem in a peaceful manner or by signing a peace treaty must never be an obstacle to the setting out of a comprehensive Arab strategy or matters affecting that.

[Question] Your excellency the marshal, could we consider this an explanation of recent repeated Egyptian statements that it is necessary to build an Egyptian deterrent force?

Abu Ghazlah: We believe first of all in a deterrent strategy because its purpose is to prevent aggression. I not only have to wait until the aggression occurs, and then stand up to it -- rather, we must prevent the aggression before it occurs through deterrence, that is, we must be able to deter people who are thinking of committing aggression. We must build a military force that is capable of deterrence, and people who think of deterrence must be convinced that this strength exists. When we ask for a deterrent force, that means that we are trying to prevent aggression. That is the gist of our strategy.

We state that the Arab nation must have a deterrent force and that it is in its power, by virtue of the human resources and various powers it possesses, to have one. In my opinion, Egypt is the country that is most qualified to have a deterrent force and able to create a balance in the region.

This is what I am seeking, because the day a balance occurs in the Middle East and deterrence is achieved, I can assure you that no country will be able to invade Lebanon and no agreements will constitute restrictions on anyone.

An Evaluation of the War in Lebanon

[Question] As a military expert, what is your evaluation of the war in Lebanon and of Palestinian performance in combat?

Abu Ghazalah: I do not want to belittle the Palestinian performance, but here I would like to raise points that, had they been met, the performance would have

been better. This naturally happens after every war -- I mean the need to evaluate and analyze what has happened. Everyone must know what has happened and where and why he erred.

In my opinion the Palestinians neglected two things. I do not want to say that they erred, but it was possible that if these two things had been achieved, the situation would have been different.

The first thing is that the Palestinians tried to fight in the face of Israel, as a regular army. That is, they defended themselves with artillery, tanks and so forth. Perhaps, from their point of view, or the view of others, there was some justification for that.

However, in my opinion, the Palestinian resistance, particularly in southern Lebanon, ought to have fought a guerrilla war, a well known type of war which has been successful against great powers, as it previously was in Viet Nam. Had the Palestinian resistance covered southern Lebanon with highly-trained guerrilla groups, with the mission of inflicting the greatest human losses on the Israelis, the situation would have been totally different.

The second thing is that the Palestinians, as some people say, put great store on the fact that the Syrian deterrent force present in Lebanon would come in on their side, but it did not. Even if that had been in their minds, the principle of self reliance ought to have been the basis; then, if the deterrent force had intervened, that would have been a positive addition to their own force, and not the basis of the confrontation.

Now, what happened at the summit conference in Fez is well known; President Hafiz al-Asad admitted the true nature of the Syrian position to the summit. You know better about that than I do, but I would like to say that Syria did not have the intention of going to war in Lebanon. Therefore what happened happened. This is not the place in which to explain or justify the Syrian position, which is the business of Syria alone and its decision alone. However, the resistance ought to have made its calculations and not considered that the deterrent force might fight. Not at all. God knows, if it had fought, that would have been a positive addition, but had it not fought, that would have been something else.

Our information is that the Palestinians reached agreement with the Syrian deterrent force that the central axis, from al-Nabtiyah north, would be the responsibility of the deterrent force. However, what happened was that the second day of the invasion the Syrian forces present in Jazzin withdrew without firing a shot, and the Israeli forces reached the Beirut-Damascus highway without coming up against a single shot from the Syrian forces. One should bear in mind that the Syrian and Israeli forces were no more than a few hundred meters apart, in some cases just dozens of meters, but combat did not take place.

Naturally if the deterrent forces had fought alongside the Palestinian resistance I can assure you that the situation in Lebanon would have been completely different, because the area is very rough. Setting off explosions in the roads will stop any force, no matter what resources it might have, for a period of a month at least.

The Story behind the Missile Strike

As to the strike at the Syrian missiles in the al-Biqa', from my military point of view the Israelis seized the opportunity of the Syrian deterrent forces' negative position to strike out at them. The negative attitude encouraged the Israelis; Sharon has a well know principle, which is that he must do everything he can, even if it is not the result of a political decision. You should do anything in your power, if you get the chance.

As the Israeli forces were advancing in Lebanon, the opportunity to destroy the Syrian missiles arose, and Sharon, applying his principle, ordered that they be destroyed. Perhaps that was not part of his plan, but the opportunity presented itself to him during the war, and he destroyed the missiles at once.

In my view, they deceived the Syrians, or made fools of them. At the same time, this amounted to a sort of Israeli psychological deterrence of Syrian forces, because, if the missiles had not been destroyed, the Syrians would perhaps have thought of actually fighting. However, the Israelis' mere exploitation of an available opportunity, and their destruction of the missiles and downing of 80 Syrian planes at one stroke, in itself assumed the form of a total psychological deterrence of the Syrian forces.

Proof of that is that the deterrence was reflected in President Hafiz al-Asad's statement to the Fez summit conference, when he said "I am not able to wage war with Israel." That is because it is a psychological deterrent when I convince you to make this declaration -- "I am unable to wage war." This is what happened, in word and deed.

Why didn't Egypt Help the Palestinians?

[Question] Wasn't it in Egypt's power to offer aid to the Palestinian resistance while it was opposing the Israeli invasion? Why indeed wasn't it offered?

Abu Ghazalah: What does the necessary aid mean? First, any military aid to the Palestinians would entail the need to move forces. Did the situation require the presence of additional forces, when the Syrians already had massive forces in sufficient quantities in Lebanon, 30,000 Syrian troops armed to the teeth, tanks, and artillery, in addition to 20,000 armed men from the Palestinian resistance, supported by 400 tanks, 600 artillery pieces, 900 armored vehicles and 23 missile bases, as well as airplanes, all in the hands of the Syrian forces?

Could any force or form of aid coming from abroad have amounted to more than that? Could it be imagined that had Egypt wanted to send aid, it could have sent this volume of forces and equipment?

Forces of this size were present in the area of the fighting, but they did not fight, so the question then becomes "Why didn't the Syrians fight alongside the resistance" instead of "Could Egypt have given assistance?"

The main question as far as the subject goes is "Why didn't Syria fight?" rather than turning the question around to "Was it in Egypt's power to give assistance?" This is very strange!

Let us set out a big question mark here in front of all the Syrian forces that were present in Lebanon and did not fight, in spite of the great bulk of the arms that were available to them in the area of the fighting.

Then let us ask whether the situation required aid, once all these resources were available, especially in the hands of the Syrians, in the area of the fighting. These were resources which did not fight and stayed silent until they were hit!

The size of the Israeli forces that invaded Lebanon was five brigades. Part of our estimate was that they were six brigades. This is the most recent, up-to-date available data and it confirms that.

The invasion began with an armored brigade, which attacked in the direction of the coast. It entered Sidon, besieged it and went up the rest of the road to Tyre, besieging that and then advancing. It left some forces behind to surround and liquidate [the opposition].

Then an armored brigade, two infantry battalions and an airborne battalion started invading in the direction of al-Nabtiyah, from the Gaillee salient. They took over the Beaufort Castle (Shaqif) then advanced north, crossed the al-Litani, and moved part of their force toward Tyre to help the armored brigade, while the remainder moved north.

The second day, the deterrent force withdrew north from the Jazzin area and the Israelis advanced easily.

It moved a mechanized infantry battalion into Shab'a, to secure its right flank.

The total size of this operations force was about three and a half brigades.

[Question] However, it surrounded Beirut with a massive force which published data says was much larger than that.

Abu Ghazalah: They were in fact the forces I have already mentioned. The armored brigade continued to advance, as well as the other forces, until they arrived. A group of airborne troops was dropped to cut off the Beirut-Damascus highway, and an attempt was made to bring in groups of marines at the level of small companies along the coast.

When he [Sharon] arrived and besieged Beirut with these forces, he tried to achieve a balance, as any military commander would. After the forces had advanced great distances, three strategic reserve brigades were transferred and moved into southern Lebanon to be closer to the other advance forces. Naturally it is clear that he took account of the fact that the Syrians could abrogate the agreement and suddenly fight. The fact that the agreement was in writing was not important.

This is exactly what happened. He [Sharon] moved a strategic operations group into Lebanon and transferred another group for support and reserve. During the combat one brigade was exchanged for another, but the forces remained at their original size.

What I want to say is that it was in the power of the Syrian deterrent forces, if it fought alongside the resistance, to eliminate these Israeli forces.

Air Battles and the Missile Deception

[Question] What about the air force and its operations? Also, what about the destruction of the missiles?

Abu Ghazalah: Let me repeat, it was in the power of the Syrian forces, if they had fought alongside the Palestinians, to eliminate the advancing Israelis. If there had been a decision to fight, there would have been no need for air battles such as those in which the Syrians brought 80 airplanes close to Beirut, which flew "sitting like ducks," so that the Israeli F-15 and F-16 aircraft brought them down.

The latest information report I have says that Israeli F-15's downed 40 Syrian planes and the F-16's brought down 44 others. The Phantoms downed one plane, and two of Israel's planes were downed.

The method by which the Syrian missiles in the al-Biq'a' were hit was as follows: each sector of the SAM-7's and SAM-9's is considered a launching base and an independent component unit which has all its own equipment, so that it can function separately; therefore, it is difficult to destroy it. It is also well known, scientifically, that jamming does not have an effective impact on the SAM-6, 7, 8 and 9 systems. Its effect is limited and not as the Israelis try to portray it. In fact, some military technicians say that jamming is almost out of the question.

However, the Syrian forces set out the missile batteries that they had brought into Lebanon in the al-Biq'a' Valley, where the ground is low and surrounded by high hills. The Israelis seized upon the negative attitude the Syrian party had shown and started to set out artillery pieces and some new missiles they had received recently from America to strike out at the radar. They installed them on the heights surrounding the al-Biq'a' plain. They also launched two drones to conduct reconnaissance over the al-Biq'a' plain. At that point the Syrians activated the radar belonging to the missile bases and downed one of the drones. Israel's artillery and the bases it had established on the heights immediately spotted these Syrian bases and hit them or compelled them to shut down their radar. At that moment, the Israeli airplanes eliminated the Syrian missiles, which had been silent, striking and destroying them, then fled. There is nothing brilliant about this, and one should not be sad. Rather, it is a matter of a negative attitude on the Syrian side and a deception on the other side, that is, on Israel's part.

Meanwhile, how could the Syrians set out missile bases on a plain, a low valley surrounded by heights which Israeli airplanes could exploit when they invaded the valley? The planes came down low from behind the heights to hit the valley, then returned again, taking off from behind the heights again, without leaving any opening whatsoever for fire or ground resistance. The Syrians erred in the choice of missile sites, and the Israelis succeeded in exploiting the error.

The Syrians ought to have gone up onto the heights and not placed the missiles on low ground. Then there ought to have been cooperation among the bases. We ourselves gained great expertise during and after the war of attrition, when close

NATIONAL COUNCIL MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS ON SAVINGS OF EGYPTIANS ABROAD

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 4 Nov 82 p 9

[Article: "Specialized Councils Discuss Economics of Savings of Egyptians Working Abroad; Experts Propose Setting up Egyptian Contracting Companies That Guarantee Proper Wage Levels"]

[Text] In its meeting under the chairmanship of Dr 'Abd al-Qadir Hatim, general supervisor of the specialized national councils, the National Production and Economic Affairs Council discussed the Financial Policies Branch's report on the economics of the savings of Egyptians working abroad in view of the importance of these savings as one of the main sources of the foreign currency revenues needed by the development projects. The report contains an evaluation of the measures taken by the state to attract the remittances of those working abroad to the legal banking channels so as to increase foreign currency deposits in the banks operating in Egypt and, consequently, enable them to contribute to meeting the country's foreign currency needs for exports and imports. The report also deals with the economic and social cost of the emigration of Egyptian labor to the outside world and the effects of this emigration on the individuals and their life patterns and on the national economy as a whole.

The council discussions ended with several important recommendations, including recommendations to:

Determine the demand for the various specializations and skills of the Egyptian work force in the coming years, provided that consideration is given to balanced educational and training policies to meet the needs of the national development projects, along with the needs of the other countries, for Egyptian labor.

Develop the savings of Egyptians working abroad by raising their income levels, organizing their work abroad and considering the possibility of setting up Egyptian or joint contracting companies to operate in the Arab countries, using Egyptian labor at the work sites and guaranteeing the travel of this labor to and from the work sites within the framework of a legislative regulation that guarantees proper wage levels and working conditions.

Establish a transactions chamber [clearing house] where the daily [currency] exchange rates are determined in order to establish real and flexible exchange

cooperation among the various companies and missile bases was mandatory, to keep the bases from being out of touch with one another. We had to cooperate with one another in the strike operations so that they could support one another in coping with counterattacks.

Military Integration with the Sudan

[Question] Your excellency the marshal, although we have taken much time with this interview, a final question remains, regarding the military situation following the signing of the Integration Compact by Egypt and the Sudan and its impact on the two countries on the one hand and its effect, and the degree to which it is affected, within the Arab region, on the other hand.

Abu Ghazalah: First of all, military integration between Egypt and the Sudan started a long time ago, before the recent compact. We consider that Egyptian-Sudanese integration will add new dimensions to national security and that it will make what we have always been saying - that Egypt is the Sudan's security, the Sudan is Egypt's security, and Egypt will not accept any foreign aggression against the Sudan - more realistic and more legalistic than it had been, because the Integration Compact is a step along the road to unity. Therefore the burden imposed on the Egyptian and Sudanese armed forces has now increased.

We are now thinking of unifying military expressions and unifying the bases for training and weapons supply. This will be done quickly, with God's permission.

[Question] In conclusion, let us thank you for this long, ramified interview which is bring your ideas and opinions to the Arab reader.

Marshal Abu Ghazalah: My thanks to you.

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rates for the Egyptian pound, provided that this system continues to be in operation for a set period and provided that the chamber forms a nucleus for the establishment of a commercial exchange market.

Exert efforts to encourage stabilization of the general economic policies to encourage domestic capital and to provide the proper investment opportunities for Egyptians working abroad within the framework of the economic development plans.

Establish tax policies that guarantee the curtailment of land and real estate speculation by levying taxes on capital gains made from real estate transactions and by achieving relative stability in local price levels.

Establish more vocational and conversion training centers to eliminate the shortage in skilled technical labor and take effective steps to apply the principle of tying wages to efficiency and productivity in order to guarantee increased production and protect highly capable technical labor from emigrating.

The minister of economy and the minister of tourism and civil aviation took part in the council's meeting.

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CSO: 4504/75

PAPER PUBLISHES 'ISMAT AL-SADAT'S DEFENSE IN INTEREST OF FAIRNESS

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2839, 8 Nov 82 pp 4-6

[Article by Salah Hafiz: "'Ismat al-Sadat Challenges and ROSE AL-YUSUF Publishes His Defense"]

[Text] All of the Egyptian papers have refused to publish 'Ismat al-Sadat's self-defense.

They have published all of the charges made against him, have added to these charges whatever information they have acquired with their own efforts and have opened their pages to commentators, analysts and cartoonists to discuss the crimes he is accused of.

But when these papers received his self-defense, they agreed, silently, to ignore it and not to publish a single line of this defense for the people.

They have ignored the "personal code of honor" that gives the citizen, whatever his crimes, the right to defend himself against every line published about him.

They have voluntarily abandoned the right they have been demanding for so long and the one they censured the July revolution for undermining, namely, the right of those accused by the state to address the masses in whose name they are tried.

Nobody in Egypt can accuse ROSE AL-YUSUF of being sympathetic to the kinds of activity in which 'Ismat al-Sadat has engaged. ROSE AL-YUSUF has always been accused, ever since the days of 'Abd al-Nasir, of exaggerating in slandering those dealing in the market and of showing no reservations in attacking them justly and falsely.

But ROSE AL-YUSUF is also eager for the Egyptian press to regain its reputation as a voice that is fair to the foe before the friend and as a platform that respects the defendant's right to the same degree that it respects the prosecuting attorney's right.

This is why we are publishing today the text of 'Ismat al-Sadat's self-defense statement, a copy of which he sent to every Egyptian paper and which we, along with the other papers, received more than 10 days ago.

'Ismat al-Sadat has written:

I had not planned to answer the lies and fabrications published by the press and transmitted by the wire services to the entire world. But an article published in AL-AHRAM on 23 October 1982 said in part: "In accordance with the provisions of the constitution, the president cannot be absolved legally when there is semi-exploitation or political corruption emanating from those working with the president or related to him, regardless of his intentions. To say that he ordered that his brother be banned from entering the port and the customs office in order to cover up the negligence of the former president is unacceptable legally, at least."

This is what has actually motivated me to answer by saying I am not in charge of protecting the name of the departed leader because the martyred leader has his God to protect him.

As for what was published in the press and reported by the foreign broadcasting stations in all countries of the world about my corrupting Egypt's political and economic life, I have the following brief comment:

First, uninvestigated accusations should not have been published before the conclusion of the investigation and until a conviction is handed down because a defendant remains not guilty until he is convicted.

Second, the millions [of pounds] mentioned by the press are a figment of the imagination and absolutely unfounded.

Third, I have not engaged in political life for 20 years, so how could I corrupt it when I am totally remote from it?

Fourth, I challenge any owner of a building in Tanta, of cultivable lands in al-Buhayrah, al-Shallufah, Baqtar Square in Heliopolis or the owners of other buildings you have read about [to come forth and prove their allegations]. If they are proven, then I willingly offer the property as a gift to the state. I own nothing other than the house I live in. I own no cultivable land, except for the land I inherited from my father and he inherited from his father. Anything else showing to the contrary is a pure gift from me to the state.

Fifth, I defy anybody to prove that I own the tourist companies and buses reported. If anything is proven to the contrary, then it is a gift that I hope will be accepted. As for the trucks, all were bought used and on soft-term installments. This is proven by the vehicle files of the traffic bureau. The installments for the trucks are paid at the bank gradually from operating revenues.

Sixth, the charge of exploiting influence to demand a share in shipping weapons from the United States and the story about my meeting with Marshal Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazalah [are untrue]. Ask him if I have ever met him on this issue or anything else. This has never happened, and I know absolutely nothing about this topic other than what I have read in AKHBAR AL-YAWM.

Seventh, what is disgraceful is the publication of the names of four women, with two of whom I have absolutely no connection whatsoever, not to mention the fact that they are married to some statesmen and have grown up children from them. By God, isn't the law of shame applied to these base lies? What is the position of these victims? Where are the values and the morals?

Eighth, as for exploiting influence, I defy the state officials who say that I approached any of them with an illegal request and used my name to have such a request fulfilled.

Ninth, regarding the importation of meats not meeting the requirements of Islam, as some papers have reported, I wish to stress that this has never happened and that I have never imported meat, chickens or any kind of foods. Rather, I have never imported anything from abroad in my entire life.

Tenth, for the sake of information, I do not evade taxes and do not (take liberties) in assessing them. I pay taxes regularly and I have the documents to prove this. As for social insurance and other issues, they are paid before renewal of the licenses, in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Eleventh, we have lived among people with love and completely sincere fraternity. I defy anybody who says that I have threatened him to face me: Where, when and why? I have never heard in my life of something called contracts to prevent exposure. I defy anybody to prove these lies.

Twelfth, in 1959 I owned 14 Fintas tanker trucks for the transportation of petroleum products. I was also transportation contractor for the Petroleum Cooperative and for Shell (Egypt Oil). From the first day in my life in commerce, I have had commercial register No 35444 [in] al-Gharbiyah as a dealer of agricultural machinery, irrigation and lighting units, tractors and other equipment. This was before the inception of the 23 July 1952 revolution.

Thirteenth, as to why the late president banned me from entering Alexandria Port. This is a long story that I will recount if asked to.

This is what I have wanted to explain to the great Egyptian people to whom I have the honor of belonging and of being one of their honorable sons who struggled loyally before and after the 23 July 1952 revolution. This is no secret. I am not responsible for the false accusations, the black malice, the settling of accounts and the distortion of our image before internal and external public opinion, and I don't know in whose interest these distortions are.

Peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon you.

Signed: 'Isamat al-Sadat
Dated: 23 October 1982

On Goal Line

This is the text of what defendant 'Ismat al-Sadat has written and sent to us and to all papers in self-defense.

We admit that we in ROSE AL-YUSUF do not believe this defense.

But we also cannot justify not publishing this defense at a time when we are demanding the right of free expression for all, both innocent and accused, rulers and ruled.

We have become tired of the frequent repetition of this silly pattern of journalistic behavior: A citizen has the support of the authority and not a word is published on his crimes and then the authority punishes him and not a word of his self-defense published!

This type of behavior was understandable when the press was a branch of the Government Cases Bureau and an executioner carrying out the government's sentences against the people.

But the press is now a "fourth estate" that stands on an equal footing with the government, the judiciary and the People's Assembly. It is responsible directly to public opinion and its role is to raise curtains and to declare all that is not declared by the three authorities and to give every citizen, regardless of its opinion of this citizen, the opportunity to address the masses.

It is incomprehensible that the press permits itself to publish all of the accusations made against a citizen who is being investigated and then unanimously refrains from publishing his defense.

The press thus undermines the reader's right and voluntarily cedes its responsibility and powers and sets a serious precedent that encourages the other three authorities to dominate it and to spread anew their control over it.

This is why we in ROSE AL-YUSUF decided to publish 'Ismat al-Sadat's defense.

It is our belief that we are serving the reputation of the Egyptian press and performing on its behalf a "collective duty" that we believe it has failed to perform.

Though we admit that 'Ismat al-Sadat's defense is not convincing, we support without reservation his denunciation of what has been published about his wives and consider this denunciation a lesson worth studying.

Neither religion, ethics nor the honest word permit relating wives to anybody other than their husbands or relating children to anybody other than their real fathers just to entertain people with provocative stories about an interesting defendant.

Moreover, the number of 'Isamat al-Sadat's wives and children has nothing to do with the issue in the first place. 'Isamat al-Sadat is being tried for actions that do not include his marriage the number of his children. Cramming this information into the details of the issue just muddles the cards and preoccupies people with gossip and with something other than that with which they should be preoccupied.

'Isamat al-Sadat has, to our belief, scored a point against the press by raising this point.

He then scored another point when all the papers refrained from publishing his defense, extremely weak and unconvincing as it is.

In some soccer games, a team may at times score a goal against itself, thus becoming on the following day the laughing stock of the people and the topic chesed by the press.

But this time, the press is the team that has scored a goal against itself.

Our publication of 'Isamat al-Sadat's defense today is an attempt, which we hope is not too late, to stop the scoring of this goal and to stop the ball, even if at the goal line.

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ANWAR AL-SADAT'S BROTHER REVEALS DETAILS ABOUT HIS PAST

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 2 Nov 82 pp 8-10

/Article by 'Abd-al-Qadir Shahib and 'Id 'Abd-al-Hamid: "Advice from 'Ismat al-Sadat: How Do You Become a Millionaire?"/

/Text/ He has the right to talk and have people listen to him in order to get to know him better. People have the right to listen to him in order to round out their real picture of him and to know him better. Therefore, this meeting was held with this personality, who has been in people's minds for long periods, for many years, and not just the past week. We are in the presence of a legendary personality who embodies contradictions. When he talks about faith, he talks in the tone of a saint surrendering himself to God's judgment and describes himself as an "accursed Job." When he talks about money and trade, his nostrils dilate and you feel that you are in the presence of an adventurer who is playing with chips and dice and knows his way around. When he talks about politics, he talks in the manner of a man in the street, wearing a gown that is bigger than he is and giving himself the character of a leader who can mobilize the masses with a gesture of the hand.

A few days ago--and in the course of the past 10 years--his name echoed in people's ears--but in a whisper, like drugs, which habitues take secretly. A card from him could propel you from the depths of misery to the ranks of the great, to the people who have rabbits, steaks, big notes and business dealings in the thousands. A word from him could guarantee that everything you accumulated could be taken away from you in the twinkling of an eye.

Now the grandeur has disappeared, the glory has vanished, the authority has gone, and nothing is left of him except the wreckage of a wounded man who mostly resembles a tiger who has fallen into a hunter's net and has turned away to a small plot of land which we ought to go to not out of glee--for glee over the servants of God is something that honorable souls find loathsome--but out of the urge to acquire information and hear what he has to say. What does he say about the charges that are leveled against him?

Mrs Fawziyah 'Ismat al-Sadat, an employee with the Federation of Arab Republics, met us. She greeted us warmly and apologized that her father would be a little late, because he had not got enough sleep. Our appointment had been at 1000 hours in the morning. Fawziyah talked a great deal, about everything, about the Federation of Arab Republics that the government wanted to take over, though Mr Muhammad

Ahmad, the president of the Federation, went to the government and cried, saying that President al-Sadat had given him a commission to direct the federation for the rest of his life, and the government responded favorably. It was a surprise to us that the Federation of the Republics still exists. However, Fawziyah assured us that it was still alive and flourishing and that it still was engaged in its activity of managing certain companies it owned. She was very amazed at the ordeal to which her father was being exposed, and claimed that her family had deep roots and was descended from Shaykh al-Sadat, who was a leader of the national movement in the time of Muhammad 'Ali, and that they had a branch in Syria and a street that bore their name. She asserted that her father was ready for any emergency, that his bag was packed and that pyjamas, toothpaste and an electric razor were in it.

In the Reception Hall

We were sitting in the reception hall in the apartment of Mr Ahmad 'Ismat al-Sadat, which takes up the ground floor of the nine-story building he owns in al-Hijaz Square, Heliopolis. In the hall there are three chambers, two of which are done in gold, while the third is an American-style entryway around a television set. In the center of the hall is a bust of former President Anwar al-Sadat placed on a wooden pedestal. Scattered on the wall are some photographs of his brother the former president, including a picture of him praying in a Captic cathedral beside Mamduh Salim, Dr 'Abd-al-Qadir Hatim, Dr Hafiz Ghanim, Pope Shannudah and (the vice president) Husni Mubarak. On one of the walls is a large picture of the mother, Mrs al-Barrayn, and another, small picture of the father, Muhammad al-Sadat.

In a short while, Mr Ahmad 'Ismat Muhammad al-Sadat came to us, dressed in a shirt and trousers with (zannubah) slippers on his feet, carrying a pack of matches and some paper napkins. The man was about 60. He had an elongated face and was less swarthy than his brother Anwar. He apologized for being late on grounds that he had taken a tranquilizer at night and had been late getting to sleep. He seemed to be fatigued, as if he had not had any sleep for days.

Is This Reasonable?

Is this the same man who 30 years ago occupied a humble room in the Hanneaux Building at the Clock Square in Tanta? At that time, he was a young man in his thirties. He always wore trousers, a shirt and a bray beret. On the walls of the room were white wooden shelves with cans of special oils for tractors and agricultural machinery. Suddenly the oil dealer disappeared and the room closed down. We asked the reason, and they said that the world had opened its arms to him. The 23 July revolution had taken place and the man had gone to Cairo to be by his brother Anwar al-Sadat in the management of AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper.

A full, complete 30 years, in which the face of Egypt, the Arab world and the third world changed. Why shouldn't the face of the man standing in front of us have changed? The years have traced their lines on his face and almost sealed his fate, with this case which has burst forth after years of fermentation.

Directly into the Subject

We got directly to the point. We wanted to know the story from the beginning, totally apart from the socialist prosecutor's investigations and the theorizing of the press, which could be right or wrong. What happened exactly? The man stated, in something close to total resignation,

"This 6 October we were with President Husni Mubarak at the mausoleum. Everything was very normal. Then on the morning of the 19th our brothers from the state security investigator asked me to go, me and my children together, to the socialist prosecutor's office. I didn't understand what was going on, what was required. There had been no previous signs. Before that, the papers tried to slip my name into the Amin 'Uthman, I mean Rashad 'Uthman, case. Rashad, in the al-Musawwar Club, said 'I haven't seen him and I don't know him. He doesn't need me and I don't need him.' I for my part have denied any relationship with him. I have not yet seen his face at all or that of anyone from his family or anyone with any connection to him. These are all things that are well known to and understood by the people. Nothing was in my mind. I imagined that they would ask me about slander or something, or would ask me something to do with the late leader, because no one goes to the socialist prosecutor unless there is something important."

The telephone rang. Faqziyah got up to answer in an inaudible voice and returned to inform her father that a woman journalist from Qatar wanted to meet him. The father answered her with his eyes fixed on us, saying,

"Let us publish our dirty linen here. They publish scandals where they are, quoted from what is published here." Fawziyah broke in and urged him to explain the facts to them, and he answered her in classical Arabic, "Who are they that I should give them explanations? They are not on my mind, Faqziyah."

Wholesale Gifts

Let us go back and pick up the conversation:

We asked, "Did you get wealthy in an illicit way and amass wealth by influence-peddling?"

He asked, "For example?"

We said, "The 'Awarah building in Tanta."

He stated, "I haven't seen it and do not know it."

We asked, "What about the tourist company that was established on an area of 6 feddans and has a fleet of buses?"

He stated, "If that belonged to me, then I will give it to you as a gift."

We asked, "What about a building in a square in Qatar?"

He said, "You can have that as a gift."

We asked, "And farmland in al-Shallufah of which you reclaimed 50 feddans?"

He stated, "Again, it's all yours. I don't even know where that al-Shallufah is."

We found that the size of the bequests and donations that he was volunteering to give us was greater than our capacity to manage them. They would take an army of workers and peasants.

We asked, "What about the building we are sitting in now?"

He stated, disdainfully, "You call this a building? I bought it in 1975 when it had three stories. I lived on the ground floor that we are sitting in now. I then put in three more floors with nine apartments for my children. I built walls and ceilings for them and sold them to them, and they completed them (with their spouses' money). People accused me of appropriating iron, cement and wood and trafficking in it in the black market. The fact is that I could not get enough building materials."

The Land Transportation Company

We asked, "Didn't you try to establish a fictitious land transportation company?"

He said, "You mean the story Ibrahim Sa'dah published in AKHBAR AL-YAWM, in which he said that I went to the late Marshal Ahmad Badawi and Marshal Abu Ghazalah? This story is fundamentally wrong. I never met Marshal Ahmad Badawi in my life. Likewise, I have not met Marshal Abu Ghazalah at all--not at all."

We asked, "Weren't you indicted in an embezzlement case when you were working in the bus company in Suez in 1966?"

He stated, "In my case the detention was made through the prosecutor's office. The investigation was continued by others. The issue of it was that I was working as a manager of the East Delta Company, but they wanted to trump up a charge against me."

We asked, "Who did?"

He stated (as if he had not heard the question) "They had forgotten that I was just a manager in charge of technical matters. The financial matters were not my responsibility."

We asked, "What was the amount of money embezzled?"

He stated, "It began with the sum of 30,000 pounds and ended up at 5,000. The operation was trumped up."

Who was the Beneficiary?

We asked, "Who trumped it up?"

He said, "The person who stood to gain my embarrassing the brother of the National Assembly chairman (Anwar al-Sadat). I am taking this back to 1966."

We asked, "By the people who trumped the case up against you, do you mean the 'Ali Sabri and Sha'rawi Jum'ah group?"

He said, "The categoric proof of that is the fact that they were not content with this case but handed me over to the Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism. After one session, they suspended my investigation until that date."

We asked, "How did your investigation in the office of the socialist prosecutor go?"

He said, "It went on for about 7 hours. In the case of my children, Jalal, Tal'at and Anwar, it took only 20 minutes with all of them. After the investigation we went home to confront a force of 1,000 Central Security men in armored transport vehicles and I found all the officers and deputy heads of investigation of the Cairo precincts without exception. I asked Counsellor Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, who had four counsellors with him, 'What is going on?' He said, 'These are ordinary measures that are normally carried out.' I offered sweets to all the officers, which is my duty as a peasant. They examined the house carefully, the wardrobes and the beds. They left nothing, but did not make any fuss. It was a careful inspection, as when someone looks for something specific. They took some of the jewelry belonging to my wife and daughter, but it was not worth more than 300 pounds. They closed up the apartments that my children had been finishing. They don't own any others."

A List of Property

We asked, "What about your wives' property?"

He said, "My wife inherited a plot of land in al-Hilmiyah from her father. Her father was a shrewd merchant and worked with me in the automobile business. When he died she herself built the house over an area of 380 meters and bought surplus organization goods from the governorate in her name, in accordance with official receipts. She built the house in instalments. There are no other places."

We asked, "Is there a pharmacy that belongs to you there?"

He stated, "Belongs to me from where? That belongs to someone name of Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahid. I am not allowed to open a pharmacy, nor is anyone else."

We asked, "What about the bakery located in Mit Abu-al-Kawm?"

He said, "That little oven cost me 1,200 pounds. It is my town's oven."

We asked, "Doesn't it bake European bread?"

He asked, European bread from where? They find the bread is dry when they eat European-style bread."

We asked, "What about the cabins at al-Ma'murah?"

He said, "Sir, they consist of a small apartment in the form of a cabin in the Salah-al-Din cabanas. Jalal, my son, has an apartment like that which we bought."

We asked, "What about the apartment in al-'Ajami?"

He stated, "That belongs to my brother Tal'at."

We asked, "What about the Sidi Jabir apartment?"

He said, "I don't know anything about that."

We asked, "What about the Sidi Bashr apartment?"

He stated, "That belongs to my brother Tal'at."

We asked, "What do you estimate the size of your wealth to be?"

He stated, "Let it be known that I have been working in business since 1944 and that I have a commercial registration in Tanta. I had an office for selling tractors and agricultural equipment. I had a big income, and I spent money on my brother Anwar out of that. His wife knows that."

We asked, "The first one, or the second?"

He stated, "The first one and the second one both. I went around naked. Their husband's expenses were large. He spent money on things we did not know about. After the revolution, when I was in my office, I was summoned to Cairo. The late leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir summoned me, and he said, 'Leave your job in Tanta and work with your brother Anwar in AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper.' However, I declined. I said, 'I do not want to work in journalism, because there is no money to be made in it, and I cannot look after my children with the income from it.' However, 'Abd-al-Nasir put pressure on me to accept. I did, and went to Mr Anwar, may God have mercy on him; they gave me the task of supervising Lower Egypt and Alexandria, editing, advertising and distribution. Ask our brother Mustafa Amin, when he complained about AL-JUMHURIYAH's activity, took the keys to AKHBAR AL-YAWM, went to Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and told him, 'I cannot compete with AL-JUMHURIYAH.' Basically, I have lengthy experience in the press because I worked with AL-MISRI in distribution. At that time my activity was not confined to AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper. Rather, I was active in the labor movement. I was the one who established the National Union's permanent labor conferences, which brought together federations, leagues and workers' unions."

We asked, "In the time of Sawi Ahmad Sawi?"

He said, with pride and confidence, "Sawi was an apprentice under me. As far as we were concerned, he was a child. Had it not been for my brother Anwar, I would have become a labor leader.. I was a worker long ago. The National Federation assigned me to establish the labor conferences under our brother Ahmad 'Abdallah Tu'aymah. I set up all the permanent conferences, in confrontation with the

unions which the people opposed to the revolution controlled, and they ordered me 'play.' I played. I set up labor conferences in all the governorates and made a permanent conference of the actual federation which could mobilize all of Egypt out of those in a second."

Al-Sawi Is a Liar

We asked, "Were you active in the March 1954 crisis?"

He said, sorrowfully, "Of course, of course. I was the person who put up the first headlines, in the words of 'Abd-al-Salam Pasha Fahmi, saying that the politicians had to disappear. No sir, we worked to the limit. At the time of the crisis, I played a part that no one could ignore."

We asked, "Where did you get this influence over the workers from? Sawi Ahmad Sawi says that he was a leader of the labor movement."

He stated, "Who is Sawi? He is a liar--a liar."

We asked, "What about al-'Uqayli, Kamil al-'Uqayli?"

He said disdainfully, "His trickery was something. Who is 'Uqayli? He belonged to the taxis' union. We had the tram, the metro and the buses in our hands. We could have shut down all the transportation in a second. Those union heads belonged to me. I would go and sit with them every night."

I Set 'Abd-al-Nasir up for Power

'Isamat al-Sadat stopped talking for a moment, as if he was recalling history and preparing to set off a media bombshell.

He said, "We set 'Abd-al-Nasir up for power through the will of a labor force that had not been bribed."

We said, "It has been stated that al-Sawi was arrested on account of this operation."

He said, "I was the person who put all this in motion, and he got the 'credit.'"

We asked, "But why wasn't your role known at that time?"

He said, "Because it was out of the question that two al-Sadats should be in the picture. Just one could be in it."

We said, "Did you take part in the operation of beating up al-Sanhuri, the head of the Council of State?"

He said, disdainfully, "That's vain boasting. I do not interfere in these sorts of impudent activities. I did not best up that eminent professor, and if I had been there I would have prevented it."

We asked, "So you were engaged in political activity in the first years of the revolution?"

He said, "Yes, and in 1957 I was a candidate for membership in the People's Assembly from Tanta. I withdrew the nomination in favor of the late Abu al-Yazid Yusuf, and I helped him, until he won."

We asked, "What about your economic activity?"

He stated, "In 1959 I started to work in the area of truck transport. I had 14 tank trucks and my father in law had four new trucks. I ran that company."

We asked, "How did you get these trucks?"

He stated, "I started with a single truck, and with a year's income I bought the others."

We asked, "Does that mean that they were profitable?"

He said, "Very much so. I contracted to transport oil products for the Shell Company and the Cooperative Society."

We asked, "A single truck produced 14 in 1 year?"

He said, "Yeah. And how. And how! The trucks were British army scrap costing 50 pounds each at Priest Musa Sulayman's place in the al-Balah agency. I would take a car and upgrade it myself, because I was a technician. I got a plot of land by the al-Qubba Bridge where I would do repairs. After a month if you looked at the car it would be as if it had just come out of the showroom."

By 'Abd-al-Nasir's Orders

We asked, "And after that, what?"

He stated, "A messenger came to me inviting me to meet the late leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir in 1961. I met his secretary. He informed me that the president ordered me to meet Eng al-Bidaywi Fu'ad, chairman of the Roads and Bridges Organization. When I went, he informed me that the president had ordered that I be appointed to a nationalized company, the very biggest one. Its name is now 'East Delta.' I was promoted three times, improved the operations in the company and became manager of general administration. After the case, I left, resigned, and became active in the scrap metal business. I went to the point scrap auctions, using leverage. You, for example, have some goods, and I take them and sell them to others. I take from one person and give to another. That's nice work. I would go in with Hanin Qasis at five points, that is, 5,000 pounds, and they would give me two. That is, seven points."

We asked, "It is well known, in the case of the al-Balah agency, that the people who control it are about nine big merchants. How did they let you go in with them?"

He stated, "I have been well known to them all my life. I have had a long-standing relationship with them as a result of buying tank trucks. I have had spare parts dealings with them. I would buy a lot of axles all together, but would market them at a commission. I continued to engage in this business until 1975. On this occasion, I would like to say that my name was entered in the first registration regulating import activities in 1957 as an importer of four classes of goods. I had registration number 3370, for imports, at a time when no one was known for import activity."

We asked, "A little while ago you said that you were government employee. How did you combine business with being an employee?"

He stated, "I received permission from the company board of directors to engage in commerce outside official working hours. You are free to do as you like--work as a cook or a barber!"

We asked, "Where did you get this commercial bent from?"

He stated, "As you say, it is good luck from God. Our lord says he bestows wisdom on whom he likes, and to those on whom he bestows wisdom he brings great benefits, thanks be to God."

The New Stage

We asked, "What was the start of this stage in your commercial life like?"

He said, "In 1975 I bought a lot of (Barirus) transport vehicles from our brother Priest Musa Sulayman. He had bought them at a Telephone Authority auction for 1,000 pounds per vehicle or less. I took the vehicles into my workshop in Tila and upgraded and renovated them. I then had eight trucks transporting cotton from al-Minufiyah to Alexandria. I started working in trucking from Suez and started to operate until I had accumulated a substantial fortune."

We asked, "How big, roughly?"

He said, "I accumulated about 150,000 pounds."

We said, "Didn't your relationship with your brother Anwar al-Sadat have an effect on your activity?"

He replied, "I knew Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir from before the revolution; my relationship with him was an old one. I had no relationship with Anwar. I challenge any former or subsequent government official to say that I presented him with an unusual request or exploited my name to settle any business."

We asked, "Mightn't the law consider what you consider ordinary to be the object of exploitation?"

He stated, the tone of defiance rising again, "I challenge anyone to say that I made an ordinary or unusual request of him."

We asked, "What about your bank account?"

He stated, "I owe the Alexandria Bank, Tanta Branch, 10,000 pounds, secured by the agricultural machinery and tractors situated in the Tanta exhibition."

We asked, "What about the existing farm in Mit Abu-al-Kawm?"

He stated, "I inherited 1.5 feddans from my father. I own no other farmland besides that. However, I did lease 6 feddans from the al-Baramusi Church religious endowment and put a corral there with six Frisian cows from which we get milk from which we make cheese for the children's consumption."

My Name Is Better Than Anwar's

We asked, "Did you exploit the name of your brother Anwar al-Sadat to facilitate your business?"

He said, "I have a better name than he does. No one will argue over my good name in the market, or in all Egypt. I would go to big auctions with just the hired hands. The auction would be no less than 200,000 pounds. I would make a profit of 50,000 pounds from it in exchange for leaving the auction. I did not deign to go to small auctions--I would leave them to the hustlers. Therefore I am well liked."

We asked, "Following your brother's death, did your commercial activity continue? Were you subjected to unpleasantness from anyone?"

He said, disdainfully, "Not at all."

We asked, "Previously a charge was brought against your son Tal'at for importing rotten sauce."

He stated, "My son filed a suit against the Ministry of Supply because he had nothing to do with this case, and he asked for 1 million pounds in damages."

We asked, "Didn't you get disturbed at the charge against your son?"

He stated, "I didn't get at all disturbed. I was going along very normally."

We asked, "Doesn't your daughter have a mansion in al-Ma'adi?"

He said, "That is something that concerns my daughter. The case has been presented to the judiciary. She bought this villa and recorded it, and it has just nine rooms. I don't know what it cost."

We asked, "Have you been married to 12 women?"

He said, "I married just four, and two of them are financially dependent on me."

The Kingdom of the Port

We asked, "What is the real story behind the claim that President al-Sadat prevented you and your children from going into the Port of Alexandria?"

He said, "The port is a kingdom independent of the Egyptian authorities. It is governed by a gang from one family from the village of Juhaynah in Upper Egypt which is led by Harun al-Zamzami, Mahmud al-Zaqzaq and Rashad 'Uthman. They are all relatives. All the people working in the port are from their village, and they number about 100,000. I challenge the security director to go into the port without asking these leaders' permission. They represent a big power center. A few years ago I tried to get into unloading, loading and transport activities in the port, and they got disturbed. Many officials supported them, and they sent cables to my brother Anwar threatening to stage a sitdown and a strike in the port. He could only prevent us from entering the port. The fact is that President al-Sadat was afraid of them and carried favor with them at my expense. He said, 'That is a family decision.'"

We asked, "Why didn't the president intervene to curb this gang?"

He said, "He couldn't, because these people have great influence. It wouldn't have been reasonable for him to put them in prison because they had complained about his brother."

We asked, "Is it true that your brother President al-Sadat refused to meet you in the last years of his rule?"

He stated, "No, he just prevented me from going into the port."

We asked, "But Rashad 'Uthman has been detained."

He stated, "Rashad had a difference with Harun, his cousin, and the dispute grew. But Harun is a good man."

We asked, "Did you play a part in supporting your brother during the events of May 1971?"

He said, "I divorced myself from politics as of 28 September 1970, the day Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir died."

A Minor Amount!

We asked, "In concluding this interview with 'Ismat al-Sadat, to what do you attribute what is happening to you now?"

He said, "I did not feel anything out of the ordinary. There were no preliminaries to it. Proof of that is that I did not withdraw my accounts or my children's account from any banks."

We asked, "You said a little while ago that you were in debt to banks and that you had no accounts."

He stated, "The money in the banks now belongs to my son Anwar. It belongs to the land companies for which he works as an agent. I do not know the amount of that exactly, but it is minor."

We asked, "Would you like to say anything?"

He stated, "I consider myself to be like the prophet Job, who was afflicted by his lord but persevered. Indeed, I am no less than Job."

11887

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GROWTH OF LARGE-SCALE CORRUPTION ANALYZED, DEPLORED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 2 Nov 82 p 9

/Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus: "Who Is Responsible for the Growth of Corruption? How Did the Prevailing Climate Permit the Emergence of the Likes of 'Ismat al-Sadat, Rashad and Tawfiq?"

/Text/ The politicians and men of the law have spoken to the people. They have asserted that it was the prevailing climate that permitted the likes of 'Ismat al-Sadat, Rashad 'Uthman and Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy to assume their strange presence. They have said that the ruling authorities were mobilized to serve them, not to serve the law, and that the lack of good examples was an important reason for the deviation, and the deviants. They have stressed that it is the liberalization policy (consumer) which permitted them to exist, and that it is not enough for an investigation to be done on 'Ismat al-Sadat or anyone else whose conduct is deviant. Rather, it is necessary to seek out the causes which led to the emergence of this sort of grave phenomenon.

Did the late President al-Sadat have any part in protecting him, if only through silence? The men of law and politics, men of various tendencies, are talking about all of this. Counsellor Jamal al-Mirsafawi, former chairman of the court of cassation, says that the main reason for the proliferation of deviant behavior, in his opinion, is the fact that the law is not applied to everyone. Everyone must feel awe vis-a-vis the law and feel that he is answerable to it, be he a ruler or subject, weak or strong, rich or poor. However, for the law to seize some people by the collar and let others go means giving the latter a chance to deviate. The problem is not in the law itself. It does not contain loopholes that give corrupt persons room to maneuver. The problem, rather, is in its application; the feeling some people have that they are above the law and above being held to account prompts them to deviate.

I asked him about President al-Sadat's role in his brother 'Ismat's deviant behavior and he replied, "I cannot speak about this subject at great length because I am a man of the law. Men of the law talk only when they have documents at hand. All I can say is that his position would vary as his knowledge of the deviant acts of his brother or his lack of knowledge of them varied. However, he was supposed to know, considering that he was the ruler of the country. May God have mercy on 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, who said something to the effect that 'By God, if a camel stumbles in Iraq, I am held responsible for that, and for failing to prepare the path for it.'"

Individual Rule

Eng Muhammad Hasan Durrah, vice chairman of the Labor Party and member of the People's Assembly, says, "There is no argument over the fact that the corruption of all forms and the influence-peddling that has spread out all over the country grew with the system of absolute individual rule: the disappearance of the sovereignty of the law, and the dominance of the assets of the country by influential persons who were not subject to oversight because of restrictions on the press.

"The fact is that the ordeal has not been confined to 'Isamat al-Sadat alone. Indeed, many people existed alongside the regime, people of his ilk, who unrightfully appropriated government money and property by all means, fraud, deceit and pandering."

Eng Muhammad Hasan Durrah continued, "These persons of deviant conduct who exploited their power and influence to trespass against the law and enrich themselves at the expense of the people must not be treated leniently by the power of the law, and this will be fully feasible only through democratic investigations and the grant of full freedoms. In democracy, everyone is equal before the law. In the light of freedom, all deviant acts are discovered in their cradle, before they become rampant." The vice chairman of the Labor Party also gave notice of the importance of strengthening faith in people's spirits as a basic way of fighting deviation, because people who believe in God will think a thousand times before committing any act that is in violation of God's strictures.

Regarding the 'Isamat al-Sadat case, Eng Muhammad Hasan Durrah demanded that all the officials who helped 'Isamat al-Sadat in his deviant acts be held to account and prosecuted; they were the people basically responsible for his deviation.

Concerning the late president Anwar al-Sadat's role, the vice chairman of the Labor Party stated clearly, "There is no argument over the fact that he was responsible. There is no doubt that he knew of his brother's deviant activities, for the reason that he prevented him from going into the port of Alexandria, him and his children. There is no doubt that history would have immortalized him had he taken the measures against his brother that are being taken now, on grounds that he was fighting corruption even when it was manifested by the person closest to him--his own brother."

Eng Muhammad Hasan Durrah summarized the steps for eliminating deviation:

Complete democracy.

Application of the law to everyone.

Strengthening of faith in people's spirits.

Corruption Is a General Phenomenon

Farid 'Abd-al-Karim, the attorney, who adheres to the Nasirist tendency, began his statement by stressing "It is not proper for us to look upon 'Isamat al-Sadat as an individual phenomenon. That means being unfair to ourselves and to him. Corruption is a general phenomenon whose causes we must stand up to, and these lie in three things:

1. Poverty and the social system: liberalization has resulted in the fact that a very small minority has enriched itself flagrantly, without effort, while the overwhelming majority is living a life of poverty, marginality and hunger through no fault of its own. That is all a categorical judgment against the corruption of the society, because people who get rich must do so through efforts and sweat, and people who go hungry must do so because of their own deficiencies and negligence, not the deficiency of the society.

2. Agencies serving the ruler: liberties have been taken with the law, which is not applied to everyone, and before which people are not equal. The reason for that, most unfortunately, is that the agencies that are assigned to apply the sovereignty of the law still wait for signs from the ruling authorities, and in the light of those they move. The law is used as they like, far removed from abstraction and general application, which are the first characteristics of any law that is respected. The law is applied under certain but not all circumstances, to certain but not all people. 'Isamat al-Sadat is the biggest example of that; he came under the force of the law only after he had lost his influence through the death of his brother.

3. The absence of good examples: examples work like magic, in Egypt particularly, in the negative or positive senses. If a big person takes over other people's property by stealth, that is a blatant invitation to steal, and if the ruler is virtuous, that is an invitation for everyone to be chaste.

Farid 'Abd-al-Karim said, "Therefore it is necessary to combat the causes that make corruption a general phenomenon, and that requires:

"Correcting the course of liberalization.

"Having everyone work in service of the law alone, and not the interests of the rulers and influential persons. That will come about only through democracy and the independence and immunity of the judiciary.

"Having exemplary persons only occupy the main positions in the government." Farid 'Abd-al-Karim went on to say, "We want a legal broom which will sweep corruption of all kinds away at once. We want a comprehensive 'war' against corruption, not a 'hunt' against it, with one target after the other."

Concerning President al-Sadat's role in his brother's corruption, he said, "There is no doubt that he was responsible. Without getting into details, it is enough for us to realize that 'Isamat al-Sadat got rich only in the era of his brother, while he was imprisoned in 'Abd-al-Nasir's era, on the charge of corruption."

The Liberalization Is Responsible

Dr Fu'ad Mursi, a prominent Grouping Party member and former minister of supply, said, "Corruption in societies is an old thing, but it remains, and continues to be, a deviation from principles and an exception to the rule, even in conditions which permit exploitation. However, when corruption is the rule and the basis and corrupt persons reach the summit and remain there until chance along brings them

down, that reveals a deep disturbance in the society, a structural disturbance which arises from conditions that do not just permit exploitation but also engender corruption constantly and in abundance.

"'Ismat al-Sadat is one of the people at the summit, whose status changed from that of an ordinary citizen in 1974 to that of a businessman who made hundreds of millions in a neglected moment of time. Every citizen is asking: How was it feasible that 'Ismat al-Sadat accumulated what he accumulated, and did damage and corruption on the earth, while the security, oversight and indicting agencies were silent about him until recently? In my opinion, 'Ismat al-Sadat and his ilk, people who wreak corruption on the earth like Rashad 'Uthman, Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy and 'Uthman Qasim, are prominent signposts along the road of liberalization. 'Ismat al-Sadat, with his past and present, embodies the liberalization policy, which was a catastrophe for the domestic economy and a bounty, blessing and ample boon for the men of liberalization. Therefore there is no way to overcome the phenomenon of 'Ismat al-Sadat except by totally eliminating the policy of liberalization, which highlights this phenomenon and spreads it about on the broadest scale or at least guiding it."

Dr Fu'ad Mursi described his views on how to guide the policy of liberalization through a number of points:

1. Granting freedom to form parties and the press: it is this freedom alone which is able to unearth corruption.
2. Liquidating the remnants of individual rule, by turning away from a presidential republic to a parliamentary one.
3. Restricting unproductive activities that are parasitic in nature with the goal of liquidating them.
4. Rapidly developing Egypt's productive capabilities, protecting Egyptian private industry from foreign competition and its local agents, strengthening the role of the public sector and encouraging the private sector to produce.
5. Limiting disgraceful differences in incomes.
6. Prosecuting parasitic groups and elements through disclosure, exposure and punishment.

Concerning President al-Sadat's role in his brother's corruption, Dr Fu'ad Mursi stressed that he was responsible through his regime, which allowed 'Ismat al-Sadat to be corrupt, and was responsible through his failure to take decisive measures to hold his brother accountable for his acts of deviation.

11887

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LOCAL JOURNALISTS' INFLUENCE ON ARAB PRESS UNDERSCORED

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 31 Oct 82 p 9

/Article by 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Sa'dani: "What Would Happen to the Arab Press if the Egyptians Pulled out of It?"/

/Text/ A demonic thought has been dominating me: If the Egyptian writers and journalists working in the Arab press and magazines issued in Arab countries and in London and Paris decided to refrain from writing or working in these magazines and papers one day, what form do you suppose these publications would assume the following day?

It is true that non-Egyptians are in charge of editing some of these newspapers and magazines and that they have substantial expertise and competence in the arts of journalistic writing and activity. However, it is the Egyptian writers, and the memoirs of people who had been responsible for executive activity in Egypt, that make them read and widely circulated.

Among these newspapers and magazines I might mention, as an example, those issued by the al-Sharq al-Awsat House in London. When the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT opened its pages to Egyptian journalists and writers before Camp David, its voice was heard and it had wide circulation. Some of the work it published by Egyptian journalists and writers continued for a long time to be the focus of discussion and commentary by Arab readers in their own countries or countries to which they had emigrated. When other Arab writers and foreign correspondents replaced them after Camp David, or for reasons of politics inside Egypt, its circulation declined and it became a paper without color, zest or style, because the material that it offered adhered to a tone that was struck to please all Arabs (except for some items of news concentrated on its second page or scattered about in foreign news pages which were disseminated by Arab and international news agencies). Even most of the light news section, which took up much of the space on the last page, dealt with non-Arab personalities in whom Arabs were not interested.

In that period, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT rarely entered the Egyptian market, and it suffered a drop in circulation and shallowness in its editorial material in general. In London I met with one of our brothers who was "supervising" the Saudi general managers of the al-Sharq al-Awsat House, by his invitation, and learned from him that they were preparing to increase the number of pages in the paper by adding pages on light subjects, in the belief that that would be a way to attract Arab

readers. However, as I expected and pointed out to him, that did not achieve the desired objective, because the readers of AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT had simply become used to devoting themselves exclusively to specific news about Egypt, to what was going on in the corridors of power in Egypt, to analyses and political and economic articles about Egypt (which, whether or not the Arabs, including the Egyptians, liked it, is the brain and heart of the Arab nation and the vanguard of its struggle), and to memoirs or commentaries by certain people who had held leadership positions in the Egyptian government before, during or after Camp David.

When the newspaper changed into its subsequent form, most readers abandoned it because they no longer found the material which they had been accustomed to or wanted to read, in order to learn what was going on in Egypt, in it.

After the political and media liberalization which occurred in Egypt, Egyptian writers resumed writing in AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, it regained its prosperity, and that induced its officials to embolden themselves to double its price, although they knew how abstemious the Arab reader in particular, and the Western reader in general, is in buying daily papers which cost more than a few piasters!

The same thing that has been said about the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT goes for the weekly magazine AL-MAJALLAH, which is issued by the same house. When it first appeared it had a modern type face, fine paper and bright, pretty colors, but readers rarely lingered over articles to read them. It appears that its editorial board, most of which, if not all was non-Egyptian, wanted to challenge the existing tradition in the Arab press, especially the Gulf, Saudi and expatriate press, but it soon had to face "reality," Egyptian writers came to occupy many of its pages, it became widely read, its circulation improved, and consequently it gained greater ties with Egyptian journalists and writers "abroad!"

What does all this mean? Why has the demonic thought been dominating me?

Is it prejudice against the Arab press, or a sort of flexing of Egyptian intellectual and artistic "muscle" against other "chauvinistic attitudes" which Egyptians working in various Arab countries might face?

Let me express what I want to state by means of an explanation, then a question:

The explanation is that the role that Egyptian writing and thought has been playing in the Arab press in general is without a doubt a matter of civilization and presence in the vanguard of the struggle. What cannot be published in Egypt but is published in this press is a sort of democratic provocation of the Arab peoples. It might not infringe upon the nature of the regimes in power there, and might not entail criticisms of these regimes' practices, but it might to one degree or another infringe upon practices within Egypt. Some such things might be published in our national press and, on a broader scale, in the party press. Believe me, in any case publication of this sort of thing, inside or outside Egypt, is in Egypt's interests.

First, it gives Egypt a democratic appearance whose fine points are all absent from Arab regimes. There is no doubt that there are limits on speech and

publication--which are genuine democratic principles that gives the ruling regime a chance, as long as they are genuinely nationalistic, their objective is the people's interest, and they are closely in touch with the pulse of this people, with its various groups and classes. However, if what is said or published goes beyond facts or actual conditions, it is not improper to discuss that on the basis of evidence, logic or the imposition of the penalties the law on democratic publication imposes, while if what is stated or published is true or is reflected in actual conditions, it would not be improper to remedy the shortcomings or errors /described/ or take the people responsible for the crime to trial.

If matters are dealt with this simply, as in liberal or democratic socialist regimes, there is no doubt that that will save much of the time we spend revolving and rotating around the same problems without coming up with positive or radical solutions, and the relationship between the person who is in power and the opposition will be healthy and more challenging. At that point I do not think that anyone in the opposition will find a single justification or reason to publish abroad.

Second, I said that what thinkers and journalists publish abroad, in newspapers, magazines or books, represents a kind of democratic provocation of Arab peoples, and this has had strong influence on groups of readers and intellectuals. One can say that it has created a new pattern in the structure of Arab public opinion and has made Arab unity more attainable--if there are regimes that believe, as the people do, in this unity.

The closest example of this was when a daily Gulf newspaper made a contract with a writer from the Egyptian opposition to publish a weekly article. Although his articles touched upon practices in 1980, an order was issued to the office of its paper's editor in chief to stop publishing these articles.

The reason for this was that these practices were no more than a drop in the ocean of like practices in that Gulf country and that the articles thus became a deeper criticism and condemnation of reality, and what people were experiencing, every day in the country where the newspaper was issued.

The role of Egyptian writers does not stop at the limits of the political aspect of the Arab press, promoting the exercise of democracy and deeply implanting the roots of unionist thought; rather, they play a pioneering, influential role in literary and artistic fields as well.

The question is:

If the most profound articles and critical literary and poetic studies in most of the literary and artistic magazines issued in Arab capitals are the ideas and writings of Egyptians--and I am not stating this in order to boast of the truth--I wonder where such works might be written outside Egypt, in the press of Egypt.

Some people who own publishing houses in Arab countries have indeed made and amassed tens of millions from Egyptian writers, and it has perhaps become an obvious point that books by Egyptian authors contain good ideas only if their publishers are

non-Egyptians (although they are sometimes published in Egypt, in the search for lower costs, and it is permitted to promote them in the Egyptian market)!

Is that because Egyptian publishers, conversely, give less weight to literary and other specialized journals in Egypt?

There is some truth to this point, but there are other points which would require an honest conference with sincere objectives and intentions, will include thinkers, literary figures, poets, journalists, owners of publishing houses, politicians from the ruling party and the opposition, and representatives of censorship agencies which have the power to permit and refuse, and will discuss the various features of the problem of publishing and payment, which are the basic reason for the problem of general culture in Egypt and the problem of the emigration of Egyptian writers and thinkers, which has had a negative repercussions on our lives.

When Egypt was the market for books, ideas and the press in the Arab nation, it played the pioneering role in these fields. This pioneering role then shifted away from it or disappeared when its writers, intellectuals and journalists turned to write and publish abroad. I do not believe that the financial reason would constitute a problem for the Ministry of Culture and other bodies responsible for culture and publication in Egypt, especially since for example it spends millions of pounds on what are known figuratively as "palaces of culture," which fail to play the role of a good book, study or even article such as those emigres publish in the non-Egyptian press and publishing houses.

In conclusion, let me state that a pioneering role in thought, the press and culture in general is the product of great esteem for the freedom of beneficial speech and the affirmation of the citizen's individual personality.

I believe that attempts are being made now which will have their effect along this road.

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CSO: 4504/73

FAMILY PLANNING ACTIVITIES REVIEWED

Training Course for Directors Held

Cairo TANZIM AL-USRAH [Family Planning] in Arabic No 11, Jan-Feb-Mar 82 p 3

[Text] The Public Society for Family Planning held a training course for directors of family planning societies and account executives in those governorates where projects funded by the International Association for Family Planning will be implemented in 1982. The number of these societies is 17. The purpose of the workshop was to lay down the steps for implementing the projects according to a specific schedule; to become familiar with the financial rules of the International Association for Family Planning and also with the method of following up and evaluating these projects; and to discuss the agenda of the societies in the governorates in 1982 in the context of the projects.

The workshop was held at the Institute for Training and Research in Alexandria during the period from 6 to 11 February 1982.

Training Course for Physicians

Cairo TANZIM AL-USRAH [Family Planning] in Arabic No 11, Jan-Feb-Mar 82 p 3

[Text] The Family Planning Society put together a specialized, scientific training course last February that was attended by 10 physicians. The course [was offered] to realize the society's goals of raising performance standards in its medical offices and to expand use of the intrauterine coil as one of the important means by which family planning can be practiced. The course was held under the supervision of Professor Dr Ibrahim Kamal who lectured about family planning methods and talked about all the innovations in that area. The course also included a lecture on clitorectomies and their harmful health effects. The lecture was given by Dr Subhi Khalil, associate professor of gynecology and obstetrics at the College of Medicine of 'Ayn Shams University. In the applied side of the course the physicians were trained to insert the intrauterine device at the center's model clinic in Zaynhum where each physician spent 2 days acquiring the skill. The course was attended by Dr Muhsin Khayri, the society's medical supervisor. He got to know the physicians who were attending the course as well as the course syllabus in preparation for doing field follow-up work on the physicians at the clinics to evaluate their performance.

Islam, Family Planning Discussed

AL-FITRA TANZIM AL-USRAH [Family Planning] in Arabic No 12, Apr-May 82 pp 1-2

[Text] The international Association for Planned Parenthood published a supplement to announce Islam's position on family planning and to correct some erroneous ideas [that are entertained by people] on this subject. Since the Family Planning Society of the governorate of Cairo works hard to publicize accurate information about all aspects of family planning, it sensed the importance of this supplement. Accordingly, it is issuing sections of this supplement in its newsletter. This supplement is basically built on the points of view of religious authorities. These were declared at two conferences on Islam and family planning that were held in Rabat, Morocco in 1971 and in Banjul, Gambia in 1979. [The information] comes in the form of questions and answers.

[Question] What is the definition of family planning according to Islam?

[Answer] A husband and wife practice family planning when they come to a mutual agreement, without coercion to use a legitimate and a safe method that guarantees them the ability to control the times of pregnancy and birth, to make these occur later or sooner, in relation to their health and to their economic, social and material conditions.

(From the records of the Rabat Conference on Islam and Family Planning.)

The purpose of family planning is to encourage responsible parenthood by enabling a married couple to come to a mutual agreement to [use] legitimate and safe means in the context of Islam to space their children. The purpose of family planning is to enable countries to make plans for their people so they would have a better kind of life. Family planning thus helps form happy, stable and healthy families.

(From the records of the Banjul Conference in 1979.)

[Question] Doesn't Islam encourage having children?

[Answer] Yes, but it prohibits the determination that having children is mandatory. Islam calls upon the faithful to have only those children they can look after.

The Holy Koran states, "None should be charged with more than one can bear. A mother should not be allowed to suffer on account of her child, nor should a father on account of his child" [al-Baqarah: 233].

The Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation said, "It is a grave misfortune to have too many children with too few means."

The prevalent impression [people have] about Islam advocating that Muslims have many children is due to the position that Islam faced in its early days. According to a senior clergyman, "This is because at first Islam was an alien [religion] in a polytheistic, pre-Islamic community. The followers of Islam were a weak minority amidst a haughty, supercilious majority. The interests [of the Muslim nation] required that an appeal be made to increase the number of Muslims

so they can face their responsibilities and protect the call to Islam and defend the true religion of God which was being threatened by many powerful enemies.

Now, however, we find that conditions have changed. We find that population density all over the world is beginning to warn against a serious decline in the necessary standards of living for people. Many thinkers have urged that birth control be practiced in every country so that each country can have the resources to meet [its people's requirements] for a decent life and offer them public services.

Islam, which is a natural religion, was never opposed to the interests of human beings. In fact, Islam has always anticipated people's interests as long as these interests did not violate the law of God.

It is my opinion that there are no legal objections to giving the matter of birth control consideration as long as that is necessary and provided that this is done by choice and conviction and people are not forced or required to practice it. Birth control is to be practiced in the context of people's conditions, and the means for birth control that are used should be legitimate."

[An independent legal opinion by al-Shaykh Hasan Ma'mun, shaykh of the Holy al-Azhar Mosque, 1964.]

Question: What contraceptive methods does Islam approve of?

Answer: The method that was mentioned in the early documents was that of withdrawal which was sanctioned by genuine Tradition. One may refer here to several traditions about the Prophet's companions, but the best known among those may be the one which states, "We used to practice withdrawal during the days of the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation. He was informed of this and did not forbid the practice. If this practice had been forbidden, the Koran would have proscribed it."

Question: Did Islam set conditions for practicing withdrawal?

Answer: Yes, Islam stipulated that withdrawal be practiced with the wife's approval. Thus, Muslim scholars have always emphasized that the husband and wife approve of the use of contraceptives so they would have intervals of time between the births of children.

Question: What is Islam's attitude on modern methods of contraception?

Answer: Relying on the fact that the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, sanctioned withdrawal as a contraceptive method, and by establishing analogies according to the provisions of Islamic law, religious scholars think that religion sanctions the use of all safe and legitimate methods of contraception.

Question: Does Islamic law have an unalterable attitude toward the family?

Answer: No. Islam is a vital religion that was inspired [to be the law] for human beings in all times and all places. It has its special methods for making adjustments to new conditions: new laws that are based on analogy and on the

Various sources of Islamic law are enacted. Throughout the ages Muslim scholars of jurisprudence have been guided to enact such laws that serve the interests of the individual and the interests of the community as well. Islam also takes into consideration human weakness and human strength. Thus, it does not seek to burden a person with more than he can endure. The Holy Koran stated, "He has chosen you and laid on you no burdens in the observance of your faith" (al-Hajj: 78).

Question: Do Muslim families accept their determined destiny easily?

Answer: According to Islam family planning is not anti-marriage or anti-fertility. It is not understood as a fight against destiny because God Almighty gave man a mind with which he could use to distinguish between what is good for him and what is harmful. Accordingly, he can pursue that course which brings him happiness in this world and in the hereafter.

(The late Dr Ahmad al-Sayid, professor of Islamic Law at al-Azhar University.)

This publication thought [it would be appropriate] to add a small part of the talk by the major Muslim thinker, Khalid Muhammad Khalid who has distinguished himself by his original independent opinions. Mr Khalid said of Islam, "Islam is almost the only religion where the authority of [man's] conscience and the magnanimity of Islam were instrumental in the success of legislation and laws. Islam connects all the business of this world and all the affairs of life with the desire of God Almighty that man live a life of virtue. Islam deserves credit for encouraging the Islamic mind to pursue those paths that had hitherto not been trodden and to accept broad independent opinions that apply to people's interests and to life's problems."

Are the Egyptian people facing a more difficult problem than that of the population growth?

Regional Symposium Discusses Problem

Cairo [ANTIM AL-UBRAH Family Planning] in Arabic No 12, Apr-May 82 p 3

Text: The Family Planning Society of Cairo took part in a symposium that was held on 24 April 1982 by the Women's Center Committee of the Regional Association of Family Planning Societies. At that symposium the Cairo society presented a working paper on negative and positive factors affecting the nature of work at family planning centers in Cairo. This paper dealt with the role and objectives of the society as well as its plan for the next 3 years. Besides providing a brief historical background about the society and its most important achievements, the paper also dealt with the problems that the domestic sector has suffered from in the area of family planning. The paper also dealt with the disadvantages of field work at family planning centers and outside impediments to action. The paper ended with a few recommendations that may be summarized [as follows]: work in the domestic sector is to be supported; doors to all domestic efforts are to be opened to encourage new ways for distributing family planning means; efforts are to be made to improve data collection methods; research is to be expanded; laws affecting childbearing attitudes are to be studied; a courageous policy to encourage the use of midwives is to be adopted; positive incentives for men of childbearing age who commit themselves to having a small

number of children is to be prohibited [sic?]; and the Ministry of Social Affairs is to be given an opportunity to play its part in the population and family planning program.

Joint Symposium in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'

Cairo TANZIM AL-USRAH [Family Planning] in Arabic No 12, Apr-May 82 p 3

Text] The Family and Children's Bureau of the Shubra Administration organized an expanded symposium with the joint cooperation of the Family Planning Society of Cairo and the social affairs administrations to increase the public's awareness of family planning programs. Four societies took part in the symposium that was held in the offices of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' Society and attended by the director of the administration, by bureau directors, by the chiefs of the participating societies and by social workers. The women of the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' neighborhood were also invited to attend. The program included a religious lecture which dealt with the subject of family planning from a religious perspective. The lecture was delivered by His Eminence al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Sa'i.

Dr Nadiyah 'Abd-al-Fattah, director of the [Public] Awareness Department of the Usrah al-Mustaqbal [Family of the Future] Society shed some light on family planning methods. [She explained] their uses and their purposes.

It is worth noting that this is the new method that the society is following at family planning centers to inform the public about family planning.

Training Course for Center Physicians

Cairo TANZIM AL-USRAH [Family Planning] in Arabic No 12, Apr-May 82 p 3

Text] Pursuant to its policy of upgrading performance at family planning centers, the society concluded that its activity should not be confined to the training of specialists, but that it should also take into account providing special training courses for female physicians who work at the centers. The society set up a training course between 29 and 31 May at the center's model office in Zaynhum. The training program included sterilization of medical devices and tools; cleanliness of the clinic and the center; and methods for enhancing healthiness of various subjects that have to do with a mother's and a child's cleanliness, with clitorectomies and breast-feeding. In addition, the female physicians received practical training in the process of sterilizing medical tools, and that took place at the center's model clinic.

Most of the students at this course had not had previous training in such activities. Their requests emphasized that such meetings for sharing information continue along with a review of problems they encounter in an attempt to overcome them.

Family Planning in the Eighties

Cairo TANZIM AL-USRAH [Family Planning] in Arabic No 13, Jun-Jul-Aug 82 ppl-2, 7

Text] It is officially recognized that the national population and family planning program is suffering from numerous problems and [encountering] obstacles

that are causing these programs to fail. Consequently, this affects the rate of population increase which had been falling but which has been on the rise since 1973. Have the agencies in question looked into the reasons for this increase? Is the increase due to the fact that the public is not aware of the benefits of family planning? Are effective means of family planning that are suitable to all cases not to be found? Is the population increase due to a shortage of family planning services? Is it due to the difficulty of delivering those services to those who need them? Is it due to the fact that the location where these services are available is not known? Is it because there are numerous agencies responsible for family planning programs and there is no coordination between them? Is red tape impeding the implementation of plans, or are various economic and social factors impeding those plans? Is there an approach that can cause all social groups to become convinced about [the benefits of] family planning? Is this approach a medical, economic, national or religious one? What is the role of domestic societies in this area?

In an attempt to find some answers to these numerous questions the Family Planning Society of the Governorate of Cairo held a symposium on Family Planning in the Eighties at the Meridian Hotel on 19 June 1982. Numerous experts and individuals concerned with family planning attended the symposium. The president of the society's board of directors spoke about the role that domestic societies in Egypt and in the world as well would play in the eighties. Dr Mahir Mahran presented a detailed review of the Rapid Kefny Report which highlights the effect of population growth on capabilities for future economic and social development in Egypt. This was followed by a historical discourse by Professor Dr Mahmud Karim on "Family Planning in Egypt: a Retrospective and a Look into the Future." The fourth speaker was Professor 'Iffat Ramadan who reviewed briefly the Usrah al-Mustaqbal [Family of the Future] project. He reviewed the magnitude of activity in that project; its development in 3 years; and its role in filling existing gaps in family planning programs.

The society thought it appropriate to devote the second part of the symposium to a discussion of three subjects: all dimensions and aspects of the population problem; family planning; and the role of domestic societies in the eighties. Symposium participants were divided into three groups so that experts taking part in discussions could discuss matters in depth and the society can be rightly guided by their opinions in making its plans for the future.

The First Group: Population Awareness

Dr Mahir Mahran was the moderator for this group, and Mr Anwar Ahmad was the reporter. This group concluded that there was general awareness of the existence of a population problem in Egypt, but that many leaders were not sufficiently aware of the real magnitude of the problem. They were not aware of the nature of the problem and its effect on capabilities for economic and social development in the future. Accordingly, there is an urgent need to use national, scientific studies that are prepared by the Mobilization and Census Agency and international studies as well, such as the report by the Rapid Kefny Agency, to raise their consciousness.

Among the matters that are still not obvious to some of these leaders is that of the imbalance in the age distribution of the population. There is a higher proportion of younger people in the population, and that has an effect on the

rate of dependency on the one hand and on prolonging the time required to achieve balance in the population, on the other, even many years after the population replacement mode is adopted, that is a family with two children.

There was agreement that there was no scientific view on the mutual relationship between population and development in the present and the future. There are superficial opinions which regard a geographical redistribution of the population and projects to expand desert construction to be sufficient rapid solutions in themselves to confront the population problem in the short term and the long term as well.

Evidence for the fact that this view is erroneous lies in the fact that the expected population increase in Egypt by the year 2000 is at best about 65 million. Construction in Sinai, however, is expected to accommodate only 1 million persons by the year 2000. This is according to the estimates of the minister of reconstruction.

The Second Group: Family Planning

Dr 'Adil 'Azir was the moderator for this group, and Mrs 'Azizah Kamil was the reporter. This group concluded that regardless of the number of children, the health benefits of family planning must be emphasized as a persuasive approach that can be used with everybody.

There was agreement that there were groups in Egypt that had sufficient awareness of family planning and wished to practice birth control. For a variety of reasons, however, these groups had failed to find the appropriate services. Among these reasons are fear of side effects; not knowing how to use a method of birth control; the lack of diversity in birth control methods; the failure of a birth control method; the absence of services in many areas; or even the fact that the location of these services is not known.

The prevalence of abortions and the outbreak of unwanted pregnancies provide evidence of the fact that the wishes of many people, who are convinced that family planning is useful in society, are not being met.

In addition, sufficient studies about the gravity of health injuries which result from unwanted pregnancies and repeated abortions are not available. As a result, no serious steps are being taken to provide safe surgical means and necessary medical follow-up to family planning programs.

There was also agreement that meeting the needs of groups that wanted to practice birth control would have a rather considerable effect on reducing the birth rate in the short term. This is what the Usrah al-Mustaqbal [Family of the Future] Society is trying to do.

The group conceded that economic and social development factors must accompany family planning programs because of their long range effect on population trends toward small families.

The Third Group: the Role of Domestic Societies

Mr. Mohamed al-Mahi, deputy minister of social affairs in Cairo was the moderator for this group which dealt with the role of domestic societies in the eighties; Mrs. Fakhrivah Qasim was the reporter.

The group reviewed the historical role of societies in Egypt, a role which paved the way for the creation of the domestic program. This program later developed its activities by integrating [its programs] with development projects, offering model services, dealing with sensitive subjects, confirming basic information that has to do with population and family planning; cooperating with various agencies to spread awareness; adopting innovative methods in offering family planning services through new channels such as pharmacies and private physicians' offices; following a social marketing method to meet existing needs and following new methods for recruiting volunteers; and finally introducing modern methods for measuring performance and sounding out public opinion.

There was agreement that societies were to supplement the medical services [that are offered at] their centers and to adopt modern medical methods.

There was also agreement that societies were to make plans to carry out follow-up and awareness activities outside the centers and to make maximum use of people who are natural leaders and of midwives.

[There was agreement] that the societies were to work hard to rely on themselves and to use various means to develop their resources and the resources of those who frequent the societies.

Finally, [there was agreement] that the societies were to coordinate their efforts with other domestic and official authorities, among which are the ministries of Social Affairs, Information and Health.

[There was agreement] that the Cairo Society was to continue its projects, such as legislation for women and children, the introduction of proper health habits and [the introduction of] positive and negative incentives to influence attitudes toward precreation.

The Latest News:

Mrs. 'Azizah Husayn was chosen member of the Supreme Family Planning Council after its reorganization.

Directors of Societies Meet

Cairo TANZIM AL-USRAH [Family Planning] in Arabic No 13, Jun-Jul-Aug 82 p 3

[Text] The presidents of boards of directors of family planning societies in Egypt met for a working meeting that lasted 3 days of full residence at the Training and Research Institute for Family Planning in Alexandria.

The Public Society for Family Planning funded this meeting from the training budget. The principal purpose of that meeting was to look into the Public Society's present activities and its future plan of action as well. [Participants] were also to be provided with the most modern management methods for the supervision, follow-up and evaluation of volunteer work, since these activities

constitute the essence of what boards of directors do. In addition, an attempt was made to reach a uniform understanding regarding the method of action, the development of [activities] and expectations regarding the future. There was also an attempt to make a collective definition of current work problems.

The opening ceremony in the morning was attended by the president's wife. She made a statement in which she talked about the importance of family planning. Dr Amal 'Uthman, the minister of social insurance and social affairs also attended the opening session. She too made a broad statement about the role of the domestic sector. Mrs Zahiya Marzuq, president of the institute's board of directors, and Dr Badrawi Fahmi, executive director of the Public Society, also attended the opening session.

Dr Fathi Abu-al-'Azam, dean of the al-Sadat Academy for Management Science gave a lecture in the evening on modern management methods of volunteers.

Dr Mahmud Ibrahim lectured the following morning about the functions and responsibilities of the president of the board of directors. He emphasized the need to train specialized people, to delegate authority and to make authority compatible with responsibility. He also emphasized the importance of supervision to ensure that the plan is being implemented according to objectives.

The lecture was followed by a public discussion about work difficulties and how they may be overcome. And here two extremely important problems emerged. The first one was that of financial incentives which workers at centers receive. Members agreed that this problem was to head the list of problems. There are two parts to that problem: the first has to do with the delay and the irregularity in the disbursement of these incentives; and the second has to do with the small amount of these disbursements. The second problem is closely tied to the first; in fact, it is a result of it. Physicians and people who work at the centers do not work regular hours at the centers. These two problems are among the most important obstacles thwarting the success of family planning programs. Several societies have reconsidered their system of incentives; they followed the lead of the Cairo society which introduced a new system of incentives in 1980. This system proved to be a concrete success in regulating work and improving performance at the centers. Among the problems that came out at the meeting were the fact that workers at the centers did not work there full-time; there were inadequacies in the comprehensive medical services that were offered; there were shortages in medical devices and equipment, in audio-visual materials, and in movies with a message. The fact that some of the societies in the governorates did not have a car impeded the information activities of these societies.

In the morning of the third day there was a public discussion about the future view of family planning and development of the popular sector. One of the most important points that emerged was the need to establish model centers where integrated services would be offered. Family planning services would be merged with local community development projects, and emphasis would be placed on the rural sector so that young people would accept the idea of small families. Comprehensive medical services would be offered at those model centers; and the treatment of infertility would be one of those services.

The establishment of new centers was considered. The locations of present family planning centers, expanding the establishment of centers in rural areas, and

seeking the assistance of mobile units in developing villages were reconsidered. Encouraging voluntarism among both sexes, especially among young people was also considered.

At the end of the working meeting members visited the model center of the Family Planning Society in Alexandria.

Awareness Program Offered

Cairo TANZIM AL-USRAH [Family Planning] in Arabic No 13, Jun-Jul-Aug 82 p 5

[Text] Pursuant to the society's policy of cooperating with social affairs administrations in [promoting] awareness at family planning centers, the society organized a symposium [to promote] awareness at the Center for Developing Society in Bab al-Shi'riyah. The symposium was attended by women who frequent that center and surrounding centers. The symposium dealt with an explanation of the religious, health and social aspects of family planning. His Eminence al-Shaykh Fikri Hasan Isma'il shed light on Islam's view of family planning. This was followed by a detailed explanation of the means that are used in practicing family planning; the proper ways of using these means; the symptoms that accompany use of each means; and the ways these symptoms can be avoided. This explanation was offered by Dr Majdi Salim, one of the physicians of Usrah al-Mustaqbal [Family of the Future] Society. At the end of the symposium, the lady who is responsible for awareness [activities] at the society informed the women attending the symposium about the importance of family planning as one of the solutions to the population problem in Egypt.

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LABOR STRUCTURE OF ALEXANDRIA PORT REVIEWED

Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic No 315, 7 Nov 82 pp 36-38

[Article by Muhammad al-Kilani: "A Master's and a Doctorate in 'Need a Porter, Sir?'"]

[Text] He started his life as a personnel clerk in the port, and got a master's and a doctorate in a single subject. He is the scholar of the porters in the port. This is the first academic study to shed light on the empire of porters in the port from which Rashad 'Uthman and other new millionaires emerged. It is a fine portrait by a university professor who started life working in the port and managed to get a doctorate while working and interacting with the society which has produced Egypt's millionaires.

Although he has in practice left his former work, he is still most closely connected to the porters, as the people who work at loading and unloading like to call themselves. He presents and participates in all the seminars and studies that describe and portray the picture of the society from which the kings of the port who have become the talk of the people, with their blatant illicit wealth, emerged on many occasions. Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Ghani Ghanim has dealt with the social and economic structure which this society has provided us with in the course of theses for the master's degree and doctorate which he obtained from Alexandria University. He has not yet divorced himself from the lifestyle he experienced, and from his old colleagues in the occupation, because they have elected him to be a secretary of the stevedores' trade union committee, which looks after public sector porters and their contact with the private sector as well. You often find him departing from the university milieu to treat the wounds of his old colleagues in their union with the knowledge God has bestowed on him.

Alexandria is the opposite of what many people imagine -- summer and the beaches, games, enjoyment, and crowds of people on the Corniche. There is another Alexandria and another face which only its own people, who have a fast rhythm and pace, know. When you mention Alexandria to any Alexandrian the port, or, as they say, "customs," will come immediately to his mind, along with many young unemployed people's dreams of finding any job, whatever it might be, inside the "goldmine" known as the port. Talk about the harbor has been going on at length, and has not yet ended, on the corruption, acts of deviation and illicit wealth, the people with the 1000-pound notes, the "rabbits," the "elephants," the "pigs" and the "alligators," and also "al-Hajj Rashad," the man who came to Alexandria

from Upper Egypt bringing a little dry "bitaw" bread and a piece of paper in hand bearing the address of someone from his village, and, on his shoulders and back, the patience of Job and his ability to carry what the ships bore and brought in, who then would go back to sleep with others, as many as 15 in number, in a single room which they rented out jointly, as they say, eating a little bit, working a lot, saving what God had provided him and joining a big contractor to guarantee him continuous work or become one of his men, and living under his control or else engaging in a "war of starvation" with him.

We are still in the port. Half the thieves in the bustling port started here, and half the rich people in the city came from here -- yes, from the port. There are poor thieves who steal wine bottles, packs of foreign cigarettes and lumber; in the course of it all, they are stealing, but "within reason," as they say.

The language of the people in the port is not the classical or colloquial tongue; rather, it is the language of the 1,000-pound notes, the rabbits (which mean homes worth millions), the elephants, which mean homes worth tens of millions, and pigs and alligators, which are the famous German Benz cars. People who have a pound, in their language, have a rooster, although when they go into Alexandria the maximum that any of them carries is a quarter rooster, that is, a quarter of a pound. They all started as porters loading and unloading ships in the port. In recent years, "strokes of luck," and rapid, chance enrichment started to make their appearance. We started hearing about them in the case which the media in Egypt and the world vied with one another to follow detail by detail, the case of Rashad 'Uthman or "Hajj 'Uthman" who began the long sequence of disclosure of enrichment and deviation. Rashad 'Uthman was not alone in the empire of the port of Alexandria -- there were many, many more than a person would imagine, and "they operated in silence."

But come along and let us, through this report, get close to the world of the 10,000 who bear 80 percent of the economy of Egypt, which passes in and out of the port, on their backs and shoulders, and who played their heroic part in the course of the October war, when the porters went over to Libyan ports to unload the foodstuffs and supply commodities that we needed along with our armed forces. It is the world of the porters or the bearers.

At the outset, Dr 'Abdallah Ghanim, an instructor in anthropology in the Faculty of Letters at Alexandria University, who went into the port in 1963 and left it for the university in 1979, accompanied us in our report. While in the midst of this world, he obtained a bachelor's degree in commerce, a BA in literature, a master's in sociology and a doctorate in anthropology. His studies and theses dealt with the society he had emerged from. The master's and doctorate theses spoke about the social and economic organization of the bearers in the port of Alexandria. Because he was one of them, he managed to put his hands on the sources of the ailment and provide the first study of its kind on the society which produced the millionaires of Egypt -- the porter who became a millionaire and the guard who came to own loading, unloading and service companies. The names are well known.

The anthropology instructor said that before 1963, before the nationalization decrees, the unloading and loading activity was dominated by foreigners,

Armenians and Greeks like Nicola Levitch and Michael Katamachilis. Their monopoly of the activity was one reason why a system of contractors was created, because it was hard for foreigners to contact workers and bring a sufficient number of them onto the job. Contractors did the loading and unloading work for a sum of money agreed on with the foreigners. The contractors obtained the necessary number of people from Upper Egypt from the village they had migrated from, people in their family and relatives.

There are specialized fields in this society. There are people who specialized in carrying lumber and people who specialize in supply commodities. There are bearers of cast iron, coal, fertilizer and salt and bearers of general commodities like onions, rice and citrus fruit, and there is also the unloading of such imports as weapons, spare parts and trunks. There are people who are specialists in carrying chemicals, others in iron bars, and there is the cotton. The empire of the port is extensive and people who go into it are like new-born babes. Mr. Chanim, the porter, adds that people who work take bottles of wine, cigarettes, tea, and (bafra) notebooks for their friends and the policemen with them when they go off the job. It is a familiar sight to see a porter outside one of the entryways carrying pieces of wood under his arm; this is the secret behind the existence of the wood sales shops that surround the customs zone!

On many occasions, the porters play the role of smugglers in the course of the buying and selling they engage in with ships crews. It has been proved that the goods porters take out of the port through theft play a serious role in imports machinery and equipment, and before it leaves customs its parts are stripped, taken out and sold. These activities assume massive dimensions in view of the easy conditions surrounding them, thanks to the people assigned to do guard work -- everyone on his own account.

Public and Private Sector Porters

While the public sector, represented by the Arab Loading and Unloading Company, had been doing 90 percent of the loading and unloading, the private sector became prominent by the early seventies, with the start of the economic liberalization and the stimulation of activity inside the port, and started to employ more than 10,000 workers inside the customs area, after the contractors and suppliers of manpower had formed companies engaged in subcontracting work.

How did the porters come to Alexandria from their own villages? For the most part, a manpower contractor would go to Upper Egypt, bring 100 men from his village with him at his expense and put them to work in the port, becoming their foreman. For a contractor to show his dominance of them he need only say, "Come on, boys, pull yourselves together, we want to empty this ship tonight. There will be a nice bonus if we do." The contractor then looks at one of the clerks accompanying him and exclaims, "Listen, so-and-so, come down and bring us lunch right now," that is, "Men, I will go on the job with you, and anyone who is interested, take off his gown," in a stage gesture. Then they all shout out, "No, boss, may you have long life, we are enough for the job." In a few minutes, the job is ablaze, its temperature rises, and bodies start jumping like woodpeckers drugged with cocaine that do not realize that they are exerting efforts beyond their capacity.

The War of Starvation

The contractor engages in a war of starvation with porters if one of them leaves on his own or does not listen to what he says. The contractor will prevent him from going to the port or even working, and will tighten the noose around him, with the agreement of his fellow contractors. At this point the porter will find that he must go back and offer oaths of loyalty and obedience, becoming like a ring on the contractor's hand, and old bearer. Ask the university instructor who lived among them and got to know them intimately why they come to work in this field. He says, "They 'set sail' because there is not enough income in their villages, because they are emulating their relatives who preceded them as a consequence of family disputes or vendettas, or because the family refused to let them marry a girl. Many of them failed in their studies and took flight, escaping from their families. There also are some who came to visit someone from their town in Alexandria who was working in the port, then decided to stay after he lured them and found them job opportunities.

"Their housing is a phenomenon that government agencies must study in order to deal with it. People live close to one another in the form of groups of 'bachelors,' because most of them leave their wives in their original villages behind. They are people who are related and come from the same towns, and they jointly rent rooms, which at least 15 of them live in." Therefore, the researcher discovered after he had gone into their homes that the people from each of the 19 villages who are working in this field all live in a single section, indeed even on the same street or the same quarter. For example, people from the village of Nazah and the village of Juhaynah live in al-Wardiyan, on a number of adjacent streets. They are specialists in carrying lumber, and Rashad 'Uthman emerged from their midst. In the al-Liban section live the people from the village of Awlad Isma'il, in one area.

The people from the villages of al-Riyayinah and al-Sawami-ah live in the Suez Quarter of the al-Liban section. People from the villages of Sahil Salim and al-Ghana'im live on al-Rahmah Street and Kawm al-Shaqafah, and those from the village of Anbub al-Mamam live on al-Battariyah Street in the al-Manshiyah section.

The Village Coffee Shop

However, they keep close to their towns in their jobs and residence, because this is a source of protection for them; with their own people, they do not feel remote from their village and receive news of the village and the family almost every day from them. Dozens of coffee shops are scattered around in these sections; each one belongs to one village, specifically, and the people from that village sit in it. Coffee houses are considered "transmission and receiving" stations for villages. People coming in go to them and distribute individual greetings from relatives and loved ones to everyone present. They also bring letters in response to the ones they received previously, when they went off to visit their people in the village."

The scholar went on to say, "Social interaction between them and the society of Alexandria is substantial, but it is very low-keyed. So far, intermarriage,

that is, 'in the group,' has been the pattern. As for neighborliness, porters attach importance to their neighbors only if they are colleagues. Their relations with people from other than their own groups are totally superficial and friendships do not go beyond the people from one's own village.

"The people from one's own village in the port constitute a single 'strike force' in face of the society of the city. They tend to use violence, generally, since they believe that that is the only way to guarantee their status in the society of the city. As soon as friction between one of them and a 'stranger' occurs, the whole village moves to ward off the aggression. This has won them 'awe' from the people of the city. As a rule they keep the job closed off to people other than themselves, and no one who does not come from the 19 villages can participate in unloading and loading activities without facing risks that could reach the point of murder. For that reason, the work is passed down among them in a hereditary fashion.

"The villages all these people come from are situated in the Governorates of Asyut and Sawhaj. These are Juhaynah, al-Sawami'ah, Anbub al-Hamam, Nasah, al-Qhana'im, al-Bidari, Sahil Salim, al-'Isawiyah, Awlad Isma'il, al-Kawmiyah, Naj' Abu Qist, Tama, al-Mashawidah, Tahta, al-Talaliwah, al-Maraghah, al-Ma'mur, Shindawil and al-Binhawiyah.

"One widespread phenomenon in this milieu is the traffic in consciousness-altering substances, especially narcotics, opium, and wine. There are people in this environment who spend 50 percent of their incomes buying these substances. They deal in them among themselves, and people who deal in them do not go outside their group.

Illiteracy is widespread among them and their children. The average amount of money spent on clothing does not exceed 10 pounds a year.

"The load they carry on their backs averages 1,200 kilograms a day. The work of porters in the port is called 'kurta' when on the decks of ships, and 'below' on the docks of the port. There also is the foreman, who supervises the job, there is the (al-hakkak) who is the link between porters on deck and those down below and there are the "wannash" who works the winch and the hold-man who stores things in the hold. The foremen or contractors are people who have powerful personalities and no considerations are given to age, because they are the dominant persons among the porters, who consider them to be their source of livelihood and the people who can deprive them of it."

Our conversation on the conditions of the workers shifted from Dr 'Abdallah Ihanim, the first person to offer a study of the porters' world to al-Hajj Shahatah Abu Dhu'ayrah, chairman of the stevedores' union. He said, "People working in loading and unloading work on the 'al-karwah' system, that is, over an 8-hour period. The wage they get is not in keeping with the efforts they exert; there is a maxim which says 'if a porter gets satisfied he won't come back the next day.'"

Regarding the most important things they face, he said, "There is no fixed income with which to organize a family life. Work in the port goes in accord-

ance with supply and demand, and the nature of the work is strenuous, affecting the workers' health. There are special illnesses in this occupation, such as asthma, allergy, to which the people carrying cotton are exposed, and attacks of epilepsy that come from going into freezers at temperatures that can be as low as 20 degrees below freezing. There also are rheumatic fever, crown arteries, and the collapse and inflation of the heart as a result of the port climate. I presented all these diseases at the industrial safety conference. There are no uniforms designed to protect them from occupational hazards' such as porters wear in every country of the world.

"The most important problem for people working in the private sector is the absence of a union for people working under the supervision of contractors to company owners. There is no commitment in terms of providing safety and social insurance, the workers are untrained, and work methods are primitive, leading to losses of thousands of pounds. One ship carrying cooking fat lost an entire shipment as a result of improper loading and unloading. The goods surveillance office in the port knows this."

How to Become a Millionaire

A large number of people who own rabbits and elephants once were porters, and came to understand the port and became utterly proficient at the games in it. It is very easy to form a company on paper only with the aid of people who have little conscience, among them people who benefitted from Decree 106 of the Minister of Transport for 1978, which paved the way for private sector companies in the field of loading and unloading, when the game of fictitious companies started -- as did the system of mobilizing porter laborers in these companies. UKTUBAR made a tour of the port and saw that there are apprentices below 16 and people who have been retired there.

The fictitious companies which fill the sections adjacent to the port in al-Qubari, al-Wariyan, Mina'-al-Basal, al-Jumruk and al-Manshiyah have strange names. There are service companies, ship scrap companies, and loading and unloading companies; they are fictitious and known to the agencies in the port, but who is behind them? Many people. Setting up a service company to perform I do not know what services, to get thousands of pounds is a simple process: you have to get to know the people who control the shipping agencies and stay up late with the captains of the foreign vessels that come through these agencies. By staying up late, and frequenting night clubs, you can peruse the fattest foreign captains' tabs -- as they say, "what have they got to lose?" It is the Egyptian agency that pays, throwing out thousands of pounds in a single game: there are people who have never left upper Egypt in their lives who have fictitious companies working in their behalf. As for ship scrap, one can smuggle all the contraband one can think of inside piles of wood scrap, in order to get narcotics, gold bars and so forth out.

A Sanitation Campaign in the Port

Today we approach the society of porters in the port of Alexandria, and learn that Kashad 'Uthman, and the little caesars in the port who had the good fortune

to become famous, are a natural result of a climate and environment that brought to the fore these elements whom society is now trying to amputate. However, now that it is too late, we have to deal with the environment and the climate from which they came and still do come. The climate here in the port is suitable and open -- it opens its arms wide to everyone who wants to get rich off contraband and liquid cash. That does not mean that everyone in the porters' society is like this; indeed, there are honorable, sincere, poor people whose blood is being sucked by their former colleagues, the little caesars of the port today.

We are presenting this report to Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, the prime minister and chairman of the Higher Ports Committee, so that he may study the conditions of work in Egyptian ports, put conditions back on their proper course, increase the national indoctrination campaigns and liquidate all the pockets of corruption and deviation in the country's economy. Studies on these subjects are before us, and we know that he will not hesitate to make use of the studies that the scholar of the port has presented. It is necessary to develop the work methods and persons who work in Egyptian ports, and also to apply the international agreement that was signed in The Netherlands regarding stevedores and the regulation of work in ports, as well as to establish institutes to provide port workers with an education and with learning. The agreement was signed in 1949 but has not been carried out here yet. Will we be hearing about it soon?

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REMITTANCE, SAVINGS TENDENCIES OF CITIZENS WORKING ABROAD REVIEWED

Flow of Funds Studied

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 21 Nov 82 p 3

/Article by 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Aql/

/Text/ The question being discussed in every economic conversation whose subject is domestic income assuredly is: What is the volume of the savings of Egyptians abroad?

A second question follows this: Where do these savings go? Are they all remitted to Egypt, or does everyone, wherever they may be, swallow up most of them before they cross into Egypt's borders?

A third question follows these two: Who are the people who are swallowing up Egyptians' savings before they get to their legitimate channels in the domestic economy?

An important scholarly economic study has responded to the three questions. The study was the subject of broad discussion in the meetings of the National Production Council sessions chaired by 'Abd-al-Qadir Hatim. It was prepared by a crowd of top-notch economists, university professors and ministers under the chairmanship of Dr Hamid al-Sayih, former minister of economy.

The study asserts that the revenues of Egyptians abroad came to 5.66 billion pounds in hard currency and that they, that is, the Egyptians abroad, spent half of these revenues on themselves abroad and remitted only 591 million pounds.

The question this report answers is: Where did the rest go?

In 1981, estimates indicate the volume of the revenues of people working abroad came to about 5.66 billion pounds; of this, the workers saved 3,169,000,000 pounds, the rest going for their expenses abroad. Of these savings, just 591 million pounds entered into the framework of the foreign currency pool of accredited banks; these were the amounts that were converted into Egyptian money. The remainder, 2,568,000,000 pounds, went into other channels which the hands of middlemen and go-betweens could easily get to. For the first time, using observations, statistical sciences and a field study, this study calculated the cost of this labor to the

nation's economy. In toto, these costs came to 1.52 billion pounds. As a result, the net revenues of the workforce came to just 1,694,000,000 pounds. The study then shifted, finally, to three focal points for increasing the benefits from people working abroad.

The study began with an analysis of the conditions of the free market, or, as some people call it, the black market, which is the "unofficial market," in order to learn a semi-specific answer to an important question--where does the foreign currency in this market come from, and where does it go? The most important sources for this market (on the supply side) are the remittances of Egyptians working abroad minus the sums that are consigned to accredited banks in Egypt (remittances by the banking system, that is, legal channels. The remittances made outside these legal channels to supply the unofficial market represented a large percentage of the volume of Egyptians' real savings. Also entering into the supply side of the unofficial market were sales to Arab and foreign tourists and sales of some exports received from the free market, since the government at present permits exporters of non-traditional goods to dispose of a specific percentage of the receipts of their exports, as a way to encourage them. The final source on the supply side was the net deficit in individual hard currency deposits with banks in Egypt, since some individuals, motivated by need for local currency, sell some of their deposits on the free market. However, the latter three elements did not in their totality constitute an important element in supplying the black market, because of their limited nature. Thus the remittances of Egyptians outside the banking system remained the predominant element in the supply side in this market, and therefore estimating the volume of the revenues of the market, and estimating the real volume of incomes of Egyptians abroad, become important.

Where Does It Go?

This money goes to finance imports made without hard currency transfers and deposits of individuals in foreign currency in banks operating in Egypt, to finance the exports of capital directed toward investment abroad, and to finance imports of gold, precious metals and other contraband items (such as drugs and narcotics), and also purchases of hard currency by Egyptian tourists for spending on trips.

The Income of 1 Million Workers Will Be 10 Billion Pounds in 1985

The number of Egyptians working abroad was estimated at about 500,000 in 1974 and came to 875,000 in 1980, accounting for an annual growth rate of 9.9 percent. It is estimated that that will rise to 1,194,000 in 1985. The average wage was estimated in accordance with average wages in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in varying proportions according to circumstances in different periods (before and after the oil price hikes) and the circumstances of each country (Saudi Arabia pays high wages while Iraq pays ordinary wages). After calculating this average, which was estimated at about 6,655 pounds a year in 1982, it was then assumed that that would increase to 8,145 pounds by 1985, since the demand for technical specialists and skilled labor is rising. From these averages, it has been possible to calculate the size of the incomes of Egyptians working abroad; this was estimated at about 800 million pounds in 1974, rising to 5.66 billion pounds in 1981, by an average

growth rate of 32 percent a year. It is expected that that will rise to 9,725,000,000 pounds in 1985, at an average growth rate of 15 percent.

Their Savings Are Greater Than Half Their Incomes

How much of their incomes do people working abroad save? It has been estimated that the propensity to save of Egyptians working abroad is about 56 percent, that is, the average of these two percentages /sic/. When some Egyptians who are themselves working abroad were asked, they acknowledged that the money they set aside as savings was more than half their earnings abroad.

5.4 Billion Pounds in 1985

By estimating the volume of incomes and the rate of the propensity to save it is possible to estimate the volume of the real savings of Egyptians working abroad. These rose from 448 million pounds in 1974 to 3,169,000,000 pounds in 1981, or by an annual growth rate of 32 percent. It is anticipated that they will rise to 5,446,000,000 pounds in 1985, by annual growth rate of 15 percent. These tendencies make it mandatory that one seek sound means and policies to attract all these resources into legitimate banking channels instead of having them go to waste and be allowed to inflict negative effects on the domestic economy. In spite of the efforts the government is making to seek to draw the savings of Egyptians working abroad into the channels of the banking system, the sums that are remitted in the framework of the foreign currency pool of accredited banks accounts for minor percentage, totalling 194.1 million pounds in 1975 and 818.3 million in 1980, then declining to 590.7 million in 1981, or 18.6 percent of savings in 1981. This confirms that middlemen are in a stronger position than that of the banks operating in Egypt in attracting savings, on the one hand, while, on the other, the expansion in the money supply that the economic situation in Egypt has been experiencing has led to inflationary pressures while the interest rates on the Egyptian pound have been rising moderately. This has encouraged people to keep their savings in the form of foreign currency, bringing them higher interest rates and providing them with security in the buying power of their savings (this was of course before the interest rates on the dollar dropped).

From this analysis, the inadequacy of the means for encouraging Egyptians working abroad to leave their savings with banks operating in Egypt, receiving Egyptian currency in exchange, stands out.

The Real Role of the Investment Authority

Outside the framework of the foreign currency pool of accredited banks, there is an important channel through which one major component of Egyptians working abroad flows, and that is represented by foreign currency deposits in banks operating in Egypt. These rose from a total of 53.6 million pounds (or 15.7 percent of total remittances in 1975) to 502.8 million pounds, or 24.8 percent, of total remittances in 1981, at an increase of 45.2 percent a year on the average. The ratio of this component to the total real savings of Egyptians working abroad also rose, from 7 percent in 1975 to 16 percent in 1981; in size this component became almost as large as the total sums submitted to the foreign exchange pool of accredited banks.

A number of reasons lay behind that, among the most important of those being a rise in international interest rates and the expectation of a rise in the exchange rates of foreign currencies, which were confirmed by an escalating trend in prices in the unofficial market and the lack of other attractive investment opportunities for people with savings (for example successful corporations and government bonds at acceptable interest rates). In general, the study underlined an increase in foreign exchange reserves in banks, especially public sector commercial and joint banks, prompting one to state that the banks need people to provide them with assured investment opportunities which will encourage them to invest their money domestically. This is the role that ought to devolve upon the Investment Authority.

Imports made without foreign currency transfers are fed from outside the banking system. Although five decrees have been issued in 2 years in an attempt to guide these, they are still exerting constant pressure on the unofficial market and therefore causing a rise in the exchange rate.

The study defined the negative effects of the flight of hard currency as:

1. Depriving the domestic economy of the productivity of the labor that has emigrated (the study points out that the value of the production of goods rose to 683 million pounds /sic/ in 1981-82, representing 3.5 percent of gross domestic product and 19 percent of the volume of their real savings).

2. Costs of education and training:

The study has calculated these costs on scientific and statistical bases which we do not have the room to explain here. They were apparently estimated at about 134 million pounds in 1981, which accounts for about 4.2 percent of the volume of real savings and about 23 percent of the sums given to the foreign currency pool of the accredited banks.

3. The shortage and high wages of technical labor in Egypt

In view of the difficulty of providing a numerical picture of this phenomenon, the study contented itself with referring to its negative effects, which are represented by technicians' exaggerated tendency to raise their wages and consequent increased costs of production, a high general price level, orientation of increased incomes toward consumption, and a reduction in the capacity to absorb national investment as a result of deficiencies in construction capacity arising from the lack of construction workers.

4. Speculation in land and real estate:

Some workers' savings are directed to speculation in land and real estate, since no attractive investment opportunities exist. The sellers of the land then devote the earnings to consumption.

5. Increased family consumption:

Incomes of workers abroad have played a big role in the growth of family consumption, in both the satisfaction of essential or non-essential requirements and

receptivity to new consumption patterns, which the rest of the public imitates and mimics. The study assumes that the optimum volume of family consumption in a developing country like Egypt is 64.5 percent of gross domestic product in market prices, which was the level of family consumption in Egypt in the first half of the seventies. The increase in excess of this optimum level came to 205 million pounds in 1979, and it is estimated that that leapt to 740 million pounds in 1980-81 and 1,182,000,000 pounds in 1981-82.

6. Encroachment on farmland:

The drain of rural inhabitants from the country to work and return with large savings that are invested for the most part in the purchase of land and the erection of residential units on the land, and the losses that plague the domestic economy as a result of this phenomenon, could be estimated at about 59 million pounds in 1981. These costs represented about 1.8 percent of the volume of the real savings of Egyptians working abroad.

The True Nature of the Situation

By gathering the abovementioned cost elements together, which one can express numerically to show the true nature of the situation created by the emigration of Egyptians and its effect on the domestic economy, we find that they came to about 1.52 billion pounds in 1981. When we realize that the volume of the real savings of people working abroad in 1981 was 3,169,000,000 pounds, after deducting the costs the domestic economy lost, net revenues came to 1,649,000,000 pounds. That is, the ratio of these costs to real savings was 48 percent; indeed, these costs came to double the sums that were left in accredited commercial banks.

How Can One Magnify the Benefits?

Magnifying the domestic economy's benefits from the savings of Egyptians working abroad may be concentrated on three focal points:

First, development of the savings of the people working abroad, by increasing their numbers and raising their income levels by studying the real demand for Egyptian labor, drawing up an education and training policy, concentrating on the provision of high-level technical fields of specialization, establishing Egyptian or joint contracting firms which will be in charge of sending workers abroad and back, and seeking to encourage Egyptians working abroad to limit their spending on luxury goods by following a customs policy which will protect those goods that can be provided by local production.

Second, drawing savings into legitimate banking channels by adopting all measures to limit inflation rates that have started to rise above the levels of interest on the Egyptian pound and compelled citizens to turn to saving in foreign currency, guiding imports without currency transfers, encouraging savings in local currency by raising interest rates, giving Egyptians attractive investment opportunities to establish financial companies, offering stock in them to individuals, and offering government bonds at satisfactory interest rates.

Third, reducing expenses and eliminating the negative effects of Egyptian labor through expansions in vocational training centers, providing transitional training to eliminate the severe deficit in trained technical labor and setting out a tax policy to guarantee that speculation in land and real property is restricted.

Savings of Workers Abroad

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 18 Nov 82 p 8

/Text/ The Central Bank's annual report for 1981-82 has stated that the remittances of Egyptians working abroad still occupy first place in the foreign currency pool revenues of accredited banks and are considered the basic resources for financing import activities, including imports made without foreign currency transfers, since these savings enter in the form of cash or material assets.

The report pointed to a decline in remittances in cash form of about 321.7 million pounds, or 37.7 percent, which totalled 532.7 million pounds as compared with 854.4 million. The value of imports made without foreign currency transfers also dropped by about 377.4 million pounds, or 30.2 percent, coming to 873.4 million pounds as compared with 1,255,800,000 pounds. Thus the total of these remittances, in the form of cash and material assets, dropped by about 699.1 million pounds in fiscal year 1981-82.

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OPPOSITION WRITER REVIEWS COMMON COMPLAINTS ON SUBSIDY ISSUE

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 18 Oct 82 p 6

/Article by Wahid Ghazi: "Mr Mazlum's Line!"/

/Text/ My name is Muhammad Mazlum. I work as a government employee in a section of greater Cairo. My salary is 60 pounds and 52 piasters and my job is to give building permits and permits for the distribution of construction materials to owners of new buildings.

"Lines" now constitute my whole life. I sleep and dream lines. I wake up to the voice of my wife calling me before dawn to pick up a couple of empty buckets and get on the cart the people in the section have rented to go to the closest area that has water and beg drinking water from the people there. I fill the two buckets and bring them back to my house on the cart. Some children get on the cart with us, to sing, as we are returning,

"Salmah, Salamah, we filled up and we are coming back safe!"

I give my wife the job of pouring the water over my children Ahmad and Muna so that they can wash themselves with the water from one of the buckets. The water from the other one is used for drinking and cooking.

I go back down to the street to stand in a bread line in front of Hajj Imam's oven.

Hajj Imam always chides us as we are standing in line: "the gentleman on subsidized bread--here you and he are in the line."

A single voice always rises up out of the middle of our line, pleading with the boss who owns the oven, "By your honor, boss, we don't want subsidized bread, we want free bread."

"Boss" Imam replies, teasing the people in the line, "Of course I know that--does anyone besides donkeys eat subsidized bread?"

Another voice comes forth reproachfully from the line:

"What donkeys, boss, that's not right!"

The foreman replies, "By the prophet's religion, I am being serious. No offense meant, there are but peasants who buy subsidized bread for animals and donkeys to eat because it is cheaper than oilcakes and fodder."

The boss takes a deep draught from his water pipe and a voice issues forth from the end of the line:

"But, boss, the government pays 850 million pounds in subsidies for bread each year."

The boss cuts him off angrily,

"We are being treated rudely, that is, I am no offense, being called a thief. They put subsidies in my pockets and I sell you 2-piaster bread. I promise I won't sell you anything but subsidized bread then."

The boss then cried out, calling one of his workers in the oven,

"Hey, kid, Hanafi, take out some trays for people coming for subsidized bread, son."

"As you say, boss. At your command."

After standing all that time in silence, I was compelled to interrupt:

"By your honor, boss, we are not responsible for what people standing in line say! It's just that he meant to ask you, considering that you were a great expert in economics"--just hearing this phrase the foreman smiled and started to calm down, and, encouraged to finish what I was saying, I said, "he meant to ask you, considering that you were a great economic expert on subsidies, 'Where is it going?'"

The boss calmed down, put the mouthpiece of the water pipe in his mouth and took a deep draught. He made a sharp cough, then said:

"In my capacity as a great expert on bread, having been in this business for 30 years, no offense meant, but your question as to where the subsidies go has one answer, and that is, 'sustenance for idiots at the expense of the insane!' People pay for subsidies and other people laugh at them and take the subsidies. It's a madhouse, sir, a birthday party, where the person it's being given for is absent."

The boss then warned, "Watch out, there might be someone here in your midst who writes for the newspapers and will be writing this statement down in my words. My fellow oven-keepers will give me a rough time. You realize I like frankness but I don't like to disturb myself, so, all these subsidies are a good thing."

I asked, "How can they be a good thing, boss? We are buying bread for 2 or 3 piasters."

He stated angrily, "Don't be so selfish. There has to be good in it for you and good for us bosses, and for the big bosses--the very big bosses."

I asked, "Who are the very big bosses, chief?"

He said in a shout, "Stop this nonsense."

My turn had come, and I picked up the ten discs and took them back home. I ate breakfast with my wife and children Ahmad and Muna. I took the two of them back to the street with me. I took the two children to school and went on foot to the square to get on a jitney to my place of work.

For the third time, I stood in line, the line for the jitney, until my turn came and I got to my place of work.

My office is on the ninth floor in the Mujamma' Building on Liberation Square. I stood in the elevator line and felt so dizzy that matters within me became confused and I could not concentrate, as I remembered how many lines I had stood in since that morning and started to recall the sequence of lines, from the water line to the elevator line. I awakened to a voice warning me that the elevator was broken down, and we ran over to another elevator at the end of the corridor, each of us trying to outrace the others to get a better position in the new line. I was 20th in line and the elevator could carry seven--that is, my turn would come, with God's permission, at the end of the third round trip of the elevator. In an attempt to amuse myself, I focussed on the elevator panel and the red light that flashed, declaring that it had arrived at the third, fourth, and fifth floors, and then the 10th floor, then came back to ground level. On the third cycle, I entered the elevator and took a deep sign. The operator pressed the buttons and suddenly the elevator went dark. The operator cried out "please get out--the electricity has been cut off!"

We went up on foot. I stopped to rest every two or three stories. Finally I arrived and immediately collapsed and asked 'Amm Ibrahim, the messenger, "Where are our colleagues, 'Amm Ibrahim? Haven't they arrived yet?"

'Amm Ibrahim said,

"No, son, they got here early."

I asked,

"So where did they go?"

The man smiled:

"They are standing in line, of course. You have forgotten."

I remembered, and ran off, going back to the stairs, as 'Amm Ibrahim's voice was bidding me farewell: "Catch up to them in line! Our lord will make you successful, son, you and your colleagues, and you will come back with your minds refreshed."

I got to the street, and stood in the "Super Craven A line." It was a long one, but entertaining. The fighting was incessant, and the owner of the kiosk we were standing in front of was light-hearted, a man of jokes.

A number of my colleagues from the office were standing in the line. Suddenly my direct supervisor came and stood behind me. I immediately stepped back and gave him my place, so that he could stand directly in front of me. He tried to prevent me, but I refused, and said,

"Is it reasonable that Mr Hamdi should stand behind me? For heaven's sake, that's not right."

We exchanged places; none of the people standing in the line objected, because the exchange did not disrupt any of their turns.

A whole hour went by and the line moved forward a step at a time. It was as if we were at a funeral.

I was jolted by a hand cuffing me on the shoulder. I turned around to find myself faced with Boss Budayr, holder of residential construction permit 124. I said,

"Hello, Boss Budayr! Congratulations! The permit came in and is ready to be picked up. Come by our place in an hour and we will also have picked up the Super Craven A's."

The old man laughed, his big belly shook underneath the gown, and he cried out,

"What line, Mr. Muhammad! Our necks have gone stiff. Come along with us, man, and we can set up a special line upstairs in the office and you can give me the permit."

I said in a whisper,

"But the head of the office has to review the permit." I pointed to Mr Hamdi, who was standing in front of me, and Boss Budayr cried out,

"How are you, Hamdi Bey! Come along with us to our private line!"

I said, "But boss Mr 'Azzuz has to stamp the permit and Mr Lahib has to record it in the ledger." and so on.

The boss cut me off:

"Where are all these gentlemen?"

I said,

"Here in the line, boss."

The boss shouted at the people standing in the line:

"all the gentlemen from the permit office who are with Hamdi Bey gather around me here. Come stand in Boss Budayr's private line!"

Three employees got out of the line, and Mr Hamdi, the head of the office, and I, joined them, we formed a special line behind the boss, and we went into the Mujamma' Building.

The foreman took us over to the elevator that was out of order. I shouted to him:

"That elevator is out of order, boss!"

The boss gave me a look that silenced me. The operator of the elevator that was out of order came and the foreman pressed a 1-pound note into his hand. He immediately opened the elevator door and we got in and went up to the office. Boss Budayr opened his attache case and removed a carton of cigarettes, which he passed around to us, and he received the permit after giving us our usual reward. Many happy returns! Tuta tita, the story is over!

1188'

CSO: 4504/73

POLLING INSTITUTE CANVASSES PUBLIC ON SUBSIDIES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 31 Oct 82 p 3

[Article by Iman Mustafa: "The Issue of Subsidies, in the First Scientific Poll"]

[Text] Writers and thinkers have certainly dealt with the issue of subsidies through research and study; in fact, it has now become the main preoccupation of all people, from various classes, and all officials in various positions as well.

However, for the first time, the issue of subsidies has been occupying the minds of scientists, researchers and specialists and coming under the microscope of science, which subjects it to scientific analysis.

The first scientific study which experts in the National Social Research Center carried out dealt with the issue of subsidies: who should they be for? Should they be kept, or not? If they are kept, what should be the conditions for keeping them, and, if they go, what should be the alternative?

While subsidies took no more than 9 million pounds out of the government budget 20 years ago, they are now devouring 2 billion pounds (two thousand million pounds). Here is where the gravity of this study, which deals with a cross-section of Egyptian society, from rural and urban areas, from all classes -- the toiling classes, the middle class, the affluent, those living below the poverty line and those who have transcended the need for wealth - lies.

What did the people say?

What have the scholars come up with to tell the people?

The issue of subsidies impinges on the lives of Egyptians every hour and every minute, to the point where the value of subsidies rose to 2 billion pounds in 1981, while in the 1961 government budget it came to 9 million pounds. This has stirred up much discussion and debate.

All groups of people who are covered by subsidies said their say and expressed their opinions in an opinion poll conducted by the public opinion measuring agency of the National Social and Criminal Research Center.

Experts and researchers dealt with a sample of citizens representing the republic's urban and rural governorates, expressing their opinions on the solutions that are now being raised to solve the problem or the issue of subsidies.

The National Social and Criminal Research Center public opinion measurement agency, by means of this poll, is for its part helping to cast a bright beam of light which might help officials and people in charge of making decisions apply the best system so that no conflicts will arise among decisions that might be reached and the higher government objective of the masses' desires and interests.

Dr Ahmad Khalifah, chairman of the center, supervised this poll and teams of experts and specialists headed by Dr Nahid Ramzi carried it out.

They Know Nothing about It!

First, the lack of clarity in the notions in citizens' minds is one striking conclusion of this poll. In spite of open public discussions the problem of subsidies has received in the various media, it is clear from the results that a little more than half the people sampled had no understanding of anything called subsidies.

However, when the researchers explained the notion to them, a number of questions were raised and it was clear from their answers that they had recommendations and solutions which they expressed spontaneously, ultimately indicating that the issue of subsidies preoccupies the majority of the people and that as they go through life they really have solutions to this problem, although it is a matter of their ability to define this notion.

It was also clear from the study that the number of people who managed accurately to estimate the value of the subsidies, or the value of what it costs the government to meet subsidy policy, did not exceed five, out of the samples of people with whom this poll was carried out.

Subsidies Should Remain, But!

Regarding the most important conclusions which emerged, it is the unanimous view of the people in the sampling, in spite of their different educational and professional levels and whether they belonged to a rural or urban environment, that the government should continue the policy of subsidies and that the notion of derogating or reducing them under any conditions should be opposed, even if the goal in abrogating the subsidies is to achieve a long-range development policy, a policy which economists consider to be the optimum solution to the problem of the increases in the subsidy budget in recent years, or even if the abrogation is accompanied by an increase in wages. The people in the sampling, even the illiterates, are totally cognizant and fully aware of the extent of the policy of increases in wages, which would certainly be accompanied by a rise in prices.

People with Limited Incomes Only!

Close to three quarters of the people in the sample expressed the strong desire that the distribution of subsidized commodities be restricted to low-income classes, to the exclusion of persons with high incomes.

The results also confirmed people's total concern that the policy of subsidies be continued, through their attitudes toward the recommendations that had been set forth, which were aimed at getting subsidies to the people entitled to them.

A recommendation which included the elimination or even the reduction of subsidies, met with intense opposition, while all recommendations aimed at regulating the acquisition of subsidized commodities so that they would reach the people entitled to them met with an intense receptivity on the part of all the persons in the sample.

As to the Elimination of Subsidies

There was a nearly unanimous rejection of the recommendations bearing on the elimination of subsidies in kind and their conversion to cash subsidies. The same tendency was also observed in the results of the poll with respect to the elimination of subsidies and conversion of allocations for subsidies to the construction of new factories or agricultural land, which would result in increased production and consequently reduced prices. However, what are noteworthy in the results of this recommendation specifically are the differences in the level of opposition to this recommendation between rural and urban areas. It appears that people in urban areas were more opposed than those in rural areas, and it appears that that may be explained by the fact that the recommendation presented would be of use in directing the subsidy budget, after the elimination of subsidies, toward the reclamation of new lands.

Since a large proportion of the people in the sample were rural, and these people were engaged in agriculture and consequently were connected to the land and appreciated the importance of projects oriented toward the reclamation of new land, their rejection of this recommendation was somewhat lower than that of the people in urban areas, because the latter evaluated the recommendation through their sense of the need for subsidies and their pressing need for them.

It was also apparent from the results that the recommendations bearing on the regulation of the distribution of subsidies, and guarantees that they reach the people entitled to them, were greeted with great approval.

There was agreement on the part of the bulk of the individuals that the acquisition of subsidies through cards by means of supply grocers or monthly coupons should be encouraged.

In addition to that, the people in the sample raised some positive recommendations to guarantee that subsidized commodities get to the people entitled to them and that they be distributed equitably. Among these were increased distribution outlets, the construction of new complexes, and intensified surveillance over them so that subsidized commodities will not go to groups which are not the targets of subsidy policy.

This scientific poll shed strong light on three major conclusions, which are embodied in the facts that:

1. Subsidies represent a vital necessity for the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian public and therefore one must not think of eliminating them or reducing their volume.

2. All policies aimed at eliminating subsidies and increasing wages are foredoomed to fail because of the price increases that will follow them.

9. There is pressing need on the masses' part to think of new solutions by which we can guarantee that subsidies reach the groups that were the original objective of this policy. Perhaps the recommendations presented by the people in the sample, simple as they are, may give us an indication of these solutions.

Who Are Entitled?

However, after this review of the opinion poll that the center for the measurement of public opinion in the National Social Research Center made, a bewildering question remains which is waiting for an answer: Who are entitled to subsidies? How can they be identified? What is the criterion by which people with limited incomes or people from groups entitled to subsidies are identified?

Perhaps the first experiment carried out in Egypt to investigate the causes of the problem of poverty and determine poverty groups was in 1938, when a committee was formed to carry out this experiment. One of its most significant conclusions was that it considered a family consisting of five persons to be in a state of poverty if its cash income was less than 5 pounds a month. The strange thing is that it was apparent from the study that the income of about 90 percent of Egyptian families was less than 5 pounds at that time.

Perhaps the gist of this experiment, which was to set a specific value to guarantee a minimum living, to measure who was entitled to subsidies. There is no doubt that this method will pave the way for the government to determine the groups that are living at a low level, in the context of circumstances which require that the government intervene directly by retaining subsidies and bringing them to those groups which are actually entitled to them.

11-87

XX: 4504/54

BRIEFS

DEPUTY THREATENS OPPOSITION PAPER--Wajih Abazah has sent a judiciary warning to the Labor Party newspaper demanding publication of a full retraction of the slanderous item of news the paper published, stating that he had offered a bribe to al-Nabawi Isma'il, former deputy prime minister and minister of the interior. The judiciary warning which Iskandar Bulus Fahmi, Wajih Abazah's lawyer, sent stated that it was absolutely untrue that Wajih Abazah had presented a notice to the socialist prosecutor against al-Nabawi Isma'il or that the subject of the alleged notice was a bribe that Wajih Abazah had paid to him under pressure. The judiciary warning said that what the paper had published entailed slander and calumny against Wajih Abazah, was defamatory to him and was just a tale that the paper had made up. The judiciary warning stated that the transaction of the Peugeot cars sold to the Ministry of the Interior was made by the French parent company and the ministry directly in accordance with special terms and that Wajih Abazah's relationship to it was that his company had provided maintenance and spare parts only. The judiciary warning noted that in the event the retraction was not published in the same space, and over the same area, he would take full legal measures. [Text] [Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 5 Nov 82 p 1]

CLAIM AGAINST JIHAN AL-SADAT--The socialist prosecutor's office has received a statement from Rashad 'Uthman, sent from his jail in al-Qanatir, declaring his withdrawal of the lawsuit filed in his name by attorney 'Abd al-Halim Ramadan against Jihna al-Sadat in which he demanded the reimbursement of 15,000 pounds that he had contributed to the children's village in Alexandria. The statement also cancels the authorization 'Uthman had given the office of attorney 'Abd al-Halim Ramadan and withdraws all of the lawsuits filed by this office in his name against both individuals and organizations. Today, Thursday, was the dayset for the Lower Court of Cairo to consider the lawsuit pertaining to the children's hospital. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 4 Nov 82 p 1] 8494

CSC: 4504/75

MINISTER REPORTS PROGRESS IN OIL REFINERIES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Nov 82 p 2

[Speech by Seyyed Jalil Seyyedzadeh, chief of Oil Commission]

[Text] The minister of petroleum, refinery chiefs, and delegates from refinery Islamic Societies attended the Majlis Tuesday morning at the invitation of the Majlis Oil Committee.

At the session's beginning, Seyyed Jalil Seyyedzadeh, Bakhtaran representative and head of the Oil Committee, introduced the new members, stated the mission and procedure of the Majlis Oil Committee, and emphasizing the importance of the oil industry in the economic sector, expressed his appreciation to all of the industry's employees. Then the chiefs of each refinery gave a report to the committee's members concerning the type of activity and actions carried out within the limits of their responsibility. In conclusion, Gharazi, the minister of petroleum, said in an interview: The oil industry's committed employees have succeeded in raising refinery capacity, which was designed for 500,000 barrels a day, to 666,000 barrels a day. Following this success, the Ministry of Petroleum was able to free the sale of natural gas. God willing, in the near future we will be able to do the same thing with the sale of white oil and gasoline. The minister of petroleum added: Refinery operations have reached self-sufficiency, and we hope to achieve self-sufficiency in the making of parts and to continue the expansion of the refineries.

9597

CSO: 4640/47

CENTRAL BANK CHIEF, OIL MINISTER EXPECT ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Nov 82 p 14

[Article by Bo Victor Pagels: "The President of the National Bank of Iran: 'Recovery on the Way'"]

[Text] Four years of revolutionary upheavals. Two years of war with Iraq with two million refugees from the war zone. One and half million refugees from the neighboring country of Afganistan. Economic boycott by western nations. A succession of political assassinations. Iran is said to be on the brink of ruin, on the edge of chaos. Yet the country seems to be on the road to recovery.

It is difficult to find substantiated numbers. Foreign observers feel that Iran's currency reserve today has been built up to approximately 13 billion dollars (91 billion kronor), having dropped to the low-water mark of just above one billion dollars after the occupation of the American embassy in November 1979.

A little more than a year ago, Iranian oil export was down to 700,000 barrels a day. Today it stands at more than two million barrels a day and gives an income of approximately two billion dollars a month.

In Iran one now points out, with pleasure, that the antagonist in the war, Iraq, has had its oil export cut to 700,000 barrels a day and is now forced to depend on gifts from the Arab countries by the Persian Gulf and on foreign loans.

Iran's oil minister, Mohammed Gharazi, says that Iran could increase its export to three million barrels--Iran's OPEC quota--if the war and other oil exporters--particularly Saudi Arabia--did not put up obstacles. Gharazi also maintains that Iran keeps to the OPEC prize--34 dollars a barrel.

"We had great problems with our currency reserve in 1979 and 1980," admits the president of the Markazi Bank (the National Bank), Moshen Nurbakhsh, a 34-year-old with a Ph.D. from the University of California. "After the purging of the U.S. spy nest, we were exposed to economic warfare with boycotts and a Saudi Arabian depressed price policy in the oil market.

The situation became worse by the rumor that Iran was on the brink of economic catastrophe.

Rationing

In order to handle the problems, Iran introduced severe import restrictions. Luxury items were prohibited, and foreign travel for Iranians was halted.

Salaries for the public sector were reduced considerably, between twenty and fifty percent, by among other things, doing away with overtime payment.

After the war with Iraq had erupted in September 1980, severe rationing of a group of necessities was implemented.

"Still, we have from 1979 till today managed to lower Iran's foreign debts from 15 billion dollars to two billion dollars," says Dr Nurbakhsh.

He refuses to state Iran's present currency reserve, but it is believed in banking circles that one billion of the two the oil gives every month goes to the reserve.

"Iran makes it a principle never again to borrow from foreign banks. The Islamic republic has self-support and independence as its goals," says Nurbakhsh.

The Iranian industry was badly hurt by the revolution. Many industry owners fled the country and plants were shut down. Others could no longer find a market for their products. Today the wheels have in many places started turning again, but not completely. Unemployment is high. According to some sources, three million people of a work force of eleven million are without work.

Inflation has been high during the last years, but now one believes it is close to being controlled.

During 1978-79, the last Shah year and the first year of the revolution, inflation was a little over 30 percent. It now stands, according to Dr Nurbakhsh, at 15.6 percent.

Agreement

Iran is also slowly making trade agreements with the rest of the world. Lesser European countries and countries in the third world replace partners like the United States of America and France. Exchanges, such as products or services for oil, are common.

"Iran is a country of the future, but it is important to be here now. Those who arrive later will have to take their places far back in the line," says a Dutch business man in the off shore oil business. "One problem for western companies that sell knowledge in the construction field is that many eastern countries, for example Yugoslavia and East Germany, are submitting

bids with which we cannot compete. It is not too bad in the oil business, but in other areas the competition is tough. The people in power here like to accept the lowest bids. There is a fear that otherwise, after the fact, one can be accused of having done something wrong, and maybe be executed. The insecurity of those we work with sometimes paralyzes decisionmaking. Everything takes a much longer time than we westerners are used to. But this is the Orient; we must accept that."

According to official sources, a building boom is to be expected in Iran, yes, it has already begun--300,000 apartments are to be built every year. But all around Tehran there is a great number of half-finished buildings, just as they were when the revolution broke out, four years ago. The authorities say that this is because some of the jobs that were interrupted were American, in other cases the ownership is unclear. The buildings belong to people who have fled the country, and the cases are being investigated.

This is not the whole truth. There is no money to continue the building projects. And most of the money is right now being invested in rebuilding the war-damaged areas. Psychologically, it is important that war refugees can quickly return home, when news bulletins daily speak of the great Iranian victories at the front.

It is a question of large investments. Dr Nurbakhsh states that the large Abadan refinery--with a capacity of 700,000 barrels a day--which was completely destroyed during the war, will be rebuilt. Large projects have already been started both in Abadan and in Khorramshar, even though the cities are still almost daily hit by Iraqi grenades.

Agriculture

There are not flat figures on agricultural production, but concentrated efforts are being made to increase it. Islamic boards have been formed in the villages, and a kind of help group--Jihad--works in the rural areas with, for example, electrification and artificial irrigation.

The goal of concentrating on farming is to make Iran self-sufficient in food supply, to make life more tolerable for the farmers and thus also to end the large emmigration to the cities.

The goals are thus not that much different from those the Shah had with his land reform, the so-called white revolution, 1963-1975. But the difficulties are great. Ayatollah Khomeini has stated that when he was forced into exile in 1963, Iran was self sufficient in farm products. It was mismanagement during the Shah's time that made Iran into an import country, and now the country is to become self-sufficient again.

Khomeini thus disregards that since 1963 there are many more mouths to feed in Iran and that water resources put an absolute limit on how much of the country's area can be farmed.

The land reform which is inscribed in the constitution has not yet been brought up in the parliament.

Rice

The supply of farming products on the market is, with certain exceptions, rather good. But rice is a shortage item that well illustrates the market. The best rice, best in the world say the Iranians, comes from the province of Gilian in the northeast. The growers want a price of approximately 200 rials (16 kronor) per kilo, but can get more if the rice is marketed in Tehran. Consequently, one keeps the rice, or the buyers store it.

The government has stopped rice shipments from the province to keep the price down and help the poor consumer. This is done by importing, for example, Thai rice for 90 rials per kilo. This way they have attempted to flood the market, but still today rice smuggled from Gilian sells for 500 rials a kilo (40 kronor) on the black market in Tehran.

According to official sources, 600,000 tons of meat are distributed every year in the country, of which 200,000 tons are imported. That means around 16 kilos per person and year.

The authorities state that around 40 percent of the meat finds its way to the open market because of "weaknesses in the distribution system." The result is that the consumer has to stand in line for a very long time for one kilo of meat in a state store, where he, if he gets any at all, pays 400 rials (32 kronor). On the open market the same piece of meat costs 110 kronor.

The government and the parliament continue to debate laws that will make the economy more Islamic--their own kind of mixed economy. One wants, among other things, to eliminate the interest paid by banks. The paying of interest goes against the Koran. Right now strong demands are being made on the nationalization of all import trade and on limiting the role of the middleman, among other things to control the large price difference between the national and the open market. There are also demands for stronger punishments for hoarders, profiteers, and currency smugglers, who have until now mostly escaped with fines and/or a jail sentence.

The chairman of the Superior Court, Ayatollah Musavi Ardebili, said the other week that the death penalty is a possible punishment for this kind of criminal.

But almost everything has a price in Iran today. To get a death sentence commuted to between ten and twenty-five years in jail is right now said to cost 160,000 kronor.

9843

CSO: 3650/61

IMPORTANCE OF ALIYEV'S APPOINTMENT DISCUSSED

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 30 Nov 82 p 7

[Text] It was announced in Moscow last week that Aliyev, secretary-general of the Soviet Azerbaijan Communist Party, has been chosen to the membership of the Soviet Politbureau and has become the deputy to the new Soviet leader. This news was attributed much significance by political circles in Tehran who consider it as an index of special attention being paid by the new Soviet rulers to Iran and the Islamic region neighbouring USSR.

It is necessary to mention that a predecessor of Aliyev had played a major role in staging an armed revolt in the Iranian Azerbaijan in 1944-45. He, who was known as "Baghov", in those days supervised the activities of the Tudeh Party and the Democratic Group of Azerbaijan. This individual was, after the death of Stalin, prosecuted and sentenced to death, and during the course of his court trial, there were revealed certain secrets relating to the Communist movements in the region.

The Western propaganda centers, which in recent months and especially after the asylum-seeking of the Soviet Diplomat from Tehran in the West, have been paying much attention to the Tudeh Party and the probability of expansion of Soviet influence in Iran, are now exploiting the appointment of Aliyev for the same purpose. In their opinion, Aliyev is amongst the supporters of the unity of the 2 Azerbaijanians (the Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijanians), and has, in the past, openly expressed his views in this connection (BBC, Nov. 23).

The IRI & Soviet officials have shown no reaction to these rumours. In the opinion of the Soviets, appointment of Aliyev, as deputy to Ponomarev, is an ordinary shift within the Soviet Government, and has no specific meaning. It should be noted that, similar to the current Soviet leader, Aliyev has, for many years, held the post of the Chief of the KGB and has also been in charge of the Soviet Azerbaijan region.

CSO: 4600/139

PLANS CONSIDERED TO BLOCK U.S. EFFORTS IN MIDEAST

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Nov 82 p 20

[Interview with Sheykh ol-Eslam, political deputy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; date and place not specified]

[Text] Sheykh ol-Eslam, political deputy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave a press and radio-television interview at the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Damascus at the end of his visit to Syria yesterday. He answered the questions of domestic and foreign correspondents concerning the occupation of the spy nest, the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam's situation after the recent defeat of his forces, and U.S. plots in the region.

According to the report of IRNA's correspondent from Damascus, he first enumerated the fruits of the Islamic revolution combating U.S. imperialism and its sold-out stooges at home and abroad. He spoke about the confrontation with U.S. plots carried out to bring down the Islamic state, and the defeat of the satanic U.S. plot in the Tabas Desert; the occupation of the U.S. spy nest by Iranian youths; the fact that the Islamic revolution eliminated U.S. and Israeli facilities from Iran and transformed the Israeli Embassy to the Palestinian Embassy; and the benefits of Saddam's imposed war for the Iranian nation. He said: The imposed war brought about greater harmony among the army, the Guards and the popular forces, and raised the capabilities of Iran's forces. He added: Right now 10 Iraqi cities are within range of our combat forces. However, the imam has not given permission for one bullet to be shot toward those cities, while our cities are under fire from the artillery of Saddam's mercenaries night and day. Sheykh ol-Eslam added: During the imposed war our forces have destroyed several Iraqi divisions, and many cities and much land has been regained. He said: During the Moharram operations we took over \$1 billion of plunder from Iraq. God willing, this very same plunder will be used against the regime occupying Jerusalem.

At the end of his speech Sheykh ol-Eslam thanked the countries that so far have recognized the righteous position of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The political deputy of our country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was then asked how the Islamic Republic of Iran will overthrow Saddam's regime when Iran has announced that it will not occupy Iraqi territory. He responded:

According to the constitution, the Islamic Republic of Iran does not have the right to interfere in other countries' domestic affairs. However, the Islamic revolution is not restricted to the Iranian nation, and action to overthrow Saddam is obligatory for every Muslim. Saddam started the war to bring down Iran's Islamic system, and he prevented the dispatch of our forces to the war fronts against the regime occupying Jerusalem. Saddam's overthrow is the duty of the Iraqi nation. Concerning Saddam's situation following his continuous defeats, Sheykh ol-Eslam said: Saddam recently executed four ministers and two military commanders. Thus his madness has spread from the war fronts to Iraq's interior. It is a sign of his imminent fall. He added: We have information that the number of high-ranking Iraqi officials executed by Saddam is more than he has admitted. Asked about the great numbers of Iraqi prisoners in Iran, the political deputy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered: The reason is that they are forced to go to the fronts, and because their genuine front is the one facing Israel, not war against the Islamic Republic of Iran, they voluntarily surrender. He added: Anyone helping Saddam in this war will share his fate.

Then, pointing to the participation of the shah's regime's planes in the 1967 and 1973 wars against the Arabs, the shah's participation in the war against the Vietnamese people, the presence of Israeli advisers in Iran before the revolution, SAVAK's cooperation with Mossad, and finally the shah's economic and petroleum assistance to Israel, he said: After the victory of the Islamic revolution, Israel's biggest friend changed into its biggest enemy. Israeli experts fled from Iran, and oil exports to Israel were cut. The Zionist regime's embassy was transformed into the Palestinian Embassy. From the beginning of the revolution, the slogan of Iran's people has been "Today Iran, Tomorrow Palestine," "Death to the United States," and "Death to Israel." All of this shows that the lying claims that the United States and Israel publish against the Islamic Republic of Iran are pure lies. Concerning Iran's future ties with Lebanon, Sheykh ol-Eslam said: Lebanon has special importance for us. We know that the Lebanese nation is an oppressed nation under pressure from others. We announce that Israel must withdraw from Lebanon and all Arab territory. There is one place for the Israelis: "Hell."

At the end of his conference, Sheykh ol-Eslam said: The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the current convulsion as the precursor of the open presence of the United States in the region. We advise all countries not to participate in U.S. plots. Saddam's goal is also one of helping the United States preserve the turmoil in this part of the world.

He added: We would like to have extremely good relations with all neighboring countries, on the condition that they recognize our righteousness and refrain from aiding Saddam.

9597

CSO: 4640/47

PAPER CLAIMS U.S. TRIES TO CREATE 'CENTO SUBSTITUTE'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 2 Dec 82 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN (IRNA) - The Persian daily Ettela'at has said in a commentary here on Tuesday that the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is rapidly developing a military and security treaty for safeguarding "withering, unpopular, and anti-social political systems of the region in the ultimate interest of the United States."

The U.S. in fact needed PGCC to replace its now dissolved CENTO, a military alliance among Iran, Pakistan and Turkey which was originally formed in 1955 under the direct supervision and active participation of that country along with United Kingdom.

Following culmination of the Islamic Revolution, Iran came out of the CENTO. Other members also followed Iran leaving the U.S. in search for an organisation similar to the CENTO.

The commentary of daily Ettela'at then added that it says the developments in the region can be viewed as bits of a jigsaw puzzle, which properly put together depict a regional plot against the Islamic Republic, spearheaded by Washington. Excerpts:

"Now that the United States and the reactionary governments of the Arab world seem to have found time for sitting back and relaxing after the butchery in Beirut and another expulsion of the Palestinians, we should naturally await their other schemes for the Persian Gulf...Much however, as the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have emphasized that by intending to export the revolution we do not mean to do so by power of arms or military adventurism, and much as they have reminded that the infiltration of the Islamic thoughts across the Iranian borders is not prompted or checked by the will of any one individual, the elements who are craving a desire for reversing the course of the revolution do not wish to hear any such assurances by the Iranian officials, since if they lend an ear to such vows by the Islamic Republic they cannot then justify that which they have been doing (against the Islamic

Republic)...

The daily Ettela'at further added that according to AP "The member countries of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council intend to coordinate their arms purchases and probably form a unified military command for their forces..

Such developments have implications... A projected dredging of a canal in Oman for the safe passage of oil tankers, and for diminishing the strategic value of the Hormuz Strait demonstrates an anticipation of insecurity in the Strait and also for eliminating dependence on the Hormuz Strait, in advance of efforts for disturbing it...

"News reports said last week that the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is to review efforts for interceding between Iran and Iraq and for ending the war. The reports said that war is costing Baghdad one billion dollars every month, the bulk of which it receives from the Saudi government...

"The rough behavior with the Iranian pilgrims during the Hajj ceremonies this year, as well as the infuriating conduct of Kuwait's police with the procession of Shiite Moslems who were marking the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in Kuwait are bits of mosaic of other symptoms. Put together, these reports, and the likes of them depict a shameless effort which gained impetus especially after the eviction of the Palestinians from Lebanon and the arrival there of multi-national forces, and which betray a plot being shaped against the Islamic Republic by the United States and in the Persian Gulf...

"Such developments are all interrelated to one another... The budding of a military pact in the region as a substitute for the defunct CENTO has been a goal of U.S. imperialism ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic.. Such backroom shenanigans are aimed at conditioning the atmosphere for publicizing the goals of the pact, and launching its particular missions.

MONARCHIST PAPER CLAIMS BIG POWERS SUPPORT KHOMEYNI'S REGIME

Paris ARA in Persian 6 Nov 82 pp 1, 2

[Text] England has sold more than 1500 million dollars worth of goods to Iran during the last year, which is three to four times more than the amount of goods sold to Iran annually before Khomeyni.

Iran pays cash and crude oil, at 25 dollars per barrel, for purchasing weapons.

The power of the presence of the Khomeyni opposition in the political arena is increasingly daily. The anti-Khomeyni forces have indeed found national dimensions.

During the past week the political circles in London showed signs of certain behind-the-scenes agreements for the immediate future of Iran (after Khomeyni). The British government plans to take the initiative for the countries of the Persian Gulf region and in particular Iran at any rate. England has never forgotten its forced withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Therefore, to avoid political failure in the future as a result of the national power of Iran and the influence of the United States, it will go so far as to force the U.S. to be its follower in all the areas of politics, military, economic and in particular oil in that region. From the point of view of the British government, the Persian Gulf has been the ancient inheritance and traditional hangout of English merchants, and the present governments of this region are each of a British brand in one form or another.

Last week, in a television program, a minister of Thatcher's cabinet called the government of Iran a "stable government" and firmly settled. However, the same cabinet minister disclosed the activities of the elements of international terrorism and even named some of the elements of terror and consternation such as Hadi Ghaffari.

It is obvious that interpretation of the above news item is not difficult for those who received their inspiration from BBC in staging the revolution.

England has sold more than 1500 million dollars' worth of goods to Iran during the last year, which is three to four times more than the amount of goods sold to Iran annually before Khomeyni. During the last three to four years England has signed the most important trade agreements with the Khomeyni regime. The Khomeyni regime has also never strained its excellent relations with England, and with great craftiness by popularizing slogans, "death to America" and "death to the great satan," has, since the first day of the revolution, freed the hands of London and Moscow all over Iran to do what they want. In this way London and Moscow have reaped great advantages. Even the Soviet satellite countries last year sold an amount equal to 3000 million dollars of goods to the Iran of Khomeyni.

End of Collaboration

The London/Moscow collaboration, designed to tear the corpse of the Iranian economy, is now decreasing and in a state of decline, because England sees Moscow's role as complete and therefore pursues her long-term settlement program in the Persian Gulf. Clashes between Moscow's and London's interests became apparent during this past week. Both governments placed themselves in confrontation by revealing the espionage secrets of each other in Iran and in the world at large. "Kuztishkin," London's spy in the USSR Embassy (in Tehran) disclosed the espionage activities of the communists, the Tudeh Party and the red clergy on the payroll of the Russian Embassy. Vis-a-vis this, the Soviet Union betrayed one of their own spies in London international telephone network, whose job was to listen to telephone conversations between heads of states.

The U.S. Agreement

Confrontation between Moscow and London caused an important reaction in Iran, and that is to put pressure on the communists. We should expect complete political demise of the leftists in Iran in the near future. This is the minimum that Washington and London have agreed upon and to achieve this end Washington will make every concession to London and will secretly award any privilege to the Khomeyni regime. It is not without reason that the volume of U.S. exports to Iran, inspite of the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, has increased. It is not in vain that the Khomeyni regime announces with such confidence weapons purchases from Israeli/Italian binational companies. The importance of these purchases can be realized when one reads the International Bank report in which it is stated that Iran is almost a bankrupt country and that if it does not sell more oil it will reach total bankruptcy soon. It is obvious that trading with such a country not only needs political courage and guts but also requires confidence in the future of its regime.

The Spanish newspapers write that Iran pays with cash and crude oil at 25 dollars per barrle for purchasing weapons from this country.

Meanwhile we see that Rafsanjani hypocritically advises the government to open the borders to those who do not want to be revolutionary and wish to leave the country, as well as to those who wish to return home.

France, the Follower

The French government, which usually follows England in matters relating to Iran and the Persian Gulf, intends to normalize its relations with the Khomeyni regime by sending a new ambassador to Iran and resuming Air France's flights to Tehran. It should be expected that the socialist government of France will allow greater freedoms to Khomeyni's regime in the area of political propaganda and receive its reward by way of exporting goods to Iran and purchasing oil from the Mullahs.

The Silence of USSR

With the beatings that international terrorism has received in the Middle East after the events in Lebanon, the USSR is not in a position to pursue a final strike in Iran. This government is only concerned with solving the Poland and Afghanistan crises in an honorable way and coming to terms with the U.S. for exporting wheat and western technology to the USSR and, if it can, meaning if Brezhnev lives long enough, considering a re-division of the world, or in the words of the historical politicians, a new Yalta agreement.

Now the USSR, on pretence of treachery of one of its important embassy officials in Iran, has taken the first step toward compromise with the west--meaning that it has sacrificed the Iranian communists and undoubtedly will curtail the activities of its large espionage network in Iran.

The Tudeh Party that has time and again has become the tool of the KGB, is sacrificing hordes of Iranian youth on the pretense of outer appearance of Russian Marxism and Khomeynism. The gift of the leaders of this party to Khomeyni and Moscow was their sincere cooperation with the Hezbollahis and the Russian embassy. The Tudeh party surely is expert in serving the Soviet Union and betraying Iranian youth and the nation.

A New Phase in the Life of the Islamic Republic

The republic of Khomeyni is entering a significant phase in order to stabilize. Khomeyni's death may accelerate this phase. The fact of the matter is that the regime and the ruling class have lost touch with the masses of people, the illiterate people and the semi-literate people, and its credibility has declined greatly. As a result the ruling class is making preparations for the after-Khomeyni period. The people have discovered that this group of Mullahs have tailored for themselves a huge pocket and by deception have accumulated great wealth. The people see that this bloodthirsty and illiterate group has no virtue other than cruelty and it is fundamentally incompetent to run the affairs of the country. For this reason the country, three years after the revolution, is in poverty and privation up to its neck, and if it were not for the reserves of the past the country would have fallen into this state much sooner.

Undoubtedly the ruling class, on various pretenses, is forced to start a number of reforms now that it had rid itself of much of its opposition. It is certain that this policy will accelerate the people's demands, and the law-seeking phenomenon of society will appear. It is possible that after Khomeyni the ruling class will sacrifice some of its aides in order to stabilize the next phase.

The Game of Fate

The ruling class of Khomeyni's regime tries not to crack the dam, either from the point of view of international relations or of national affairs, but the game of fate will break the egg in the hat.

Khomeyni's system has made many miscalculations. The ruling power is not aware of the nature of Iranian society and is not sensitive to personalities and public institutions.

The power of the presence of the Khomeyni opposition in the political arena is increasing daily. The anti-Khomeyni forces have indeed found national dimensions. Khomeyni's agreements with the West and the East will not guarantee the continuation of his regime, just as numerous developments and military agreements of the past did not compel the West and the East to defend the Iranian regime.

The national forces are coming together. Iran will walk in her natural course. The important thing is to be present in the arena.

9741

CSO: 4640/45

POLICY ON STEEL INDUSTRY EXPANSION OUTLINED

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 30 Nov 82 pp 5-8

[Interview with Engineer Maddahl, Mines and Metals Ministry undersecretary, by the daily ETTELA'AT, in which he explains various issues related to his ministry and the steel industry]

[Text] Q. What is the overall government policy on expansion of industry and increase in steel output in the light of the projects underway, the anticipated projects as well as the supplementary programs?

A. Following the Revolution, the Ministry of Industries & Mines (MI&M) was divided into two Ministries of "Industries" and "Mines & Metals" on account of the expansion of industrial activities. It was anticipated in the bill on establishment of the MI&M that after 6 months of the ratification of the bill on this Ministry, the bill on setting up the Ministry of "Heavy Industries" would be presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and this was done accordingly. Consequently, the MI&M attends to matters related to geology, & exploration equipping and exploitation of mines, and expansion of metallurgical industries. This Ministry is composed of these units: The National Iranian Steel Company (having more than 12 units); the National Iranian Copper Industries Company; The Geological & Mineral Research Organisation; the Mines & Metals Smelting Company; The National Mineral Exploration Company, and various mineral & metallurgical sections of the Industrial Development & Renovation Organisation (IDRO). The MI&M would focus its efforts on two fields: First, the mines which provide the raw materials need for producing domestic steel such as coal, iron ore, lime etc. The other field relates to activities on preparation of other metals. On the whole, efforts are being made that in not a too distant future, not only the domestic needs could be met in this field but we would also be able to export mineral materials. In connection with these objectives, we have already carried out tasks in the three fields of planning, exploitation and formulation of laws & regulations and organisation affairs.

As for exploitation & production, among the basic tasks undertaken are the commissioning of the first phase of expansion of the Isfahan Steel Plant. We are confident that with the operation of the second high furnace during the current Iranian year (ending March 83), we would be able to boost steel output to two million tons. Presently the nominal output capacity there is 550 thousand tons. However, with the efforts of the working personnel, this has been

boosted by 6.6% which is unprecedented in the history of the plant. It is essential to mention here that had we tried to import the steel thus far produced at the Isfahan Plant, we would have needed to spend three times the foreign exchange invested on this plant. This is more significant in the light of the fact that the Isfahan Steel Plant hasn't yet attained its maximum production capacity.

In respect of the Ahwaz Steel Complex, there did exist a stagnation period following the exit of US contractors after the Revolution, thus causing a series of socio-political complications so much so that the political splinter groups demanded a total blockading of those premises as they brought up their social demands for their presence in their place of work rather than for actual work. In this way, millions of Tomans were paid for no work. However, with the plan presented by the then government officials, all the workers & technicians of the contractors were brought back and then cooperative labour groups were set up to continue the affairs of the Complex. Today we have nearly 250 such groups in Ahwaz which are speedily carrying out the affairs related to the putting into operation of the complex. After a trial period in Ahwaz, the labour cooperatives were also set up in Fouladshahr in Isfahan and thus far over 30 such groups have come into existence there. Under this procedure, workers have a better incentive for work because the wages are paid in a cooperative, in proportion to the progress of work. For example, if 70,000 housing units, as anticipated in the program, were to be set up in Fouladshahr, Isfahan, under the previous procedure, it would have taken several years to build them. But, with the setting up of these labour cooperatives, the work is progressing very speedily. The same plan has been devised in respect of the mineral field.

As to the Mobarakeh Steel Complex, it would produce nearly 2.5 million tons of sheet steel upon operation. The contract for the project was concluded with a multi-national company but after the Revolution, there were opposing views about its completion. The government officially ultimately decided to implement it but not on the basis of the weak contracts & guarantees of the past. In the days of Hasan Nazih, the Oil Ministry had agreed to pay money to that company instead of oil delivery, but we reversed this agreement. Another weak guarantee was that 5% of the invested money should be paid back to that company in case the project fails to go into operation. All these guarantees have now been strengthened. With due consultation, we have reached the conclusion that certain amendments should be made in the contract. The Economic Council too has approved this decision. Implementation of this project has been anticipated for the Second Development Plan of the country. Generally speaking the policy of the Ministry of Mines & Metals in carrying out the Ahwaz and Mobarakeh Steel Complexes is as under: First phase of steel production--up to 1.9 million tons; second phase--up to 4.4 million tons; and third phase--up to 6.4 million tons (by another ten years). The important factor in it is the recent discovery of coal mines in Tabas whose initial reserves estimates have been put at one billion tons.

Another important project undertaken during this period is that of Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex. After the Revolution, the Americans, before their exit from Iran, had inscribed upon the walls of the complex that "we would return by

another 6 months." They were thinking that the Iranians are incapable of putting this complex into operation. The construction work at the complex had been completed but its operation seemed to be difficult due to the complicated and sophisticated machineries. At long last, with the hard work of revolutionary brethren, the complex was put into operation and is presently functioning with its 50% official capacity. The final capacity is 145 thousand tons of copper per year. The copper reserves of the country have been estimated to be at 750 million tons. This complex has no problem in terms of manpower, and makes use of only a small number of foreign specialists in connection with the copper refining and refinery projects. Also, projects on extraction of gold and molybdenum are being studied by experts at the complex. After the Revolution the aluminum plant was in a bad shape as one of its production lines was totally out of order. As a result of the sustained efforts of the personnel, the plant output has been boosted to its 80% capacity while the total capacity is 45 thousand tons annually. The planning target in copper, zinc, lead, aluminum etc., is to attain self-sufficiency. As already anticipated, we would, at the end of our 20-year plan, produce 91% of our steel needs, and 100% of our needs in copper and aluminum. Another program envisages the survey assessment and exploration of the national resources required by metallurgy (e.g. iron ore, natural gas and different kinds of energies), manpower employment, establishment of supplementary industries and maintenance of installations.

The following anticipation have been made in the first five-year plan of the Ministry of Mines and Metals: 1. Putting into operation and expansion of first phase of the steel plant up to 1.9 million tons; 2. Completion of Ahwaz Steel Complex with a capacity of 1.5 million tons of bars; 3. Completion of operations, installation and commissioning of Khuzestan steel industry affiliated to the National Iranian Steel Industries. 4. Implementation of the "Kavlan" Pipe Plant with a capacity of 800 thousand tons. 5. Survey for establishment of new pipe factories for the use of the raw steel in excess of the Ahwaz Steel Complex. 6. Continued implementation of the construction and installation operations of the Mobarakeh Plant. 7. Completion and commissioning of the Sarchesmeh Copper Complex up to 145 thousand tons capacity. 8. Designing and establishment of supplementary copper industries. 9. Total commissioning of the Arak Aluminum plant up to 45 thousand tons capacity. 10. Completion and commissioning of expansion phase of Arak Aluminum Plant up to 70 thousand tons capacity. 11. Survey and designing of the extension of aluminum industries up to 120 thousand tons output capacity.

The main features of the second five-year plan are as under: Completion of construction and installation operations of the Mobarakeh Steel Complex and production of 2.65 million tons of steel (1.6 million tons of hot pipes and 830 thousand tons of cold pipes). 2. Completion of first expansion phase of Isfahan Steel Complex and boost steel output to 4.2 million tons. 3. Placing orders for equipment, preparing designs and implementation of construction & installation operations of 2nd phase of the Complex to boost output up to 6.4 million tons. 4. Establishment of second steel unit with a capacity of 120 thousand tons. 5. Planning studies and designing of new complexes for steel and other metals production, needed during the next decade.

Q. Why are we importing coal and from where?

A. The coal utilised in coke and high furnace is to have specifically accurate qualities, and with a combination of the German and Iranian coals, the necessary plasticity to turn them into coke is obtained. God willing, if we discover such mines in future that possess the necessary specifications, we would then have no need to import coal. Another reason for coal import is the speedier commissioning of projects and our becoming independent of iron imports. We prefer to import raw materials (such as coal) rather than the manufactured iron.

Q. Would you tell us whether the work on the second steel furnace is progressing as per scheduled or not?

A. As announced earlier, the coke-making batteries of the steel plant have been ignited whereas a group has taken it to be the high furnace. This is a prelude to the start of the high furnace. However, this process has been behind our original schedule.

Q. Transfer of the National Iran Steel Company Headquarters to Isfahan has met with conflicting views. Has this transfer been done in coordination with other ministries and relevant organisations or not?

A. As per ratification of the Revolutionary Council, these headquarters were to be shifted to Isfahan because of its importance as the steel nucleus of the country. With the Isfahan Steel Complex with a capacity of 6.4 million tons and Mobarakeh steel with 2.5 million tons, this city would become a major industrial center in future. With the transfer of the headquarters there, the related affairs are now being expedited and also the policy of decentralisation is being put into effect. We believe other ministries too can follow suit.

Q. What is the position of the "Kodurmukh Agreement" at present?

A. It was agreed during the satanic regime to revive the iron ore at Kodurmukh, India and meet the needs of the Ahwaz Steel Industry by extending a loan to that country. After the Revolution, our brethren went over to India to inspect the "Kodurmukh" mines. However, parleys are still to be held on the issue to reach a final agreement. We can, however, meet the iron ore needs for the Mobarakeh Steel Complex from the Golgozar Mines" (ETTELA'AT, Nov. 14).

CSO: 4600/139

BUDGET PROGRAMS, OBJECTIVES EXAMINED

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 30 Nov 82 pp 9-12

[Text] The 1362 budget is in the process of being formulated. Next year's budget would be the first budget to be prepared in the plan form so that it could come in line within the realisation of the objectives of the first five-year plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran that has, under the title of "major economic, social & cultural program", already been approved by the Economic Council. As stated by the relevant officials, a total of over five thousand are presently engaged in preparing the objectives, strategies and sociocultural programs so that, as demanded by the Islamic upsurge, they could design the first five-year plan of IRI. The government officials say that already one-third of the various phases on preparation of the next year's planned budget have been completed, and the rest of the work too would be finished soon so that the said budget is presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for final approval by February 1983.

In order to meet the overall objectives of the first five-year plan and to guide the society on the path of development, there have been approved some strategies in the next year's budget whose salient features are given below:

1. To check the consumption trend, and to lay emphasis on investment and continuance of contentment in all fields.
2. To consider agriculture as the pivot of development
3. To lay stress on expansion of research, boost the spirit of invention & innovation in scientific, technical and cultural fields, to guide the research programs for carrying out suitable programs to resolve socio-economic issues, and to promote the results, thus obtained, among the people.
4. To expand supplementary production activities as well as those related to rural & tribal people.
5. To bring about a link among various economic sectors.
6. To respect significance & priority in chalking out plans for the return of the war-hit refugees to the liberated areas, to distribute capital funds among the deprived provinces, to make efforts for increasing the non-oil revenues such as from carpet, farm products and handicrafts, and to stockpile essential and basic goods in the country, as well as tens of other programs.

By taking a close look at the next year's budget, the significance of that budget would become still more evident. When we sought the opinion of the people concerning the pivotal nature of agriculture, all of them agreed on the fact that our agriculture should be developed speedily and the traditional

techniques, applied in cultivation, should be changed to mechanised agriculture. They also pointed out that in case agriculture were to form the base of our economic development, there would be produced food requirements of the people in sufficient quantity domestically and consequently we would become independent of foreign imports in this field. As to the mode of attention by the budgetary planners to this issue in the next year's budget, we had a conversation with Dr Banki, Minister of State in charge of the Plan & Budget Organisation (P&BO) when asked about the policies to be followed in 1362 budget, he said: "The year 1361 was announced by the Prime Minister as 'the year of planning', and we are presently at one-third stage of our planning work, in the sense that the programs have already been chalked out by various districts and provinces. Some of them have already been presented to P&BO while some others are being typed out. The most important issue being pursued in the 1362 budget is the realisation of economic, social & cultural objectives of IRI in line with the outline of the five-year plan. To achieve these objectives, it is essential to increase and strengthen order & coordination in all spheres and human & physical resources should be divided in a balanced manner."

Dr Banki added: "We are preparing a major program. There are many requirements arrayed before us that are causing concern. In order to speedily meet these needs, we have to act in a realistic manner. Otherwise, there would be designed a budget that would be difficult to implement. For instance, in case we specify in our program that one hundred thousand hectares of land would be levelled during the next five years, we would have to break that land into five parts of 20 thousand hectares. May be we would not be in a position to level these 20 thousand hectares annually, but we must apply such a practical mechanism whereby we could gradually make up for the shortfall in our performance. However, in case we put 20 thousand hectares as our annual target in the plan but could not achieve the same, this would lead to the fact that neither the task is performed nor preliminaries to it are provided for. As such, it is very essential to accurately assess the government capacity for tasks in the budget."

Dr Banki describes the significance of next year's budget in the following terms: "The most important issue currently faced by the government is the devising of executive techniques which might not be traditional but conform to our own values and be able to meet our requirements. It is due to this reason that parallel to the formulation of the budget program, a group of individuals has been assigned by the Economic Council and the Ministerial Council the task of specifying executive programs and the fact as to which structural & advisory groups should carry out the bulk of the development projects." Yet another major issue, which has found its way in the next year's budget policy of the government is the expansion of agriculture as the pivot of development. Dr Banki, while referring to the fact that the Gross National Product (GNT) should be spent on investment and also be saved, says: "The current year as well as the future years would be very crucial for us because we would have to specify that we would use this amount of money and funds, possessed by us, on investments in order to increase the country's capabilities. In view of the fact that we are answerable to the basic needs of the nation, we must make necessary investments in productive fields to enable us [to] procure our own consumption requirements. The reason is that if we produce anything for our consumption it would go to lessen our foreign dependence."

The P&BO Director further said: "The discussion about the expansion of agriculture in a pivotal manner is quite evident. Imam Khomeyni, Ayatollah Montazeri, President Khamene'i and the Ministerial Council all hold the view that in case we want to taste independence, we should produce our own food requirements such as bread, meat etc. Such a development shouldn't be taken as lack of attention to industry. In order to attain agricultural progress, the industry should be paid due care, but there would no more be the slogan of "a Paykan Car for every Iranian." Rather, our industrial sector should produce as many tractors as are needed by agriculture similar to chemical fertilisers. So, it shows no lack of attention to our industry, but is to give a specific direction to it, our agriculture has been neglected in the past. After having been an exporter of farm products for half a century, we are now in such a mess that we import a large amount of food grains. We would certainly alter this phenomenon with the help of these policies."

Dr Banki pointed out: "Among other priorities that have been given priority in next year's budget, are the expansion of research, strengthening the innovative spirit, and search for academic & cultural spheres to undertake projects for resolving the socio-economic problems. Most significant steps that should be taken by any society seeking to have independence are to set up such organisations that probe into the executive problems of plans and projects and find a solution to them. We have already specified in the five-year plan that a certain portion of our national income should be spent annually on research work, and the amount allocated to this task, as compared to countries like India where it is 3%, is partial and just at the level of 1%. These researches have already begun in some places giving good results. We have to undertake such researches at an extensive level as these are essential for a country that wants to meet its needs and to resolve its problems. As such, our researchers would ultimately come to observe that the government machinery really needs their services."

While continuing his conversation and reviewing the different aspects of the budgets for 1361 and 1362, Dr Banki noted: "The main features of the 1362 budget is that this budget is obtained from a five-year plan. But in 1360, we didn't know where the country was leading to. Of course, we then possessed a series of desirable aspects but all in all, we had not designed any plan for several years. Fortunately, this plan has now been realised, and the wishes of the Martyred Rajal duly fulfilled." As to the mode of formulation of the budget, Dr Banki said: "In the light of the progress that country plans to undertake during the next five years, we are preparing our next year's budget. As a result of the survey undertaken by us, we have concluded that the budgets of the days of the former satanic regime can, in no way, be termed as "planned budget." Just take a look at the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex. This colossal investment was made without any evaluation by experts as it was aimed solely at meeting the interests of imperialists and upon the instructions of America. But, since the 1362 budget is to realise some of the objectives of the first five-year plan, the annual priorities and strategies of various sectors have been altered as compared to the past. In addition to this, the priorities of such productive plans & projects that go to boost the infrastructural development. Last year, we made efforts to finish the incomplete projects and to carry out essential tasks, but presently we are aware as to where we are proceeding, as we have initiated the infrastructural projects with specific objectives."

In another part of his conversation, Dr Banki, referring to the recruitment of expert cadre for implementing specific projects in provinces and deprived region, said: "We would provide essential facilities and amenities for the residence of those experts who would proceed to various provinces. Due to this reason, the funds for governorates-general of the various regions have been duly appropriated in the next year's budget whereas this wasn't the case last year. In earlier years, implementation of projects & programs was difficult for us at that time." (KAHYAN, Nov 22) (To be continued)

CSO: 4600/139

FIVE-YEAR EXPANSION OF SOUTHEAST RAILROADS PLANNED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 1 Nov 82 p 19

[Interview with Brother Eskandari, director general of Southeast Railroad District; date and place not specified]

[Text] Yazd—During the next 5 years, the operations to build a 670-kilometer Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas rail line and a 550-kilometer Kerman-Zahedan rail line will be completed, and the lines will be put into operation. Brother Eskandari, director general of the Southeast Railroad District, announced this fact in an interview with IRNA, and said: There were plans in the past to expand the railroad, but not much importance was given to them. After the victory of the glorious Islamic revolution, in light of the economic sanctions followed by the imposed war and the plot of the superpowers, the Islamic Republic's Railroad began to plan for the expansion of the railroad in the southeast district. At the present time railroad contractors have begun grading operations on several sections of the Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas line which passes through the cities of Sirjan, Rafsanjan and Gol-Cohar. In addition, the surveying work on the Kerman-Zahedan line which passes through Bam has been finished. The staking operation is taking place presently. Its various sections will be turned over to contractors soon. In connection with the southeast Railroad's self-sufficiency, he stated: Actions took place in this regard, and at the present time machinery parts are being built. However, repairs are done on diesels, railroad cars and mechanical tools in the main railroad factory in Tehran. We have succeeded in building cylinders and rings and a lot of other equipment and parts with the resources we have. They possess desirable quality in comparison with foreign samples. Concerning the income of this district's railroad, he said: The monthly income of the southeast railroad has increased four to five times over what it was in the pre-revolutionary years. The tariff revision and the increase of goods which were formerly loaded in the southern district have played principal roles in this matter. The railroad's income during 21 March 1981-20 March 1982 was 1,798,664,265 rials. This is a notable increase over the district's income in 21 March 1977-20 March 1978, which was 515,461,205 rials. The March 1981-March 1982 income also shows an 80 percent increase compared to March 1980-March 1981. At present, an average of 140,000 tons of cargo, such as wheat, meat, ironware, chemical fertilizer and coal clinker, is loaded and transported monthly. Concerning passenger

facilities, Brother Eskandari stated: Due to the priority of transporting goods, most of our locomotive power is used in this area at present. Therefore we have passenger trains 3 days out of the week. First-class luxury and ordinary second-class cars were formerly used on this line, but they are worn out. Now we are using the best cars in the railroad service, which are first-class sleeping and second-class express cars with the best facilities.

Concerning the role of the railroad in the imposed war, and this district's action in the reconstruction of the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr line, the southeast district director general said: The railroad is like a military unit in these instances. The most important issue for the Islamic Republic's railroad after the victory of the revolution has been the reconstruction of the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr line. About 100 kilometers were totally destroyed by the Saddamist mercenaries. This line was originally built by foreign contractors in a 1-year period, but was repaired through the efforts of the railroad brothers in 3 months and some days. I must add that this district's employees built 8 kilometers of the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr line, and 17 housing units at the Khorramshahr station.

9597

CSO: 4640/47

PAPER DISCUSSES 'ATTITUDE TOWARD ARMENIAN TERRORISM'

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 20, 21 Oct 82

[Two-part editorial by E. Hrandian]

[20 Oct 82 p 1 Part I]

[Text] Armenian terrorism is a source of worry not only for the Turkish Government but also for all those who have huge interests in Turkey, or even those who expect to get large returns from Turkey in the future. Such interests do not necessarily have to be direct and in material form. When by its government posture and assumed undertakings Turkey helps, even though on a small scale, in the continued existence of a given system, thereby guaranteeing the interests of a government even though in another country, Turkey thus becomes profitable for the said government. Another government may not have direct or indirect interests in Turkey today yet expect to profit from tomorrow's Turkey, even though only a probable expectation.

Pragmatism and opportunism can be used to describe the policies of the overwhelming majority of the governments on our globe. One in effect announces loudly that this or that event suits or contradicts the interests of its government. The other hides its real stand or tactics concerning this or that issue and by talking about the interests of people, one day helps a country for the sake of another's interests and another day does the opposite, regardless of the regime of the given country or its nature.

This profit-seeking leads to the policy of denigrating liberation movements and fighting them overtly and covertly. At one time Algerian freedom fighters were called terrorists. Also terrorists were the Vietcongs, the Sandinistas, the ZANO freedom fighters and so on. Yet now they are government personalities and take part in intergovernmental negotiations on equal footing with their opposite side. The ruling government in the countries mentioned above or other countries of these freedom-fighters at one time safeguarded its interests by calling that country's freedom-fighters terrorists in a negative sense, yet today that same government expects to seek profit once again in the land of those same "terrorists" even though they may be in charge of the government.

The posture and ruling mentality of many countries specially those with advanced industries, particularly among skilled politicians, are such that change of governments do not necessarily alter their foreign policies and interests. Consequently, if France today demonstrates friendship toward Algeria, it is not necessarily the result of the present French Government's anti-colonialist convictions, especially if there might be indications to the contrary such as the suppression of Corsican freedom-fighters whose struggle, in essence, is not much different from the one-time struggle of Algerian patriots.

The case is different, however, when the subject concerns the people of those same pragmatic governments. When the Shah of Iran dispatched troops to Oman to suppress the Zofar freedom movement, probably no one in Iran shared his views because his interests were different from those of the people and because it is not always feasible to use the ruse of 'national interests' to fool people instantly--something which more or less plays a role in Western industrialized countries.

[21 Oct 82 p 2 Part II]

[Text] The immediate concern of West Germany's rulers is their fear for the economy of tomorrow and the next day and the employment of the work force; thereby formulating a policy for example in Namibia or South Africa, a policy which in the final phase is contrary to the interests of the peoples of those two countries and creates an antithesis in the freedom movements of those countries.

This policy of West German leaders which does not change with changes of government, is based on [word indistinct] raw material supplies and other interests Germany supposedly has in South Africa. According to the theory of those leaders, if they fail to cooperate with this or that, even illegitimate, regime, thousands of metalworkers in West Germany will be idled at various plants whose raw material needs are supplied from that country or whose products are exported to that country.

This opportunistic policy is no longer able to satisfy the German people. Witness the 'Green' movement by which they are pushing aside in that and other industrialized countries the excuse of those regimes for the continuation of a system linked to economic growth and employment. This and similar movements in other industrialized countries are spurning the centuries-old policies which have cost the lives of millions, which have brought our globe to the present state of armament; and which, on the other hand and at the same time, turned our globe into a garbage dump for industrial waste, thereby endangering human lives.

If these movements develop, as early signs indicate so, pragmatic rulers will no longer be able instantly to dazzle the masses by using their today-and-tomorrow phrase of instant 'peoples interests' linked to economic rationalization. This is because the masses will look farther ahead and will not be satisfied, to quote an example, with the export of millions of items to Turkey for [word indistinct] profit or the import of raw material from their [word indistinct]. In addition to the effect of this supposed political evolution, background comments in news concerning Armenian terrorism already refers to the Armenian genocide, acknowledging the

occurrence of another evolution, this time in the minds of the masses, thus forcing the media to [word indistinct] the terrorism, even though in a falsified context, and often describing Armenian terrorism as acts of revenge.

Yet much remains before skilled politicians and professional parliamentarians and deputies change the way of their approach. We are still living in an era in which governments in practice do not condemn even genocides when those are perpetrated by a country with which they have mutual interests.

People thus are moving closer to each other and events of such a nature cause deep anger among them, irrespective of the profit-seeking calculations of their governments. The crimes of governments and their mercenaries, such as the criminal attitude of the Turkish Government, even if condemned verbally by governments, do occur because of the feelings of the people and their sense of justice.

Yesterday the Algerian freedom-fighter was a terrorist, today he is a government personality. Today the Armenian freedom-fighter is a terrorist, tomorrow....

5854

CSO: 4605/1

CITIZENS CALLED UPON TO 'JOIN BATTLEFRONT COMBATANTS'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 8 Nov 82 p 2

[Text] A message to the Muslim nation of Iran has been sent by Mohsen Reza'i, commander-in-chief of the Islamic revolutionary guards, and Colonel Seyyed Shirazi, commander of the ground forces.

The text of the message is as follows:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the people of the fighting Islamic nation and the martyr-nurturing nation of Iran, may God help them. Peace be upon you, a valiant and dear nation who have proven your great loyalty to Islam and humanity with the sacrifice of your lives, your property, and your children. Praise and the endless peace of God be upon the pure souls of your martyrs who assure the power and strength of the Islamic republic by shedding their pure blood. Peace and the blessings of God be upon the nation of partisans of God and upon their battlefield and martyrs who repeat the lessons of history to the people of the world which were taught by the Muslims at the dawn of Islam and who have responded to the celestial call of His Holiness the Imam's deputy Emam Khomeyni with their presence on the battlefield. All the people, from the young and old and the great clergymen to the workers, farmers, merchants, students, tradesmen, and respected national officials, have gone to the battlefronts in answer to the Imam's call in order to obliterate the evil of Saddam's followers with lightning speed in accordance with their valiant and divine mission and to relieve the country of the plots of America and other enemies. In the course of thanking the beloved nation for its unprecedented response to the command of the Imam of the nation and shadow of God for people to go to the battlefronts, we direct the attention of the national officials and various classes of people to some of the priorities and necessities which exist at the front and behind the lines:

1 - Since activities behind the lines, from helping to mobilize the people to helping with obtaining provisions and support for the fronts, are especially important, it is therefore requested of the respected national officials and authorities, the provincial governors, and officials of organizations that they give top priority consideration to the above matters, for the desired management of the war is directly dependent on this.

2 - It is necessary that those who have had military training or who have been to the fronts previously, as well as those who are specialists or are familiar with engineering, or mechanical repairs, go to the front with the cooperation of military people throughout the country, so that with the full cooperation of the armed forces and the help of the fighters of Islam the evil of Saddam's infidel followers will be eliminated as quickly as possible.

3 - All of those whose continued presence in the country's offices and organizations is in some way necessary, based on the discretion of organizational and ministry officials, must remain, so that with the cooperation of officials and adherence to priorities, advisable decisions can be made with regard to sending them to the front. In conclusion, it is necessary to note that in the event of the emergence of other necessities and priorities, the matter will be put before the martyr-nurturing nation. We are desirous of the glory and greatness of Islam and God.

Colonel Seyyed Shirazi, commander of the army ground forces of the Islamic republic.

Mohsen Reza'i, commander-in-chief of the Islamic revolutionary guards.

Ministry of Defense Proclamation

The Public Relations Office of the Political and Ideological section of the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced in a proclamation: In compliance with the most recent fatwa from the great leader of the revolution and the glorious Commander-in-Chief Imam Khomeyni, all members of the political and ideological section of the Ministry of Defense, the management, and the sections and offices under them proclaim their readiness to be sent to the battlefronts of the truth against falsehood.

9310

CSO: 4640/42

BIOGRAPHIES OF MAJLIS MEMBERS PUBLISHED

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 30 Nov 82 p 21

[Text]

BAZGHANDI-Hussien

Born: 1950- Bazghand, Luristan Province.
 Education: Primary level, religious studies.
 Family background: Clergyman. His father is a farmer.
 Career: Before Revolution: Religious study and propaganda.
 After Revolution: Propaganda and Friday prayer leader in Azna.
 Member of post, Telegraph and Telephone's Commission of Majlis.

BAKHSHNAVAB-Hussien

Born: 1952, one of the villages near Saveh,
 Education: Secondary school.
 Family background: Religious family. He is a clergyman.
 Career: Before Revolution: Study, teaching in Ghom theological school.
 After Revolution: Friday prayer leader, Ramhormoz.
 Language: Arabic

BAHARI ARDASHIRI, Abbasail

Born: 1953- Sarl, Mazandaran Province.
 Education: B.A. in Arabia literature and language.
 Family background: Clergyman. His father is a farmer.
 Career: Before Revolution: Farming, study and propaganda.
 After Revolution: Teaching in secondary school and teacher training college, propaganda, farming in school holiday period.
 Publication: On Mono theism, Resurrection and Zmamate. Critism on Mottaahari's Rastan Story.
 Language: Arabic, English.
 Travel: Iraq.

BEHROUZI-Maryam

Born: 1949- Tehran.
Education: Completed secondary school.
Family background: Her father is a shoe maker.
Career: Before Revolution: religious teachings.
After Revolution: religious teachings & propaganda.
Language: Arabic.
Travel: China, Japan.

CSO: 4600/139

PARIS DAILY INTERVIEWS PRESIDENT YITZHAK NAVON

PM061031 Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Nov 82 p 2

[Interview with Israeli President Yitzhak Navon by Rene Baduc--date, place not given]

[Excerpt] Question: What is your view of the Israeli-Arab and Palestinian problem?

Answer: If I compare the present situation with the situation 35 years ago I see great progress in the sense that, for the Arabs, Israel has become a reality which they must accept.

The peace with Egypt broke the consensus on rejecting Israel. Current relations with Egypt are not as I would like. There can be cold peace like cold war, but a new course for relations with the Arabs has been started. This is a long process, as moreover was the peace process between France and Britain or France and Germany, divided by years of anarchic struggle. What counts is not the length of the conflict but its direction. It has changed at least for some of the Arab states, and that is a change for the better.

There are great differences of opinion in Israel on the Palestinian question and I cannot express my opinion on them. What I can say is that there is a growing awareness of the existence of the Palestinian problem. In the Camp David agreements Begin accepted wording which I would never have accepted. I cannot subscribe to "negotiations on the permanent status" of Judaea and Samaria after a transitional period, "to the legitimate and just demand" of the Palestinians in Judaea-Samaria and Gaza, to their "participation in determining their future." That is a great deal, especially for the prime minister who has always seen the occupied zones as forming an integral part of our historical land.

The PLO, however, has not changed. I have a criterion for judging the real intentions of its political leaders: I trust what they have said to their people in their own language for a long time but not what they say to foreigners.

Al-Sadat had told his parliament that he would wage war. He did so. Then he said that he would make peace with Israel. He kept his word. I believe

him in both cases. What 'Arafat says to the representatives of the French press or whispers in Chancellor Kreisky's ear has no importance. What counts is what he says to his people in Arabic. He does not talk of peace to them. I have heard him with my own ears, he is promising that they will gain possession of Galilee, Jaffa and Jerusalem.

Question: When you were an active member of the Labor Party, you opposed the policy of the Likud, which is now in power. Can you influence the government's policy as president of the State of Israel?

Answer: I have never pronounced on a political question on which the parties are divided. I pronounce on political questions on which there is at least a two-thirds majority in the country. For instance, in the case of the peace treaty with Egypt. On the other hand I take sides on any question of principle of morality without taking anybody into consideration.

Question: On the Sabra and Shatila massacre, for example?

Answer: Yes. That was not a political question, even though my intervention could be interpreted as a political act. Everybody knows that that horrible crime was committed by the Lebanese Phalangists. Nonetheless, although none of our soldiers was involved in it, I asked for a Commission of Inquiry to be set up. I found it unacceptable that a massacre should take place with the Israeli Army nearby. I want to know whether it was possible not to know about it; whether it was possible to save even one child. I want to know who first received the news of the massacre and when. If there are responsibilities, the officials must shoulder them; that is a vital moral question. For it is our morality which will determine our future. If we do not behave according to the rules of morality, we endanger our state and the world will not support us; the Jews will be ashamed of us. Moreover, if that was merely a political question, 400,000 people would not have gathered to ask for a Commission of Inquiry to be set up. [Answer ends]

Yitzhak Navon's influence among public opinion is such that he could have a decisive influence on the Socialist Party's fate if he agreed to lead it in the next elections. But protocol made it impossible to ask him questions on that point. I tried to approach the question indirectly by asking him what is the political influence of a constitutional president devoid of any power.

Answer: It lies in the symbol which I represent. For that, I not only need no power but I would readily give up what little I have, like that of appointing judges or signing the texts of laws.

The Israeli people comprises people from 102 countries, speaking 81 languages. The president's task is to strengthen what those tribes have in common and give each of them value. The first man, one of our writers said, was a great philosopher when he first pronounced the word "me" by that he did not mean his head or his nails but the link between his memory and his aspirations.

I am a mediator between the common memory of the communities which form the people of Israel and their aspirations. I do not need a budget or a secretary for that. All I need is to fly like a bee from one community to another to make them feel that they are welcome in the Israeli family, while describing the other communities' difficulties and asking each to give of its best.

There is no split between Jews of Eastern and Western origin. But since each Jewish community represents the average level of its country of origin and since there is a difference between the level of development in the United States and in Kurdistan, it is obvious that there is also a difference between the American and Kurdish Jews. My task is to prevent that difference becoming hereditary. What people forget is that in 1963 one-third of the illiterate people were of European origin: World War II had prevented them from studying. The danger to be avoided is that the weakest groups should accept their situation as if it was their destiny. The role of the president, who symbolizes the whole house of Israel, is to bring out the best in each community. [Answer ends]

The results of that "symbolic" activity explain the president's great popularity. Opinion polls show that after each meeting which Mr Navon has with one of Israel's "tribes," 46 percent of the people interviewed say that their national identity has increased while 81 percent say that their village or district has gained in dignity.

CSO: 4400/112

ISRAEL

INDUSTRY MINISTER HOPEFUL ABOUT TIES WITH AFRICA

TA301823 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1705 GMT 30 Nov 82

[Report on interview with Industry and Commerce Minister Gid'on Pat by Gadi Sukenik; date and place not given--live or recorded, with Pat's remarks recorded earlier]

[Text] Gid'on Pat, on returning from the Gatt conference in Switzerland, said that he met there with large delegations from African countries, which he would not name because they asked him not to publicize the details of the talks.

[Pat] They only asked for one thing: That we put less emphasis on political ties and more on economic ties. Of course, they regard Israel as a developed country, and the Americans also presented us as such. So, I can definitely say that some of those meetings were something of a ray of light in our relations with that world that has no diplomatic relations with Israel.

[Sukenik] Pat said that the African representatives asked Israel to resume the technological aid programs it ran long ago, including the sending of experts. However, this time the emphasis is not on agricultural aid, but on industry and advanced technology.

[Pat] I definitely think that there can be a very interesting improvement in our relations with the African countries. As soon as the foreign minister returns, I will of course report to and consult with him on how to actually make these improvements. But, we were definitely encouraged by the meetings that we were asked to arrange, and that we did not have to ask to arrange, as unfortunately was the case for many years.

[Sukenik] Pat said that the Gatt conference itself, many regarded Israel as an economic child prodigy because it has almost no unemployment, while its real inflation, according to the industry and commerce minister, is less than 50 percent if the linkage system's effect is taken into account.

CSO: 4400/111

SHARON, EHRLICH CALL TO STOP ARAB LAND ROBBERY

TA241405 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 24 Nov 82 p 2

[Report by Yosef Wachsman]

[Text] The head of the settlement section in the Zionist Federation, Mati Drobls, has issued urgent orders to check into the possibility of establishing community settlements in the Jerusalem area, near the areas captured by Arabs, in order to stop the land robbery from expanding. Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon and Deputy Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich, who is the chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs, told MA'ARIV yesterday that everything will be done in order to stop this phenomenon. The two ministries are now checking what steps should be taken.

More details were given yesterday following the report of MA'ARIV about the mode of action of the bodies directing the Arab takeover of the lands which are intended for Jewish settlements.

The takeover of the areas is done with the aid of maps for locating areas for Jewish settlements which have reached those Arab bodies in ways which are not yet known. With the aid of these maps they locate the heart of the intended settlement about to be established and immediately enlist villagers in plowing up the area.

After the plowing a few tents are erected in the area, and after a week a hut is built, or a few huts. If up until this moment they are not caught and taken off the land, they begin building rigid structures with the aid of many persons and unlimited building supplies. The houses are built at record speed, within a month or even less than that, and very often they work at night and day without a stop.

This speed is important for them since they learned that after a building was built no one will chase them out of the area and the area is disqualified for Jewish settlements since the authorities do not want to get into legal debates over the title for the land.

This activity is done systematically and an "unknown hand" directs it in a very sophisticated way. There are already quite clear reports as to the

identity of those behind the action, but as long as there is no clear cut evidence against them the authorities refrain from taking steps against them.

Settling elements told MA'ARIV that up until the uncovering of the subject by MA'ARIV the authorities hushed the affair, although they knew about the growing problem of land takeover. The elements expressed the hope that now after the affair was uncovered this policy of hushing up the problem will stop and an active policy to uproot the evil and put a stop to the unlawful robbery of state lands by Arabs, who act, according to the opinion of those settling elements, with the guidance and aid of the PLO.

CSO: 4400/111

SHIM'ON PERES INTERVIEWED ON VARIOUS ISSUES

TA242030 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1935 GMT 24 Nov 82

[Interview with Labor Party Chairman MK Shim'on Peres by Ya'akov Ahime'ir and Menashe Raz; live in the television studio]

[Excerpts] [Question] It seems to me that it is impossible to begin the interview with you this evening, Mr Peres, without hearing your reaction to the decision of the Commission of Inquiry into the massacre in the Beirut refugee camps, a decision published this evening. According to this decision, central figures in Israel, in the government and the IDF, are warned that they might be harmed by the conclusions of this commission. What is your reaction to this decision?

[Answer] I will not jump to conclusions. This is a move that comes in the midst of debates. One should wait until the end. I will certainly not draw any conclusions before they are released. I only want to say one thing: It is good that there is a Commission of Inquiry. In the absence of a Commission of Inquiry--which we and another 400,000 people who gathered at Malkhey Yisra'el Square demanded--a big stain would have tarnished the Jewish people and the State of Israel. Not even for one moment did I think that we were involved in the massacre--and I also said as much at the Knesset--and I am almost certain that this point will be clarified to the entire world. There is another problem, that of the functioning of the government and the responsibility of people. We will await the conclusions.

[Question] At a meeting of the Alignment faction at the Knesset--and one cannot ignore this meeting--MK Yitzhaq Rabin leveled harsh accusations against you implying or, perhaps, specifically questioning your leadership. Mr Rabin claims that tearfulness on your part is not a political plan or policy. What is your reaction to this criticism?

[Answer] My dear friend, this outburst angered me and anger is not a good adviser, at least not the way I see it; there are more important issues. If anybody questions my leadership he should not do so on television or in an interview. Let him come to the pertinent partisan institution and air his questions. Such outbursts are common in politics and I am not impressed by them.

[Question] Mr Peres, I do not want to anger you but allow me to quote further from Yitzhaq Rabin's remarks. He quoted President Truman who said: Whoever cannot take the heat in the kitchen should leave. Does this not necessarily imply that the Labor Party is in dire need of leadership?

[Answer] If you are already asking, I will tell you that for 5 years I have been receiving a great deal of appreciation from my colleagues. I have withstood this campaign for 5 years and neither the heat in the kitchen, nor the coolness of the opposition have made me lose my coolheadedness. I do not accept any other considerations or evaluations.

[Question] Meaning, that the rehabilitation of the Labor Party is your own personal achievement?

[Answer] Not only mine, but also mine.

[Question] When referring to the possibility that you may step aside, the name of President Yitzhaq Navon emerges.

[Answer] Referring? Who is referring? I will remind you that I was legally elected by the party convention. I went to elections, the Alignment under my leadership received 710,000 votes. If you want to substitute elections with pools I can tell you that the man would have to be replaced every 3 months because then he will become the next target.

[Question] Nevertheless, there is talk in your party about the possibility that Yitzhaq Navon may head the list in the next elections. What do you think about the candidacy of your good friend, Yitzhaq Navon?

[Answer] Yitzhaq Navon is my friend and I feel a great deal of appreciation toward him. He has asked that as long as he is president there should be no public or other debate on this issue and I will respect his wish.

[Question] There is a feeling that the storm provoked by Max Frankel's article in THE NEW YORK TIMES has somehow left the main point in the side-lines, that point being a cut--if at all--in U.S. aid. There is a feeling that, in this respect, you are in a catch because if aid is cut you will be held responsible for it. What is the policy that should be adopted on this issue, in your opinion?

[Answer] If I were the prime minister or a minister today I would seek to increase U.S. aid, first and foremost, for security needs. We receive \$3 billion from the United States of which \$2.2 billion go for security needs and \$800 million for development in Israel. As for security, sanctions have actually been imposed on us; the sale of aircraft to us has been postponed. The price of weapons rises yearly and the dollar exchange rate decreases yearly. In actual fact, we asked this sum in 1974 and it has lost a great deal of its value since then. The security budget in Israel is not the consequence of the size of our state but of the enemies confronting it. I would indeed demand an increase in the security aid.

As for the economic aid, I think that we need it to develop our country. The dispute is neither with, nor in America; the dispute is within the State of Israel: How to invest these sums. This is a legitimate argument and we do not want the Americans to decide for us.

[Question] I assume that part of these funds go to the settlements.

[Answer] To the settlements, to raising living standards, to increasing the [national] debt; this issue is treated frivolously. The question is not America but what will happen to us. We currently owe \$21 billion and we pay high interest for it. How long can we go on? Does everything boil down to America or not to America? All the funds that we receive from the outside must be dedicated to three targets in Israel: Security, aliyah and absorption and developing the state in order to reach economic independence sometime. Whoever deviates from this position must be criticized.

CSO: 4400/111

'AL HAMISHMAP' INTERVIEWS RABIN ON JORDAN, POLICY

TA191644 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 19 Nov 82 pp 3, 11

[Interview of MK Yitzhaq Rabin by Dorit Gefen: "Husayn's Incorporation Is the Key to Advancing Peace"--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] Over the last few months there have been two weighty tragedies in Lebanon. The first was the massacre in Sabra and Shatila, and the second was the collapse of the headquarters in Tyre. As a former prime minister, do such events force the political echelons to some sort of political conclusions, without referring to the investigation committees that are examining the events?

[Answer] With regard to the two events you mentioned, one of them is under the examination of the Commission of Inquiry, in accordance with the Law of Commissions of Inquiry, 1969; and with regard to the second, there is still an internal investigation committee of the defense establishment. With all the difference between these two tragic events, they are weighty catastrophes. I have no doubt that this requires that the political echelons reach conclusions. However, as long as the State Commission of Inquiry is at work, the political echelons are also prevented by law, as well as by public morality, from drawing conclusions. As for the tragedy in Tyre, I would wait, and I assume that by the time this interview is published the findings of the investigation committee will be known. If you mean conclusions resembling the decision to resign--not necessarily. This is not incumbent.

[Question] Not upon even one of the cabinet members?

[Answer] Not according to what is the custom of the law of Israel. It is worth recalling that the Alignment government, too, did not resign after the Yom Kippur blunder.

[Question] Our relations with the United States are not improved. There are some who describe them as a sharp confrontation, there are some who think they are on the brink of a crisis, and there are some who are presenting them as an almost frontal clash. You often travel to the United States and, among others, meet with U.S. administrative representatives. Are we in a crisis? Is this an unavoidable confrontation?

[Answer] When speaking of Israeli-U.S. relations, they should be divided into three planes: Contacts with the administration; contacts with the public, which has a real--almost immediate--expression in Congress, with both its houses; and contacts with the Jewish community in the United States. It is impossible to make a generalization. With regard to the administration, I would not define the situation as a confrontation, but as differences of opinion in the two immediately operative fields. One is in connection with the negotiations in Lebanon, and the second, which is more substantive and more basic, is connected with the differences of opinion over the question of what should be done to advance the peace process. In general, I would say that in regard to certain aspects, mainly after the war in Lebanon, an absurd situation has been created. The Americans emerged as the main beneficiaries of the war. They know that. This takes expression in private statements by administration staff and also in the U.S. media. The United States has strengthened its position in the area to a considerable degree, at the expense of the Soviet Union. And this will have tangible expressions. When Syria and the PLO want to reach some sort of solution, either in West Beirut or in connection with Lebanon in general, they did not go to Moscow, but to Washington--not to mention the other Arab countries. Now an Arab delegation headed by King Hassan has gone to the United States, one that included the Syrian foreign minister. The PLO was also prepared to join it, had the United States not stopped this. Perhaps this delegation will also go to Moscow, but that will only be a show.

[Question] Despite the advantages you have enumerated, has Israel's status in the United States not dropped to a nadir the like of which it is difficult to remember?

[Answer] Israel's status has been mainly weakened in public opinion, and the United States wants to take advantage of the strengthening of its position in the Middle East and Israel's weakening in public opinion to advance matters it believes in. There is a U.S. awareness that the Israeli move criticized by public opinion has given the U.S. status an outstanding advantage. There is a desire in the administration to take advantage of Israel's weakening in public opinion to advance matters even--in the concept of the government of Israel--at Israel's expense.

[Question] At the beginning of the war there was a firm impression that the United States was not only not criticizing Israel, but in agreement with the war moves, at least in silent agreement.

[Answer] I would not say that. The United States did not express itself positively. But the very fact of its nonintervention and the very fact that it did not appeal to Israel except in rare cases, such as the brutal bombardment on 11 August, hints that there was post factum agreement. In my opinion, an analysis of the past is not so important as discussion of the practical problems today. For example, the main party today that is interested in a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and the most active in achieving this objective, is the United States. If Israel carries out a unilateral withdrawal, the greatest disappointment will be that of the United States, because, in the administration's assessment, without making

Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon dependent on a Syrian and PLO withdrawal, first and foremost, there is no chance for U.S. policy to obtain the consolidation of Lebanese sovereignty over Lebanon. Today we are witnessing identical attitudes by the U.S. administration and the government of Israel on the issue of the unilateral withdrawal. As far as advancing peace is concerned, there is a difference and there is a dispute.

[Question] Can the government of Israel take advantage of the identical interests in one area in order to get "benefits" or compensation in the area in which there are differences of opinion and contradictory interests with the United States?

[Answer] I do not think that the two different things can be linked together and a sort of deal made. But today I would not define the situation in relations between the administration and Israel as a crisis, but as differences of opinion. And it is preferable for us, the Alignment members, not to create an incorrect picture which will be disproved within a month or two and we find ourselves as having threatened a situation which turned out not to exist.

[Question] Are the administration's high preference for advancing the peace process in the area, and the government of Israel's rejection of the Reagan plan, not leading to a crisis situation, in view of the Arab activity now going on?

[Answer] The Reagan plan was received by the government with hysteria, and by certain groups in the Labor Party and Mapam with euphoria. I was given the opportunity to clarify with U.S. elements in Israel and in the United States what, in fact, the Reagan plan is. What is its goal? When the Americans come out with such a plan, it is not a public relations exercise. It is a serious political move that has been examined, weighed and checked out for a long time. The plan must be analyzed as to its content, its operative objective. With regard to its content, all it does is to reflect the basic U.S. view of the way to solve the dispute: On the basis of the Camp David agreements, which I have known from at least four presidents. I asked U.S. interlocutors: Is the Reagan plan a substitute for the Camp David agreements? Their unambiguous answer was: No. And, really, anyone who reads the working paper with the preface that bears the subheading: "principles," reads in the first paragraph: We continue to be committed to the Camp David agreements. I asked: Is this not a substitute for Camp David? Is acceptance of the plan by the participants who signed the agreement, and other elements, a condition for the resumption of the talks? The answer was unequivocal: No. This being so, I asked: What is the status of the plan? They answered me: This is the U.S. position on the interpretation of the Camp David agreements--autonomy and the image of the permanent solution, as we, the Americans, as a party to the discussion, will present it.

[Question] Why did they have to jump the gun and present their position on matters that are not yet on the agenda?

[Answer] To this they said that they had reached the conclusion, with which I agree by the way, that in the original tripartite framework of the Camp David agreements--Egypt, Israel and the United States--there was not much chance, and I say: There is almost no chance, of continuing the Camp David process; that is, to reach an agreement about the foundation of autonomy. They say: The test of our initiative lies in one thing--will it bring Husayn to join the negotiations on the basis of Camp David? That is to say, progress toward peace in two phases: Autonomy, and only after that, the permanent solution. That is the test. One of them told me: Today the ball is not in the Israeli court. The ball is in the Arab court.

[Question] Does this also include the PLO?

[Answer] In contrast to the voices speaking in Israel about mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel, the Americans are not speaking about this. They are demanding of the PLO what they guaranteed to us in 1975--a public, unambiguous statement by the PLO recognizing Israel's right to exist and accepting Resolutions 242 and 338. Before that, the United States will not recognize or speak with the PLO. By the way, the United States has stood firm on this and is still standing firm on it, and very nicely too. In all the negotiations about the PLO's evacuation from West Beirut, Philip Habib did not hold one [last word in bold face type] contact with PLO members. The Americans do not support, in fact they are opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state, even to granting the right to self-determination to the Palestinians. They know that in the conditions of the Middle East such a thing would automatically lead to a Palestinian state. They did not do this only because of us. They know that if these things are not said, Husayn will not come to the negotiations. He does not need to come to negotiations in order to give the PLO territory he receives. Therefore, the test of the U.S. plan is--will it bring Husayn to the negotiations.

[Question] One of the government's complaints about the Reagan plan is that the United States has taken up a stand on the conflict and its solution, and the question is: Does the United States have any right to take a stand?

[Answer] We have always claimed, even when we were in the government: You are not only a party to the negotiations. The United States has a role beyond being one of the parties. The United States is also an influential factor, being the one who takes things out and puts things in at moments of crisis, in preparation, in bridging gaps and in initiatives of its own. Therefore we have always said: Do not take a stand. Although we all know that in the course of negotiations the United States puts forward proposals, there is a difference between speaking through diplomatic channels and a president coming out with a public plan which binds him afterward--because of the prestige of the president in the United States. But I repeat, if Jordan joins the peace process on the basis of Camp David in the wake of the Reagan initiative, knowing that this is the U.S. interpretation, I will regard that as a positive result.

[Question] You indicated the main role the United States intends for Husayn, and you also regard his joining the negotiations as a condition for resuming the negotiations. Has Husayn got anything to discuss today with the Likud government, whose positions are known, and what could he expect from an Alignment government?

[Answer] From the aspect of the government at present, I see many difficulties for Husayn. First of all, at this moment the government is not inclined to accept a simple proposal I have already dwelt upon, whose aim is to make things easier for it and to give it weapons to overcome the opposition in the Arab world. Secondly, the government says today: Our interpretation of 242, when it is a question of the eastern sector, is nonacceptance of any part of a territorial withdrawal in the permanent solution. Therefore, I am not saying with certainty that Husayn will not come, but things are certainly not being made easy for him. When referring to the Alignment, I believe that the conditions are much easier, both because we are willing to freeze the settlements, if he comes, and because the Alignment program is not border changes, but another map. And we are prepared to say that the clause in 242 that discusses a withdrawal from the territories, not all of them, can be implemented.

[Question] But the Arab demand, that of Husayn too, is a withdrawal from all the territories?

[Answer] Husayn can come to the negotiations and say: I have not given up one iota of my demand for a comprehensive withdrawal from all the territories and for the partition of Jerusalem (by the way, Al-Sadat also declared that that was his position), but this position of mine does not stop me from now entering into negotiations over the establishment of autonomy. When the time comes, I will fight for my demands. We would accept his announcement and say that we regarded a withdrawal, which in our view is not comprehensive, [last three words in boldface type] as a commitment by us when the reference is to a permanent solution. I believe that there is a substantive difference concerning King Husayn's ability to join negotiations on the basis of the Alignment positions. It would make it easier for him and revive the peace process, which is frozen and neutralized today.

CSO: 4400/111

U.S. IDF PRESENCE SAID KEY TO LEBANON STABILITY

TA261840 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 26 Nov 82 p 4 Weekend Supplement

[Column by Arye Tzimuqi: "The Defense Minister to General Donn Starry: 'You, Americans, Can Give Arms to the Lebanese Army and We Can Make It Stand on Its Feet'"]

[Text] After listening to the defense minister's review of the war in Lebanon, General Donn Starry, the head of the U.S. readiness command and a candidate to the post of NATO commander, asked Sharon: Who can help in Lebanon's rehabilitation and cure?

Sharon replied: Only two countries, to the extent that they cooperate in order to prevent the return of the chaos of the past.

Starry: Who are they?

Sharon: The United States and Israel.

Starry: How?

Sharon: In order to prevent Lebanon from once again becoming a center of terrorism, its army should be supplied with weapons. You can do that, while we can make its army stand on its feet quickly and effectively since we are located there. You live far away from here; your "Marines" will leave Lebanon just as quickly as they came, whereas Israel and Lebanon will continue to be neighbors.

Starry arrived in Israel this week to learn the military lessons of the war in Lebanon. The talk between the two men, held in a friendly atmosphere, reflects the defense minister's basic view of the United States' status and role in rebuilding the torn, destroyed Lebanon.

Sharon is firm in his position, which he has reiterated many times before, that the key to finding arrangements in Lebanon is in the hands of the Americans. He said as much at cabinet sessions and other forums, emphasizing that it would be enough for the Americans to say one word and an agreement would be reached with Lebanon. Incidentally, the opinion prevails in the defense establishment, and even in certain political circles, that if the

Reagan plan had not been published on the day the last boatful of terrorists left Beirut, we would have already attained peace. This view holds that the Americans ordered Amin al-Jumayyil not to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel, except in the framework of a comprehensive agreement--and, after all, this is what the Reagan plan is all about.

Those subscribing to this approach claim that Amin has been under heavy pressure from Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan. In their opinion, during his visit to the United States the Lebanese president realized that he should refrain from signing a peace treaty with Israel because such a move might hamper his efforts to merge into the Arab world. If Amin had to choose between the United States and Israel on the one hand and the Arab world on the other, he would opt for the latter.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the United States believes the Lebanese problem should not be detached from the complexity of regional problems and its general policy.

In contrast, there are those in Jerusalem who believe that the Americans have begun to sober up and would not repeat their past mistakes which led to a stalemate on the Lebanon issue. They also realize that the publication of the Reagan plan did not contribute to accelerating a solution to the Lebanese problem.

There are signs that immediately after the terrorists' evacuation from Beirut the Syrians had been ready to display a more moderate position than they have been recently. The power changeover in Moscow--the election of Andropov to replace Brezhnev--may also have stiffened the Syrian position.

The freeze that has prevailed in the negotiations on the future of Lebanon, right at the onset of winter, has aroused gloomy thoughts among many Israeli leaders. The impression is that the Syrians feel comfortable with the current situation. The Lebanese are not enthusiastic about the departure of the IDF soldiers from Lebanon, since the latter are doing the policing work. There are those who believe that deep down, and as long as he has not succeeded in setting up his own army, al-Jumayyil prefers the presence of the IDF in Lebanon over an arrangement leading to its withdrawal.

Hence, it is possible to understand recent voices emanating from inside and outside the government about the need to carry out a unilateral withdrawal in Lebanon to the borders of the 45 to 50 kms security belt. Indeed, there are those who claim that one must now show weakness and that the talk about a unilateral withdrawal might be interpreted as a bargaining point from a position of weakness. In contrast, there are those who believe that it is better to caution the Lebanese Government now that if progress is not made soon in the negotiations for the pullout of the foreign forces and toward determining the security arrangements, Israel would pull all its forces out and would not be responsible for events in the evacuated areas.

It is easy to foresee what would happen in Lebanon if the IDF withdrew. In fact, if an agreement is not reached with Israel, there will be no other choice but to reinforce Major Haddad's troops and to ensure that he controls

the entire security belt. Sharon has warned the Lebanese as well as the Americans that it will be impossible to toy with the achievement of arrangements for long because Israel would be forced to draw its own conclusions according to its own interests.

There is no doubt that many people in government harbor fears about Lebanon's future. Amin al-Jumayyil does not resemble his brother Bashir, who had maintained a practical friendship with the Israelis for many years. Many suspect the Lebanese president's intentions, particularly in view of his many problems and delicate situations. Frustration and uneasiness have been voiced more than once in the cabinet about what is happening in Lebanon and there are even some ministers who wonder whether it would not have been better if we had only sufficed with occupying the security strip.

These days, Sharon has been explaining that it is more important to emphasize what Lebanon lacks rather than what it has. He says Lebanon does not have a Palestinian state, a world center of terror and vast arms arsenals ready to be used against Israel. Sharon is also aware of the fears harbored by many people about the future of the IDF's presence in Lebanon. However, in cabinet meetings he calls for forbearance and patience and, first and foremost, adherence to the objectives. Then, in his opinion, the objectives Israel outlined for itself in Lebanon would finally be achieved. Sharon reiterates that there is no force in the world capable of moving Israel out of Lebanon. He believes that everything depends on the Americans: If they so desire, an arrangement will be reached with Lebanon; otherwise, the current situation--which is also bad for them--will continue. Time and again, Sharon reiterates: We hold the cards.

Meanwhile, people in the defense establishment claim that trade relations have been established with Lebanon whose scope exceed those with Egypt. Trade with Lebanon amounted to \$20 million in October and may total \$30 million in November. In their opinion, when an agreement is reached it will only be a formal wording of an existing state of normalization between the two countries.

On the other hand, it is hard to get rid of the bad impression caused by the obstinacy of Amin al-Jumayyil and his close associates in abstaining from direct contacts with Israel. Defense establishment officials find solace in the fact that the Phalangists continue to show loyalty and a friendly attitude toward Israel. They also note publications by the Phalangists which speak in favor of peace negotiations with Israel. The Phalangists are trying to convince the Israelis not to attach special importance to al-Jumayyil's public declarations and emphasize that he is subject to constant pressures from various quarters. The Phalangists continue to regard the PLO as their enemy and they want to create a situation leading to the departure of the Palestinians from Lebanon. Perhaps recent stories about the mass murder of Palestinians in Beirut are exaggerated, but there are grounds to the reports that thousands of them have been expelled beyond the Syrian lines. It appears then that the Phalangists do not think twice about harassing the Palestinians. It is doubtful that the commission of inquiry they set up to investigate the massacre in the refugee camps will publish its real conclusions, just as it is doubtful that they will even try to find the real culprits.

CSO: 4400/111

U.S. SAID INCREASING 'INTERVENTION' IN WEST BANK

TA190930 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 19 Nov 82 p 19

[Commentary by Shmu'el Segev: "The United States Is Increasing Its Intervention in the Affairs of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza"]

[Text] Various signs indicate that the United States has decided to increase its direct intervention in the affairs of the West Bank and the Gaza district. In the framework of its preparations for resuming the political momentum based on the spirit of the principles formulated by President Reagan, the United States is now inclined to expand its circle of relations with Palestinian figures who may merge in the negotiations on the establishment of the autonomy according to the Camp David accords.

Thus, following the appearance of Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj and former Gaza Mayor Rashad al-Shawwah on a prestigious television program in the United States, the Reagan administration has now invited the chairman of the "Federation of Palestinian Leagues," Mustafa Dudin, for political talks in Washington and to appear before the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Relations Subcommittee. At the time, Israel banned Frayj and al-Shawwah from departing for the United States and both Palestinian leaders were ultimately interviewed by a television crew sent especially to Israel. Mustafa Dudin, on the other hand, in addition to being the "strong man" of the "village leagues" is a former Jordanian Government minister and at present is one of the public supporters of the "Reagan plan." Therefore, it will be interesting to see how the Israeli Government treats this matter, whether it will prevent him from leaving for Washington or whether it will permit him to appear before the U.S. Congress.

However, regardless of the possible departure of Mustafa Dudin for the United States, the very fact that contacts are held with him prove that the "village leagues" are beginning to be part of the political scene in the territories. Since the "civilian administration" headed by Professor Menahem Milson was established last November, seven village leagues have been established in Judaea and Samaria, currently comprising about 120 villages or approximately one third of the villages in the West Bank. The constant strengthening of the "village leagues" in spite of the pressures exerted on them by more extremist nationalist elements, is clear proof that not every Palestinian is by definition a "PLO supporter."

On the contrary, as a direct result of the war in Lebanon, the evacuation of the terrorists from Beirut and their scattering in eight Arab countries, the tension in PLO-Syrian relations and the confusion in the Palestinian and pan-Arab establishment regarding the "Reagan plan," enrollment into the "village leagues" may increase in the next few weeks. In spite of Menahem Milson's resignation in the wake of the Israeli Government's initial hesitations to investigate the massacre in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps it seems that his policy in the territory persists and will apparently continue to enjoy the proper encouragement from the Israeli Government.

This assessment is based on the behaviour of the Arabs in the territories during the war in Lebanon. Contrary to the past, when the Arab of the territories demonstrated against the Israeli authorities and thousands of workers did not show up for work at their work sites within the boundaries of the "green line," the inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza this time behaved as if the war against the PLO in Lebanon did not concern them and none of them boycotted the Israeli work market. Only on one occasion, the day following the massacre in Sabra and Shatila, was there a partial commercial strike in the West Bank, a strike that contrasted sharply with the stormy demonstrations held that same day in the Arab villages in the Israeli Galilee. Despite the PLO's incitement and the call over the Palestinian radio station on the Arabs of the territories not to show up for work in Israel and thus weaken the Israeli war effort, the Arabs of the territories totally ignored this call. A similar call was also not heeded on "land day" on 30 March this year.

Israeli elements acting in the territories attribute this complacency to the fact that the "National Guidance Committee" has been outlawed and that several mayors--such as the mayors of Nabulus, Janin, Ramallah, Qalqilyah and Dura--have been dismissed. The dismissal of the mayors divested the PLO supporters of the tools required for organizing "mass demonstration." Moreover, mayors usually enjoy broad local authority and whenever persuasion fails, threats and personal intimidation follow. The dismissal of the mayors of the large towns has detracted from the small towns mayors' ability to perform and has had an immediate effect on the daily behavior of the inhabitants of the territories.

Thus, for instance, when the pro-PLO mayor of Jericho died he was replaced by a man known for his staunch support of King Husayn. The PLO refused to recognize him but this did not have any impact and the new mayor prevailed in his post while he continues to support King Husayn and has even expressed support for the "Reagan plan."

It seems that the current behavior of the inhabitants of the territories stems from their increasing realization of the urgent need to include Jordan in the peace process and that time is not working in favor of the Arab countries. This feeling found public expression in the mass rally held by the "village leagues" last week.

In a daring and firm speech, Mustafa Dudin publicly called on King Husayn "to get off the fence" and actively merge in the negotiations on the establishment of the autonomy, according to Reagan's interpretation. Dudin

explained to his supporters that it is clear today that there is an Israeli national consensus not to negotiate with the PLO while there is readiness, at least on the part of the Labor Party, to conduct talks with Jordan and even reach a territorial compromise with it. If Husayn continues to hesitate and does not take a "courageous initiative," the Palestinians may miss the train and the accelerated process of merging the West Bank into the Israeli economy will ultimately also bring about the official annexation of the West Bank. Dudin and his friends do not accept the principle of refusing to conduct negotiations with Israel. They believe that the establishment of the "village leagues" may in the course of time become a tool through which Israel will want to conduct the negotiations on the establishment of the autonomy.

Nevertheless and in spite of the expected expansion of the "village leagues" it would be a mistake to disregard the weight carried by the Husayn supporters in the territories. Although they maintain a low profile and try not to be too obvious in their public activities, their influence behind the scenes is still strong.

The group of Husayn supporters are currently headed by Hadj Ma'zuz al-Masri, a former mayor of Nabulus, and Nadim (Zaru), a former mayor of Ramallah who was deported by the military government and allowed to return to his hometown last year. Ilyas Frayj and Rashad al-Shawwah are also known to be supporters of Husayn's joining the negotiations and they were encouraged by the release of the "Reagan plan" and the support it attracted from various sectors of the Israeli public.

When the proposal made by Israeli Ambassador to the United States Moshe Arens to temporarily freeze settlement to enable King Husayn to join the talks was published, these people publicly expressed their support for this notion and strengthened their supporters' faith that "the time for negotiations is approaching." Contrary to other mayors known for their loyalty to the PLO, the Jordanian supporters are not firmly opposed to the establishment of the "village leagues." They believe that, in any event, even if Husayn joins the negotiations, a local body ready to join negotiations on the establishment of the autonomy is not of great importance.

Of course this compromising mood is only temporary and depends on the ability of the United States to persuade Saudi Arabia to "bend" the PLO's arm so as to give King Husayn the "green light" to join the negotiations. Palestinian circles in the West Bank say that in preliminary contacts State Department officials held with Saudi Arabia and Jordan they received the impression that Saudi Arabia would indeed be willing to more actively support the "Reagan plan."

The U.S. officials attached more importance to the encouraging signals from Saudi Arabia than to the "understanding" revealed by King Husayn. But then came the summit in Fes and this dispelled hopes. Even though contacts continue between the PLO and Jordan, the fact is that Yasir 'Arafat has not yet granted King Husayn the necessary mandate for conducting negotiations although Palestinian elements believe that such a mandate will ultimately

be extended. They claim that the United States is not giving up on its plan and that following its departure from Lebanon, the PLO's pan-Arab status has declined and its blackmailing power has decreased.

On the other hand, King Husayn has been "generous" to the PLO in agreeing to take in several hundred fighters evacuated from Beirut and opening a PLO political bureau in Amman headed by Halil al-Wazir ("Abu Jihad").

Following a lengthy interval, the activities of the Joint Jordanian-PLO Committee funneling pan-Arab funds into the West Bank have resumed. If this conciliatory trend persists, as Husayn supporters in the territories hope, it will be possible to thaw the freeze in the negotiations on the establishment of the autonomy and to include Jordan and Palestinians in the peace process. Mustafa Dudin's scheduled visit to Washington and his testimony before the U.S. Congress Foreign Affairs Subcommittee may strengthen this process.

CSO: 4400/111

U.S. SAID WITHHOLDING RESEARCH ON LAVI AIRCRAFT

TA250815 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 25 Nov 82 p 1

[Report by defense correspondent Hirsh Goodman]

[Text] The State Department has been withholding from Israel since last August the findings of three U.S. firms which were carrying out research on the Lavi fighter plane.

Earlier this year, after Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon approved a final version of the Lavi, the Israel aircraft industries requested feasibility studies on various alternatives for the Lavi's wing and tail sections. These are to be built mainly of composite materials, using technology Israel has not yet acquired.

The three firms approached were General Dynamics, Vought-LTV, and Grumman, each of which charged roughly \$1m for the initial study. Their findings were presented to the State Department's Office for International Affairs, which was due to process them and release them to Israel.

After perusing the findings, Israel was due to stipulate to each of the firms which of the alternatives the Air Force preferred, and to ask for bids no later than December.

THE JERUSALEM POST has learned that the State Department has held up transmission of the material to Israel, claiming that it still has to assess the situation given the changes in the current version of the Lavi over that originally approved by the U.S. some 2 years ago.

Israeli sources said last night that they were extremely worried about the attitude of the State Department, and noted that bureaucratic procrastination, which may or may not be a result of administration policy, is setting back the plane's development programme by many months. This may force Israel either to acquire the technology here or seek it elsewhere.

France, Italy and Germany all have the technical know-how, but the fear in Israel is that if the Americans for some reason should deny Israel the information they originally agreed to release, the Lavi programme could be set back considerably.

Israeli defense officials questioned yesterday said they suppose the reason for American delays is that the U.S. would prefer the Israel Air Force to purchase the all-American aircraft, for economic and political reasons. By keeping Israel dependent on American-made aircraft, the administration would also retain greater leverage over Israel's foreign policy.

If the State Department releases the data and lifts its current opposition to American participation in the research, development and design of the Lavi, Israel will spend around \$500m in the U.S. over the next decade.

Defense Ministry sources also said yesterday that a story carried in the POST earlier this week citing opposition to the Lavi project in the special sub-committee of the Knesset State Control Committee was inaccurate. The sources claimed that no opposition was registered, and that the committee accepted the clarifications requested on certain issues without opposition.

The Lavi project has been checked and re-checked three times, the sources added, and has been approved by the treasury, the Defense Ministry, the Air Force and the Israel aircraft industries. The only point of disagreement between the defense establishment and the Finance Ministry was over financing, the treasury wanting most of the research funds to come from the American aid package--a problematic request because by American law all such aid has to be spent in the U.S.

CSO: 4400/111

'DAVAR' COMMENTATOR ON 'U.S. FIASCO IN LEBANON'

TA031315 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Dec 82 p 15

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "Reagan Against Reagan"]

[Text] The Americans' right hand is working against their left one. Uncle Sam is hitting Uncle Sam. This is one of the obstacles on the road to a settlement in Lebanon. This is also one of the difficulties the Reagan plan is facing in its attempts to bring about a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. This is the cause of the "Gordian knot" of comprehensive U.S. policy in the Middle East. This complaint against U.S. policy can be encouraged [as published] if we compare it with U.S. policy as it was directed in the past by Henry Kissinger in his various roles.

Let us start with Lebanon. U.S. diplomacy is trying to convince the Syrians and the PLO, by means of persuasion and coaxing, to agree to withdraw from Lebanon, so far unsuccessfully. In the meantime, they are showing no willingness to withdraw. The Americans obtained the previous stage of the Syrians' withdrawal from Beirut in another way. Then they did not content themselves with U.S. persuasion combined with Saudi Arabian attempts (involving financial bribery, of course). Both of these were founded on an Israeli military threat, which was used alternately in a controlled and exaggerated way, with endless quarrels between Israel and the United States about the amount of control and the deviations from it.

The Americans claimed that there was no need for force, persuasion was enough. There was no need for the Israeli whip. The Saudi Arabian and U.S. carrot was enough. Angry quarrels broke out about everything between Israel and Philip Habib and President Reagan himself. Now there is no longer any Israeli whip--and it is impossible to wave it convincingly. The Israeli military force has been contained and bound by the Americans, and the Israeli motivation to use the force has also been weakened and worn down. Now the Americans can put their claim to the test, the claim that U.S.-Saudi Arabian persuasion will be sufficient to convince the Syrians (and the PLO) to give up their grasp on Lebanon and even their reliance on the Soviet Union. The United States bound the Israeli force instead of waving it. This is not what was done by their predecessors, according to Kissinger's policy toward Egypt since the war of attrition and the Israeli indepth bombing of Egypt, which forced the Egyptians to be in need of sole U.S. mediation (in the

months June-August 1970) to the distress of the Soviets. After that they went back and forced President Al-Sadat to cut himself off from dependence on the Soviets in two stages (the "purge" of the Egyptian agents of the Soviet Union who controlled the "centers of power," and, afterward, the expulsion of the Soviet advisers). The crowning glory was the Yom Kippur war and its conclusion, with the encircling of the third army, which was by way of being putting the Israeli pistol against the Egyptian brow and taking the Israeli finger off the trigger only after President Al-Sadat had agreed to sole U.S. mediation. That is how it was then. Now just the opposite is happening. In the Lebanon war Kissinger's heirs stopped the pressure on the Syrians and the PLO too soon and now nothing is left for them but to get down on their knees and beg and promise that from now on they will not test their strength with Israeli military pressure behind them. On the contrary. They will contain Israel and bind it and put pressure on it instead of pressing the Syrians and the PLO. Instead of reaping the fruits of the Israeli military threat (which was built up by them) for their own benefit, for the benefit of Israel and for the benefit of Lebanon, they are leaving the fruit on the Syrian-Soviet tree. President Reagan and his secretary of state, Shultz, are repeating the failures of Eisenhower and Dulles after the Sinai and Suez campaigns, instead of repeating the successes of Nixon and Kissinger after the war of attrition and the Yom Kippur war. We must still wait and see how the U.S. fiasco in Lebanon will end.

The Americans are repeating a similar mistake, in larger dimensions, with regard to the Reagan plan and their comprehensive policy in the Middle East. The United States wants to persuade Israel to give up the "strategic depth" it has in Judaea and Samaria within the framework of the Reagan plan. There would perhaps have been some logic in such a U.S. proposal for the military weakening of Israel if the Americans were not at the same time working for the strengthening of the Arab military option in the West Bank. The United States is weakening Israel's technological edge and at the very same time it is helping Egypt to rehabilitate its army on land and in the air and furnish it with U.S. weapons of the most advanced, sophisticated type--no less than that of the IDF. This rehabilitation will end in 1986, and that same year Saudi Arabia will already have the AWACS planes and the F-15's and all the ground infrastructure that accompanies them and enormous quantities of air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles of all types. If Jordan is also equipped by then with planes and a modern U.S. anti-aircraft system, all these forces will, toward the end of the 1980's, join to form an enormous offensive military option. And, in contrast to this, as stated, the Americans are already using sanctions that are damaging our technological and military edge and its development.

It is not to be assumed that the Americans are acting knowingly and deliberately to undermine the balance of forces to Israel's disadvantage and to negate the narrow strip of deterrence and containment that the areas of Judaea and Samaria provide against the Arab offensive option of the end of the 1980's. The Americans do not intend this, but they are doing it. It seems that the left hand is working against the right one without the brain thinking about the grave results of this dangerous contradiction--undermining the balance of forces in the Middle East.

CSO: 4400/112

REPORTS GIVE DETAILS OF CHEYSSON-PLO MEETING

TA280846 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Nov 82 p 2

[Report by political correspondent Yehuda Litani]

[Text] Reports reaching Jerusalem about the meeting held 2 weeks ago between French Foreign Minister Cheysson and the person responsible for the PLO's foreign affairs, Faruq Qaddumi, say that Qaddumi had informed Cheysson that the PLO wants to maintain direct contacts "with elements in Israel who are prepared for a mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO."

According to the reports, he also said that the PLO at this stage is not interested in unilaterally recognizing Israel, but is interested in mutual recognition. Qaddumi noted that he was expressing a personal opinion since this issue has not yet gone through the process of approval in the Palestinian National Council.

A unilateral recognition of Israel by the PLO, Qaddumi said, according to these reports, will aid in the PLO's rapprochement with the United States. But the PLO does not want to waste such an important card at this stage only for the sake of this rapprochement.

It was also reported that in the meeting between Cheysson and Yasir 'Arafat in Tunis this past month 'Arafat promised that the PLO will recognize Israel. A day later, 'Arafat revoked his statement, informing Cheysson that some obstacles are involved and that only after a while will it be possible to overcome them. In the meantime, 'Arafat asked Cheysson not to disclose anything about this promise.

According to the reports, Cheysson is urging the French Government to officially recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. President Mitterrand has reservations on this, since he is skeptical of the PLO's ability to decide to recognize Israel at present. According to the reports, Mitterrand suggests that, for the time being, efforts be restricted to exhausting the Jordanian option. It is believed in Jerusalem that Mitterrand's position was adopted partly due to his ties with the Israeli Labor Party and its chairman, Shim'on Peres.

CSO: 4400/111

CHIEF OF STAFF ON LEBANON, SETTLEMENTS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS

TA031705 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1605 GMT 3 Dec 82

[Excerpts] Tel Aviv, 3 Dec (ITIM)--Chief of Staff Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan today said that the issue of nuclear weapons constitutes a serious problem in this region and that Israel would again be called to cope with it toward the end of the 1980's or the end of this century. He added that the Arabs wanted to develop nuclear weapons and that Israel could not tolerate this. The chief of staff was speaking at the Engineers' Club in Tel Aviv and although he replied to many questions from the audience, he abstained from responding to questions about issues being discussed by the Commission of Inquiry.

The chief of staff added that if Israel had not attacked the nuclear reactor in Baghdad, the Iraqis could have possessed nuclear arms by mid-1983. He added that the Americans and the Soviets take pains not to allow such countries to develop nuclear arms. However, the French, the Italians and the Dutch had helped in developing the nuclear reactor in Baghdad and they had been about to establish a facility that would have enabled the production of nuclear weapons. The chief of staff pointed out that the world had viewed the Israeli operation with concealed satisfaction since it had failed to find any ways to curb the progress and development of that reactor.

"If they possess nuclear weapons, we would not have a defense and absorption ability, particularly in view of the fact that we are living in a densely populated small area," the chief of staff added.

Replying to a question about the situation in Lebanon, he said that the previous situation of some sort of Palestinian state would never return and that Israel's northern border has not been harassed from Lebanese territory.

To the question of whether Israel will evacuate Jabal al-Baruk, the chief of staff said that if the two conditions he mentioned earlier in his remarks were fulfilled Israel would be able to evacuate Jabal al-Baruk. He added smilingly: "When they get hold of a good place, Israelis do not want to get off and they want to climb higher."

As for the struggle between Druze and Christians, the chief of staff said that they are entangled in an embroglio that began in the last century.

He said that during a tour in Lebanon on Thursday, he ran into a Druze leader in the middle of the street. The chief of staff received the impression that the problem lies in that, superficially, an artificial calm may be reached but under the surface attacks may erupt anywhere because of blood feuds, and vendettas. The leaders are not seeking these attacks but there is nothing they can do to prevent them. The Lebanese Army has not yet been capable of imposing order in these places because the army itself is composed of soldiers from various sects. "I do not know what the solution may be to stop the clashes. However, we are there not to impose order between the sects but in order to achieve the conditions for an arrangement on security for Israel," the chief of staff stated.

As for settlement in Judaea and Samaria, he said this is a security condition for Israel's existence and without Judaea and Samaria we could not defend the country. "This is my professional opinion, from the military point of view, and it does not have any political connotations," the chief of staff observed.

Chief of Staff Eytan believes that settlement in Israel occurred only once [in the past], in the days of the prophet Joshua. Now there is again settlement and everywhere a settlement has been established, the border has been marked. Settlement contributes to security and any additional population and control also contributes. As noted, settlements marked the borders and if Gush 'Ezyon had stood fast and not fallen in the war of independence there would have been no arguments about the establishment of Qiryat Arba', Lt Gen Eytan concluded.

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FEW CHANCES SEEN FOR LABOR PARTY SUCCESS

TA291145 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Nov 82 p 9

[Commentary by Avraham Schweitzer: "Sick Tactics"]

[Text] In retrospect, it seems that Labor Party Chairman Shim'on Peres was right in describing Mk Yitzhaq Rabin's moves last week as an "outburst." Indeed, after saying very harsh things against Mr Peres, including a mocking invitation to vacate his seat if he is incapable of withstanding the solitude at the top in the absence of solidarity and frequent criticism, Mr Rabin rushed to backtrack and promised to behave himself (this is the significance of his announcement that this is not the right time for a race--a code word for a cease-fire).

Peres reciprocated and the two men even held a reconciliation meeting at the end of the week. The rift which according to all observers had become an unbridgeable abyss has once again been covered over by a thick layer of plaster.

From reaction heard among Labor Party circles, it seems that the reconciliation has been accepted with a sigh of relief by party functionaries, although everybody admits to its being ephemeral. These functionaries are almost hypnotically watching the Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Kahan, whose report--this is the version prevailing in the Labor Party--will utterly undermine Mr Begin's government. Then the sun will rise on the Labor Party: It will be portrayed as life buoy to abandoned coalition partners who will be once again gathered into an alternate government headed by the Alignment, without any pains or elections. Therefore, this is not the time to quarrel inside the camp. As for the future, being in power will heal internal divisions and hostility.

However, this view will not necessarily impress those without whom the Labor Party cannot set up an alternative government. The National Religious Party [NRP], Agudat Yisra'el and Tami cannot but take notice of a split and divided party, not because its leaders quarrel but due to the lack of programmatic glue to stick them together and political content; in other words, emptiness breeds quarrels. Moreover, the designate coalition partners also see that the Labor Party does not possess a mechanism to settle personal disputes, either by making a resolution and reaching organizational conclusions regarding those violating the internal calm, or by concealing disputes

in such a way that they are not easily revealed. Hence, the partners of an alternate coalition might come to the conclusions that the Labor Party does not deserve to lead the country.

If that is so, those waiting for the sun to shine on the Labor Party might be in for a disappointment: A beaten Begin, with his authority eroded, will be seen by the coalition partners--not to mention the general public which is more impressed by appearances than professionals--as a real rock of stability, a landlord in the full sense of the word. Tactics are a good thing and the seizure of a temporary advantage by maneuvering and movement has been more than once known to have taken the cart out of the mud. However, a person suffering from cancer cannot be healed by a quick and effective treatment of his upset stomach. One had better stop all this paraphrasing and get down to the point: The disease does not lie in the quarrel between Peres and Begin [as published], but in the erosion of the Labor Party's political substance and its subsequent inadequacy in putting an end to the head-on confrontations among its leaders.

Well then, one may arrive at the depressing conclusion that covering up the Peres-Rabin feud and their reconciliation cannot change the fundamental fact of the political impotence of the Labor Party, in whose arena they exchange blows then rest for a while in order to once again return to the ring. Indeed, it may be that the Labor Party has weakened to the extent of becoming a protest party and a counterbalance to a firm and dynamic government, but lacking the substance required of somebody who has pretensions to lead the country.

Mr Peres prides himself on the initiative that brought 400,000 people out on the streets of Tel Aviv to demonstrate in favor of a Commission of Inquiry. Nevertheless, the demonstration does not expose the Labor Party's strength and its suitability to rule, but rather the opposition's limited potential that can only uproot the weeds growing in other fields and that is all. Mr Rabin is only secondary; the trouble is that the party Mr Peres has been healing for 5 years since 1977 has limited political validity; its cheeks are rosy although its health is poor, its soul is rent and its spirit is dwindling.

CSO: 4400/112

GENERAL PUBLIC OPINION PREFERS NRP'S HAMMER TO BURG

TA030722 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 3 Dec 82 p 3

[Report by political correspondent Mark Segal]

[Text] Tel Aviv--Education Minister Zvulun Hammer is the most popular choice for the leader of his National Religious Party [NRP] among the general public, but not among NRP voters. They pick him as second best after Interior Minister Yosef Burg.

Hammer is most popular with Labor supporters while the Likud camp sees little difference between him and Burg. On the whole, however, nearly half the public declared themselves undecided on the choice of the NRP leader.

The above emerged from THE JERUSALEM POST poll conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute among a representative sample of 1,255 adults in the first part of November.

Question: "In your opinion, who is best suited to lead the NRP?"

	<u>All respondents</u>	<u>Pro-Labor</u>	<u>Pro-Likud</u>	<u>Pro-NRP</u>
Zvulun Hammer	28.8	34.2	24.1	29.6
Yosef Burg	19.5	17.6	25.2	37.0
Yehuda Ben-Me'ir	2.4	3.2	3.4	7.4
Hayim Druckman	2.1	--	2.5	3.7
Others	1.2	1.9	1.4	--
Undecided	46.0	43.1	43.4	22.3

Institute Director Dr Sara Shemer hedged her analysis of the data by pointing out that the sample of NRP voters involved was too small to produce any far-reaching conclusions on the comparative standing of Hammer and Burg in the party. She preferred to describe the results as indicating that Burg and Hammer are the most preferred men for the top position by party supporters.

Another question dealt with the public's reaction to Hammer's dovish political shift during and after the war in Lebanon. While 61 percent of those questioned showed no change of attitude, Shemer noted, more NRP supporters disapproved of Hammer's shift than other segments of the public.

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JORDAN-PLO RELATIONS ANALYZED

JN021611 Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World 1435 GMT 2 Dec 82

["Observation": by Anis Tawfiq]

[Excerpts] In modern psychology there is a phenomenon called the love-hate relationship. It means that an individual or a group may love something and then hate it successively and repeatedly with no apparent logical reason. Official Jordanian circles have a love-hate relationship with the terrorist organizations [PLO].

Jordanian Information Minister 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah recently expressed this contradictory emotion with an unusual eloquence. Abu 'Awdah said that his country would not join, separately and without PLO approval, any peace talks with Israel on the Palestinian problem. He said that Jordan and the PLO jointly perceive the threat posed by Israel and that time is, in the short run, on the side of Israel, which exploits the status quo to entrench its position.

In this statement, the elements of love and hate are exceptionally clear and complete. Peace with Jordan should concern Jordan. Abu 'Awdah, however, says that his country will not, separately and without PLO approval, join the peace talks. This means that Jordan, as stated by a senior Jordanian official, places its supreme national interests in the hands of a defeated organization which has lost its way after losing all its bases. Is this logical? Can anyone expose his country's interests to danger in this manner? Is it true that Jordan and the PLO jointly feel danger?

The terrorist organization has lost all its bases. Did Jordan lose anything as a result of this or did it gain? Has the road not become smoother for Jordan now that the Palestinian organizations have been scattered all over the Arab world?

Abu 'Awdah made his greatest mistake in saying that time is on Israel's side in the short run. It is more reasonable and logical to admit that time in both the short and long run is on the side of Israel and of peace. This is because peace is based on realism and not on contradictory emotions and showing false love to the organizations. If Jordan wants peace, it should not place such a great responsibility in the hands of the enemies of peace.

CSO: 4400/112

COMMENTATOR SCHIFF ON MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS FAULTS

TA210836 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Nov 82 p 9

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "A Block in the Reporting Channels"]

[Text] Without any connection to the circumstances of the massacre committed by the Phalangists in the Sabra and Shatila camps, two worrisome phenomena are emerging and becoming clearer from the testimony concerning the defense establishment and the prime minister. Anyone listening to the testimony cannot escape the disturbing conclusion that there is some sort of blockage in the defense establishment's reporting channels. This feeling is also reinforced by personal conversations, both related to the massacre and in general. Indeed, it is hard to assume that a block in the reporting channels only affects one matter and is not felt in other cases.

The second worrisome phenomenon concerns the prime minister's role and place in the decision-making process on vital security matters. The problem is not the status of the prime minister. Everyone treats him with respect, but it is becoming increasingly apparent that they do not always make sure Mr Begin is included in important decisions before their implementation. The impression is that sometimes they also do not take the trouble to quickly report to the prime minister; instead, they determine the facts and conclude the matter, then rely on the prime minister accepting a late report. This is not a new phenomenon, but the testimony in the massacre affair has exposed it very clearly.

The block in the pipe does not apply only to the IDF. Questions also arise when we hear of the methods of reporting to the defense minister's office and from it onward, and about the methods of reporting between the prime minister's office, the defense minister's office and the Foreign Ministry.

If we begin with the assumption that everything we have heard in the public testimony to the Commission of Inquiry is true, then we see a very strange picture. Despite the advanced and sophisticated equipment, reporting from the field is choppy and slow. When it reaches the command headquarters, it is written in memo notes. But what is strangest of all is that, although the reports are cut down, there have been almost no attempts to check how to complete the partial reporting. This resembles one of the outstanding faults from which the Arab armies suffer: Not making sure that instructions have been carried out and that acquired information is correct.

The faults in the pipeline are apparently also to be found in the most senior command headquarters. Many people receive the reports for their information, but not their action; therefore, there is no trend, even on these levels, to immediately question what is not sufficiently clear. In such a situation, there is a tendency to leave assessment to someone else, someone more senior. After it emerged that a cable had arrived from the field speaking of 300 killed in the camps, it was explained that the cable had not arrived via the intelligence reporting channel, but through the general staff one. But it is actually the argument over this point that shows us that something is wrong. The difference between the general staff report and the intelligence one, so they explain, involves the source of the report and the responsibility for its distribution. This is the main point in the technical argument and it may prove that there is a desire to pass formal authority on to someone else. It is possible that the large quantity of reports streaming in through the military pipeline, in addition to battle fatigue, blunt sensitivities, but this does not explain how the minister's office and some of the senior commanders received the report and were responsible for it.

The blockage seems even stranger when we examine what occurred in the defense minister's office. Since the war, a "situations room" has been established in that office with the sole purpose of receiving more rapidly all the information from all sources inside and outside the defense establishment. The minister's office has not relied on the old system of direct reporting to the military secretary and adjutant or to other people in the office. Hence, much personnel--senior, experienced officers--have been placed in the national security unit, and it has begun to work as the chief of staff's "shadow." And it turns out that here, too, there has been a block in the pipe--if we really do accept the testimony as it has been stated. Is this a blockage, or something else? How does it happen that one report, a very specific one, is actually cut along the way and does not reach the minister? And why is there a block in reporting to the prime minister's military secretary? Who is responsible for this report, the minister's office, the "situation room," or the chief of staff's office?

The pipeline between the Defense Ministry, the prime minister's office and the Foreign Ministry seems to be based on chance, doing favors and go-betweens--in brief, quite primitive and not befitting an advanced country. When the foreign minister says that his staff investigated what Minister Tzipori said about a massacre in the camps, we do not know who controls the link and where the check was made. . A security report is, for some reason, checked in the prime minister's office, not in the Defense Ministry, and it appears that there are no standing procedures on this matter.

Some of the testimony contradicts the stories that Sharon always calls the prime minister by telephone and reports on every step. Sharon himself once explained why there was no need to appoint other people in place of the prime minister's military secretary and military adviser, who left their posts, by saying that direct contact between him and Mr Begin was preferable. But what is strange is that not only do people forget to report to the prime minister, but also to his military secretary. The blockage is also seen in the telephone conversations between Sharon and Begin: Some of them are noted and some not; some are remembered and some not.

The affair does not end here. The faulty reporting has also exposed the fact that it is precisely on sensitive security matters that the prime minister is not always truly the prime minister, and the defense minister is not satisfied with being the government's representative responsible for the IDF, but occasionally takes upon himself the authority of the prime minister and the entire cabinet. Begin gets the respect he is due from him, but he is not always briefed fully and in a timely manner. The prime minister is made to sign many things after orders in the field have already been given and the wheels have begun to roll.

On this matter it is worth comparing, for example, the time at which the decision on the IDF's entry into West Beirut was made, as reported by Division Commander Brig Gen 'Amos Yaron, and the timetable Sharon gave the Knesset on 22 September, when he pointed out the 18 clauses in connection with the massacre in Beirut. Sharon speaks of a decision made after midnight (0030) and Yaron relates that he had already received the order at 2200. In general, care is ultimately taken about reporting to the prime minister, even post factum, as Begin himself explained at one of the cabinet sessions during the war, because of the need for his backing in times of need. Mr Begin is a gentleman [last word in English] and tends to relieve Sharon of such blows, but this is not a matter just between the prime minister and one of his ministers. This is a matter belonging to and involving the entire public.

CSO: 4400/111

FORMER ADMINISTRATOR KARMON'S W. BANK ROLE ANALYZED

TA181045 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Nov 82 p 7

[Commentary by Tzvi Bar'el: "The Gospel According to Karmon"]

[Text] Colonel Yig'al Karmon observes his Palestinian subjects from the heights of the second floor of the gray and ugly building that houses the civilian administration headquarters. Apparently these will be his last days as prime minister of the West Bank, a job that for him represented the climax of all his dreams come true after long years of waiting. In those years, he was "forced" to serve masters who were less talented and not as sly as him and who were less understanding of what is called "Arab wisdom."

Nevertheless, we would not be telling the truth if we said that Yig'al Karmon made do with being "number two" although that was how his duties in the civilian administration and the military government had been described to date. He was Professor Milson's deputy when the former was the adviser on Arab affairs to the commander of the Judaea and Samaria area. He was Milson's deputy when the former was appointed head of the civilian administration. Today, and for a short period of time, he holds the title of acting head of the civilian administration.

However, in practice, beyond the spectrum of formal titles, Karmon has played a decisive--if not exclusive--role in implementing the policy toward the Arab population designed by the civilian administration. He is the man who stood behind the Milsonian theory that spoke about a war to the bitter end against the PLO and its supporters in the West Bank; he is the man who resurrected the notion of setting up village leagues, a notion which for many years gathered moss in the drawers of the military government at a time when the population of the West Bank was regarded as having its own desires and political aspirations and not merely as an administered body whose political desires must be forcefully castrated; he is the man who stood behind the idea to launch a struggle against the Jordanian supporters.

There is no doubt that Karmon has modern and innovative thoughts in the Arab political field. Even his opponents in the civilian administration admit that the man is talented and has a sharp analytical mind. The problem apparently lies in the channels to which Karmon directs his gifts. He does not explain his ideas and his outlooks very well. Professor Milson used to

be his mouthpiece: In his smiling and eloquent appearances on television and in press interviews, Milson excelled in explaining the ideas Karmon had so wisely ingrained in him.

While Professor Milson was busy with public relations, persuading and tailoring nice and attractive clothes for Karmon's ideas, the latter proved his great performance abilities. There were even some who called him "the master of manipulation." He was the man who held the regular and daily contacts with the "subjects," he advised Mustafa Dudin on how to build his relationships and the administration of the village leagues, he reprimanded dignitaries in the West Bank who gave press interviews "deviating" from the line he had set out for them, he masterminded the mass celebrations by members of the village leagues to mark the opening of a new road or a small public enterprise and he is the man who banned East Jerusalem papers from publishing advertisements in which key villagers announced that they were quitting the village leagues.

He called Israeli jurists of international reputation "communists" only because they advised heads of universities in the West Bank on how to fight orders issued at Karmon's inspiration, not to mention names such as "traitors," "PLO supporters," "Israeli enemies" with which he regaled lawyers, journalists, Knesset members, university lecturers and even command officers subordinate to him. All this, because these people had the nerve to express their own mind.

While Professor Milson was occupied formulating a general policy, and consolidating and presenting ideas, Karmon invested his efforts in performing. He became the "sacry man of the West Bank." Through highly detailed directives and meticulous supervision over their implementation as well as acute and speedy retaliations against those who did not toe the line, both officers and Arabs, Karmon made himself the strong man in the system. Publicly, he also succeeded in avoiding direct criticism since this was usually directed against "the boss," Professor Milson. The latter was frequently forced to come out in defense of his aide's "whims."

After he was appointed to replace Milson, Colonel Karmon could no longer hide behind his master's apron. In his new position, he not only had to perform but also to explain, not only to the Arab and Jewish population but also, and particularly, to his superiors in the Defense Ministry and his many subordinates in the civilian administration.

To this end, he gathered the Jewish staff in the civilian administration at the end of October and lectured them about the principles of his ideas and the ways to implement them. In his cold analytical method, he divides the population of the West Bank into four groups: The radical mayors, as he called them; the Jordanists group; the group we have begun fostering, the first evident independent sprout (?) that includes the heads of the village leagues and those appointed moderate mayors; and the group of 12,000 administration officials.

"The handling of these groups will be as follows"--as if the reference were to sick people in need of therapy and reeducation, following which they

would become obedient and docile citizens who would stand up at attention upon listening to the "Hatikva" [the Israeli national anthem]. Referring to the first group, Karmon writes that "we will continue the struggle against the nationalists. This is an endless struggle and we must go ahead with it with utmost adherence, to ceaselessly persecute all its members. Pressure on them must not be lifted, even after they have been expelled from their posts."

Karmon puts the governor and command officers in charge of carrying out the persecution and he urges them to come up with ideas and determine the men who will be the target of the liquidation efforts.

Referring to the second group, the Jordanists, Karmon says that it must be seen to it that "their maximum neutralization continues and they are made very dependent on the civilian administration." Until some time ago, Karmon had tried to convince them to maintain normal relations with the civilian administration. However, since they turned him down and refused to fill the political vacuum he had created, they also became a target for persecution.

As for the third group, that independent sprout carrying IDF weapons and financed by Defense Ministry budgets--the members of the village leagues--Karmon states that "massive aid and support must continue."

As for the fourth group, the Arab officials of the civilian administration, they must be turned into the army of the civilian administration. "They must be strengthened for political objectives, for their political use in the future. The civilian administration will set out on a campaign to oversee the governmental apparatus which for many years lacked a political nature, was indifferent and even harmful to the civilian administration's efforts. Their handling will be through sanctions and the mass expulsion of those harming the system and maximum support to positive activists. Their fostering will include several authorizations [as published]: Raise of salaries, redeployment of authorities and individual promotion. It will be emphasized that the aim is not promotion in its own merit but rather for achieving a political goal and for politically activating this sector."

Moreover, Karmon also demands that the district governors submit weekly reports on how they have handled negative elements. They will also expedite sending these reports, headlined "names for administrative handling," to the police and will also submit proposals on who should be dismissed either through retirement or trial by a disciplinary court.

During Professor Milson's term in power, command officers claimed that they were not given directives and that they were not let in on the action. There are no longer grounds for such a claim under Karmon's rule. The directives are explicit, clear-cut and indisputable.

The Defense Ministry was embarrassed by the publication of Karmon's theory. Official elements said that this theory was incompatible with the defense minister and the coordinator of activities in the territories. If that is

indeed the case, then a man is sitting in the civilian administration who is conducting and even implementing an independent policy without the agreement of the pertinent political level, as if it were the Turkish empire during the rule of the sultans when the central government did not quite know what was happening on the periphery.

Karmon's days in his post are numbered and a senior officer will soon be appointed head of the civilian administration. However, the replacement of the head will not change the way things are if "the formulator of policy and the man in charge of its implementation" continues to hold onto a powerful position in the system.

CSO: 4400/111

OPTIONS IN LEBANON ANALYZED

TA171434 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Nov 82 p 9

[Commentary by Mati Golan: "The Lebanese Options"]

[Text] Lots of water has flowed through the Litani River since the IDF entered Lebanon. What was originally intended to be a military operation limited both in scope and in the number of casualties has turned into a massive war which continues to claim victims with a merciless appetite. The distinct feeling that we are groping for the way is confirmed by the difficulty in seeing, at the end of the Lebanese tunnel, the ray of light to which this tunnel was supposed to have led us.

This situation nurtures the temptation to get up and say "but I told you this is what would happen." Whoever opposed this war from the outset--and especially those who did not support the extension of its goals--can say today that their forecasts came true: The number of victims has reached a few hundred; Israel's image in the world has deteriorated to an unprecedented low; the vision of peace with Lebanon is fading away; the Syrian forces and a few thousand terrorists are still in Lebanon; and U.S. pressure to solve the Palestinian problem did not weaken as a result of the war, but strengthened.

Despite all this, those in the opposition will be wise to resist the temptation to publicize their prophetic powers. Even if their various claims were correct before and during the war, they had better understand that it all could have been different.

Indeed, not much was needed for things to be different. Today it seems that two unexpected elements united to cause the turning point, which changed everything. The first was the murder of Bashir al-Jumayyil. It can be assumed that had he not been killed, there would have been a real chance for some sort of negotiation with Lebanon. Maybe not a peace in the spirit of the latter days, which the prime minister and the defense minister hastened to describe, but probably a security arrangement with certain elements of normalization in the relations between the two countries.

The massacre in the Sabra and Shatila camps, which was a result of Bashir al-Jumayyil's murder, disrupted the plan even more. Politically, the greater damage from this event was in losing a big part of the maneuvering space

which Israel previously had. If before the massacre Israel could claim to be the one who freed itself and Lebanon from the heavy yoke of the terrorists, then after it found itself in the defendant's seat in the peoples' trial. It might not be right, but political facts are not necessarily established according to justice.

The day for assessing the war in Lebanon will probably come. At the present stage the only decisive question left is how to make the best of a bad situation, since the war has already occurred, the victims have already fallen and the political damage and the damage to our image has already been done. Such a high price demands a supreme effort to maximize the war's achievements.

When making its decisions, the government is facing two options. HA'ARETZ political correspondent Yehuda Litani reported (HA'ARETZ 15 November) on what could be defined as a minimalist option. According to this report, a plan is being formed in the Defense Ministry in case the contacts with Lebanon reach a dead end. This plan calls for Israel to give up the war's extra goals and make do, in actual fact, with the original goal of securing peace for the Galilee. This will be done by controlling the 45 km through the forces of Major Haddad, which will be trained and equipped for this purpose. It is understood of course that Israel will see itself as being allowed to have its own presence in this security zone in case it is needed.

The maximalist option comprises two main elements: The withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon; a security, or maybe even a political arrangement with the Lebanese Government.

It is not easy to decide between these two options: The theory that the sooner we leave Lebanon the better works on the side of the minimalist option; this is a land that not only devours its own inhabitants but also those who try to mingle with them. There is no doubt that a disaster such as the one that happened in Tyre and the fear of more disasters strengthens this impression.

There is also no doubt that adopting this option will be choosing the easy way out. The question is whether it will also be the right way in the long run, or even in the not so very long run. This question should be examined in light of the ability to ensure that the 45 km range will remain free of terrorists enjoying Syria's support in the long run.

A definitive answer to this question does not exist. There are only measuring tools based on chances. Leaning on Haddad's forces to ensure the peace for the Galilee does not seem very pleasant, even if his soldiers are armed to the teeth and trained incessantly. It is doubtful whether they will be able to close the road in front of the terrorist squads. And if they cannot, then the IDF will have to enter the area--so what have we gained?

We would have more peace of mind if we knew that all of Lebanon, not just its southern part, is free of terrorists and Syrian Army forces; if we knew that our pact is with the Lebanese Government and its army and not just with Major Haddad's forces--which in this case will be an additional force--as the only force on which the security of our northern border depends.

The realization of the maximalist option will not bring just peace of mind. Worrisome statements toward Israel are being heard from the Lebanese prime minister. President Amin al-Jumayyil does not do anything to silence his prime minister and is himself turning a cold shoulder toward us. Superficially this might weaken us, making the minimalist option more attractive. But it should be remembered that all this rhetoric is being heard as the Syrians and the terrorists are still sitting on Lebanese land. Although there is no certainty of this, there is a reasonable chance that completely different tunes will be heard from Beirut when Lebanon is totally free of the Syrians and the terrorists.

It was Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon who praised patience and cool headedness many times. And although he committed many wrong deeds and said wrong things, on this issue, it seems he was right: The more presumptuous the goal the more it needs patience and a cool head. But it seems that Sharon himself is beginning to neglect his own teachings. Although in public he continues to preach it, behind closed doors he shows a growing tendency to take the minimalist option. It might be that the Commission of Inquiry has diminished his self-confidence, or it might be that the fall in his political shares undermined his staying power. Or maybe the doubts plaguing many have begun to awaken him too.

If this is the case, then the defense minister should be told that he reacts very slowly, and this is worrisome. The time for doubting was before the war began before it was extended to the gates of Beirut; but not now, after all those things were accomplished with determination bordering on rashness. Now of all times, when everything seems foggy and in mourning, is the time to drink from the springs of patience and cool headedness.

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PLO-APPROVED DONATION TO JERUSALEM CANCELLED

TA251504 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Nov 82 p 2

["Exclusive" to HA'ARETZ by Britain correspondent Yosi Melman]

[Excerpt] London, 24 Nov--The Jerusalem Municipality refused to accept a generous monetary donation from a Jewish-Austrian businessman after it transpired that it was personally approved by PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat. Details of the affair were revealed to a HA'ARETZ correspondent by reliable economic sources.

Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek recently approached his friend, the Jewish-Austrian businessman (Carl Kahana) and asked him to donate money for a new project intended for the Arab residents in East Jerusalem. Mr (Kahana), who is a close friend of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky was involved in the past in organizing meetings between Israelis and Palestinian representatives and is considered close to the Israeli Labor Party. In the past he also headed an organization for selling government bonds for Israel, but resigned from this office when Begin was elected prime minister.

It was reported that (Kahana) accepted Kollek's request and promised to donate tens of thousands of dollars for the project, but not before he went to his friend, the head of the PLO, so that he could express an opinion on the matter. Yasir 'Arafat personally approved the donation, based on the fact that it was intended for building a project for the welfare of the Arab areas of Jerusalem. When Teddy Kollek found out about it he hurriedly cancelled the donation and told (Kahana) that he does not need donations approved by the PLO. It was revealed that relations between Kollek and (Kahana) cooled off since then.

CSO: 4400/111

PRICES UP ON FOOD, FUEL

TA010715 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 1 Dec 82 p 1

[Report by economic correspondent Avi Temkin]

[Text] Basic commodities and fuel other than kerosene went up at midnight by 5 percent, and urban public transportation by 10 percent. The hikes are part of the implementation of the treasury's policy of gradual price increases as envisaged in its new economic plan announced last September.

The treasury has also announced that the Knesset Finance Committee will be asked today to approve a 5 percent rise in the price of electricity and postal and telephone rates.

The treasury expects the hikes to raise the consumer price index by 0.4 percent and hopes that the CPI will rise by a total of only some 5 percent for December. Economic observers expect the November CPI to rise by 5 to 6 percent. If these projections are borne it would mean that the annual rate of inflation would be slightly less than the record 133 percent, reached in 1980 when Yiga'el Hurwitz was finance minister.

Despite yesterday's price hikes, basic commodities continue to be heavily subsidized by the treasury. The subsidy on bread, for example, was cut from 165 percent to 152 percent. This means the government still adds IS1.5 for every shekel the consumer spends on bread.

Train fares will also go up today by an average of 10 percent, the railways spokesman announced. The fare on the Haifa-Tel Aviv run will now be IS55, up from IS50.

Another 10 percent increase takes effect on the Carmelit subway in Haifa, from IS5 to IS5.50 per trip.

	Prices in IS	[Including value added tax]
	<u>Old</u>	<u>New</u>
<u>Fuel</u>		
Petrol 91 octane (per litre)	18.9	19.9
Petrol 94 octane (per litre)	20.5	21.6
Diesel (solar) (per litre)	15.0	15.7
Cooking gas (12 kg)	269.5	283.0
Urban bus ride	5.0	5.5
<u>Food</u>		
Litre milk	9.4	9.94
Loaf of white bread	4.8	5.05
Litre cooking oil	24.9	26.15
Tub of margarine 250 gr	7.25	7.60
No 2 chicken per kg	67.00	71.00
No 3 egg	2.2	2.3
Shoulder roast	142.00	149.00

CSO: 4400/111

'POST' RAPS GOVERNMENT POSITIONS ON LEBANON

TA280814 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Nov 82 p 8

[Editorial: "Stubborn and Stuck"]

[Text] The government's answer to critics of its West Bank policy has long been to invoke the emotive rhetoric of patriotism. The same defense mechanism has now been transferred to the debate surrounding the policy in Lebanon. Here the critics are branded not only as unpatriotic, but also as weak.

We must stand firm, the minister of defence exhorts. Do not keep asking 'how long?' and 'what will be?' Mr Sharon admonished amid the ruins of the headquarters building in Tyre.

The government demands the nation to be undaunted by the prospect of a long cold winter, of an end to the army's unhealthy involvement in Lebanon's chronic internecine violence, of a scaling down of its political demands.

But it cannot uproot the suspicion that its pursuit of 'political achievements,' elements of normalization with Lebanon enshrined in formal agreements, is intended principally to persuade the people that the war and its sacrifices were 'worthwhile.'

It is a moot point whether Bashir al-Jumayyil, had he lived, would have been bold enough to ignore the Syrians, to ignore Moslem sentiment at home, to ignore Lebanon's inherent need to woo the Arab world and not antagonize it. There were signs even before his tragic murder that, as president, he would have been more circumspect in his overt ties with Israel, than he had been as the leader of one warring faction in a divided country.

President Amin al-Jumayyil, at any rate, is plainly not ignoring all these various internal and inter-Arab pressures on him, and it is doubtful if even the IDF's continued occupation of a sizable swathe of his country can persuade him to change his mind. For he has the U.S. to support him in his professions of weakness.

More doubtful--and more to the point from Israel's perspective--is whether changing Amin's mind is worth the IDF's continued presence deep inside

Lebanon, worth the wrangling over who will head the delegations to the still-unstarted talks, worth the expenditure of the energies of the army and the resources of the nation.

Six months after the war began, the wheel has come a full circle. The national consensus that existed then--in support of a terrorist-free 40-km security zone--still exists now. Not even the government's exploitation of that consensus, by extending it into an adventuristic and divisive war, has undermined the basic quest for security in the north.

That goal is still attainable. If Israel were to settle for it, some of the 'political' elements to which Mr Sharon ostensibly aspires might well evolve with time, quietly and untrumpeted.

So, instead of squandering Ambassador Habib's efforts on procedural irrelevancies and political dreams, the government should at last get down to the business of arranging for the security of the north--and getting out of Lebanon.

CSO: 4400/111

ARAB NATIONALISM EXPERT DISCUSSES DRUZE COMMUNITY

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 22 Oct 82 Weekend Supplement p 13

[Interview with Professor Yehoshu'a Porat, Arab Nationalism Expert, by Yosef Shavit, date and place not specified]

[Text] The demonstration held this week by hundreds of angry Druze, opposite the Knesset building, was but one indication of the fomentation among members of this ethnic group--most recently against the background of their concern over their brothers in Lebanon. At first glance, the demonstrations do not fit the image that the Druze minority has had since the beginning of time: A religious sect--not a nation and not a nationality--trying to assimilate into each country where its members have settled, avoiding conflict with the local government. Have these recent developments exposed a new reality in the delicate relations between the State of Israel and its Druze citizens?

The man whose help I sought to gain an understanding of the Druze in Israel and Lebanon is considered one of the outstanding figures in our community: Yehoshu'a Porat, professor of Islamic history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a specialist on Arab nationalism in general, Palestinian nationalism in particular.

"The basic assumption is true," explains Professor Porat, "the Druze are a religious sect that adapts to the reality in which it finds itself. But the recent events in this region have not changed that fact."

[Question] How then do you explain these demonstrations, which go beyond the local, ethnic plane and bear the signs of nationalism.

[Answer] This development emanates to a large degree precisely from the assimilation of the Druze in the State, especially from the fact that they serve in the army. The Druze therefore feel that they are Israelis, entitled to struggle for the advancement of their interests by using every possible means which our democratic system affords to pressure groups of any kind. They exploit the media and the fact that they have their own Knesset members. They are well versed in the Israeli reality and aware of the heated argument surrounding the war. They also saw how their friends--Jewish reservists--used public pressure as a weapon, following the war, and demonstrations as a means to an end. All this, of course, has had its effect.

A Gap that Cannot be Bridged

[Question] Despite assimilation, it seems that over the last few years we hear more and more expressions from the younger generation Druze against identification with Israel and service in the IDF. How do you explain this?

[Answer] As in those neighboring countries where there is a Druze minority-- Syria and Lebanon--the importance of ethnic identification among the young people is decreasing while the importance of the lingua-cultural factor in the determination of a personal and community identity is rising. In Israel, this phenomenon is not yet as strong as it is in Syria, where the Ba'ath party-- which espouses Arab solidarity based on language, culture and secular history-- has for some years now been strongly supported by the Druze.

The process of rapid modernization within the Druze community in Israel did not necessarily have to bring about the adoption of an Arab, nationalist identity. But the Israeli society, which is predominantly Jewish, is suspect of other ethnic groups. In the State of Israel, Israeli nationalist identification is not open to all citizens. You are an Israeli Jew, Muslim, Christian or Druze. A Druze whose religious affiliation is weakening is then pushed to identify with Arab nationalism as an alternative.

[Question] Does the Arab nationalist movement take in these young Druze?

[Answer] As far as the concepts espoused by the Arab nationalists, there is no problem in accepting the Druze. The traditional nationalist movement which integrates Muslim identity with Arab nationalism, fully accepts the Druze claim that they are of the Muslim religion, Arab culture and Arab origin. The movement that defines Arab nationalism in secular terms, by language and history, also has no problem accepting the Druze. They speak Arabic and their history is clearly tied in with the history of the Arab people in this region. But despite their common language, there has always been enough of a difference in their religion to distinguish the Druze as a separate ethnic group in the countries where they settled, especially Syria.

[Question] You said that the Druze claim to be Muslim insofar as their religion. Immediately following that you noted the religious difference between them and other Arabs in this region. Isn't there a contradiction between these two statements?

[Answer] Although the Druze try to represent themselves toward the outside world as Muslims and although they adhere to some of the external commandments of Islam--holidays and prayers--as far as theological tenets, the Druze religion is so distinct from Islam that there is a gap which has yet to be bridged. For example, Islam--like Judaism--emphasizes that God is one and remote. The Druze religion, in contrast, believes that God is embodied and has appeared several times in the form of man.

[Question] To what extent did Druze youth participate in the various Arab political organizations in Israel?

[Answer] There are very few independent Arab organizations in the State of Israel. In these few cases--like "al-Ard" at the beginning of the sixties and "Abna'al-Balad" in the late seventies--there were no Druze or if there were, they were a small minority. In contrast, within the Druze community itself there is an organized body, which is indeed independent--the Druze Initiative Committee--working toward the elimination of obligatory army service, which is involved with radical Israeli Arab groups in their struggle against land expropriations. These groups generally take an anti-Israeli position.

[Question] What is the position of the Druze religious leaders toward the State of Israel?

[Answer] The religious leadership demonstrates through its behavior the traditional approach of conforming to conditions in each country where they reside. Thus the religious leaders supported assimilation in the State of Israel and army service. They, of course, were principally the ones who enjoyed the benefits afforded the Druze community in the State of Israel. Under Turkish rule, and during the British Mandate, which inherited the Ottoman law in religious matters, the Druze were not recognized as a separate religious community but were considered part of Islam.

[Question] Rakah has an important influence on Arabs in Israel. Is this also true of the Druze?

[Answer] Over the last 15 years, with growing modernization, there has been a growing Arab awareness among the Druze, and as a major Arab nationalist body in the State of Israel, Rakah did penetrate the Druze settlements. But Rakah's penetration into this sector was fraught with many difficulties, because the Druze leaders were vehemently opposed to the affiliation. There is also another factor deterring Rakah--the relatively great importance of Christians in the party. A real example of the tension between these two communities in Israel was the dispute in Kfar Yasif, which ended in a bloodbath.

Large Development Budgets

[Question] Has cooperation with Israel given the Druze more rights and benefits than Muslims or Christians?

[Answer] Yes and no. At least in the villages of the Karmel, the Druze received more generous development budgets than other minorities. The government even tried to direct Jewish industrial capital to these villages. In contrast, it should be noted that land expropriations in the fifties also effected the Druze villages in the Galilee, such as Bayt Jin and Magar. The Israeli commercial field was open to the Druze and some Druze were appointed to representative public offices. Thus, for example, Zaidan Atshi served as propaganda consul in New York. Over the last 10 years, even in the "sacred cow" area of the IDF, the Druze do not serve in minority units only. Today they can be found even in other military units. But the Druze see regular military

service and reserve duty--which are not imposed on other minorities--as the fulfillment of an obligation, whereas they have not yet received enough benefits from the State.

[Question] What percentage of the population of the Druze constitute in those countries where they reside?

[Answer] In Israel, the Druze represent 10 percent of the total minority population in the country. Their highest relative concentration is in Lebanon, where they are seven to eight percent of the total population. But it should be remembered that this is not up-to-date figure. The statistics are based on the last census which was conducted in 1932. In Syria the Druze represent around four percent of the population. But even this figure is not exact, because since the rise of Habbat to power, the Druze have been included in the statistics with Muslims. In any event, the total number of Druze in all these countries is no more than 800,000-900,000.

[Question] You said earlier that the Druze continue to see themselves as a religious community which assimilates with the local way of life in every country. How do you explain, then, the demonstrations by Druze in Israel in support of the Druze in Lebanon?

[Answer] A feeling of community solidarity is still the main factor among the Druze. Although most of the Druze in Lebanon were allies of the Muslims and Palestinians, the Israeli Druze have an almost automatic tendency to support members of their sect wherever they are and see it as their obligation to help.

[Question] Why then didn't the Druze in Syria show concern for the fate of their brothers in Lebanon?

[Answer] There are two reasons: First, a certain portion of the Druze in Syria has become so deeply entrenched in the government and the army that their Druze identity has become secondary. Second, in contrast to Israel, Syria has a dictatorship and the Druze there cannot, even if they wanted to, express their feelings.

The Ongoing Armed Struggle

[Question] What is actually the background of the never-ending confrontations between Druze and Phalangists in Lebanon?

[Answer] First, the dispute between the Maronites and the Druze started during the first half of the 19th century when the make-up of the Lebanese elite changed and took on a totally Maronite character, at the expense of its traditional Druze characteristics, which were previously the dominant, decisive force. The dispute emanates from the conflict of interest between the Maronites, who tried to strengthen their rule and position on Mount Lebanon, and the Druze who wanted things back the way they were. The dispute peaked in 1860, when the bloody civil war broke out between the two communities. Since then there has been no harmony in the relations between them. In the 1958 civil war,

again the majority of the Maronites and Druze found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. The Maronites tried to stop the proud wave of Arab nationalism and protect their elite position in Lebanon; whereas the Druze for the most part, under the leadership of the Junblat family, were the bastion that tried to preserve the status quo. After things quieted down, another civil war broke out in Lebanon, in 1975--and since then the two communities have been engaged in an ongoing armed struggle.

[Question] One of the most important leaders of the left in Lebanon is a Druze, Walid Junblat, who established close ties with the PLO. Can one therefore draw conclusions as to the position of Druze in general in the country and their position on the political map?

[Answer] I do not accept the definition. Junblat is an important leader in the camp which opposes the existence of Lebanon as a state with a separate non-Arab identity--basically western, Christian. Most of the Druze in Lebanon accept the Junblat family's leadership. Thus, the majority can, since the civil war of 1958, be found in the camp struggling to establish Lebanon as an Arab state in every way, one that maintains ties with its Arab brothers and participates in the struggle against Israel--whence the pact with the PLO. But it is a limited pact. The Druze in Lebanon did not allow the PLO organization to set up camp within the Druze quarter itself--the Shuf mountains area. A minority among the Druze supported the Arslan family, which is today much closer to those forces supporting the status quo, the situation as it stood until 1975.

[Question] Is there really a fear today of physical danger to the Druze in Lebanon?

[Answer] There is no doubt in my heart that the Maronites and their main organization--the Phalange--want at this point to prevent the Druze from influencing the civil war. At the beginning of the Israeli penetration, the Phalangists tried to exploit the new situation and take out their revenge on the Druze. Lives were lost but due to the pressure brought to bear by their brothers in Israel, the Israeli government understood how dangerous the situation was and restrained the Phalangists.

[Question] Can the huge gap between the Druze and the Maronites be bridged?

[Answer] What is clear is that if the Maronites try to establish in Lebanon a situation like in the past, when they were in power--the Sunnis, Shiites and Druze will all continue to object. But Amin Jumayyil apparently understands that he cannot fulfill the prophecy of the radical Lebanese nationalists (the radical Phalangists and the "Guards of the Cedar" militias). He understands that he needs the active cooperation of the various Muslim communities, the Druze among them. He is therefore ready to pay the price of weaker ties with Israel, as the Muslims demand. Weaker ties with Israel will be interpreted by the Muslims and Druze as proof that he does not expect to rule the country through the Phalanges or members of his sect alone.

Under these conditions--in the absence of Israeli influence--the future is more secure for the Muslims and Druze in terms of their ability to stand on their own and even overcome the Phalangists. That was the situation in 1958, when, as requested by President Camille Sham'un, American advisers were rushed to Lebanon to save the Maronite government.

Comfortable Security Arrangements

[Question] The Druze in Israel claimed that the IDF dismantled their brothers' weapons in the Hashuf Hills but left the Phalangists' weapons alone. If that is true, wasn't a serious travesty committed?

[Answer] To the best of my knowledge, the Druze weapons were not dismantled. What was done is that in the Maronite village of Bayt al-Din, close to the mainly Druze Hashuf area, the IDF ousted a Lebanese army unit, whose officers were apparently Druze, from the area and allowed the Phalangists to come in instead. This step angered the Druze because it was the first time that the Phalangists had penetrated the Shuf mountains area.

[Question] What course of action would you suggest the Israeli government take in Lebanon so as not to disturb the delicate relations with the Druze in Israel?

[Answer] In my opinion, the State of Israel should stay out of the inter-ethnic dispute in Lebanon. It is not in our power to resolve the problem and Israel should not be involved. The only thing that Israel should concern itself with is the establishment of comfortable security arrangements on the northern border and all borders--which will ensure the well-being of its citizens and prevent the use of territory on the other side of the border for attacks on Israel.

[Question] And until then?

[Answer] To continue transferring control over areas more distant from the Israeli border to the Lebanese government.

[Question] But in Israeli political circles, they are claiming that Amin Jumayyil is actually interested at this point in Israel's continued presence in Lebanon because his army is not capable of filling the gap which would be created by an Israeli withdrawal. What do you think?

[Answer] Does Israel have to play the role of the pawn in Jumayyil's chess game? If he is having political difficulties--he should resolve them himself, based on the real circumstances of the balance of power in his country.

[Question] The Prime Minister committed himself this week to prevent any harm to the Druze in Lebanon. Can he fulfill this commitment without sacrificing the cooperation of the Phalangists, in whom Israel apparently has an essential interest?

[Answer] If Israel really and honestly intends to ensure the well-being of the Druze, Israel must remain in the area. That would mean constantly policing the two opposing camps. The inevitable consequence would be that both sides

would become Israel's enemies. An analogy would be the situation which Britain faced in Israel during the Mandate period--between the Jews and Arabs. Each side held the British responsible for attacks, and in the end, both Jews and Arabs resented the role played by the British.

9811

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ARAB AFFAIRS ADVISOR DISCUSSES ISRAELI ARAB ISSUES

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew No 5, 6 Oct 82 pp 13-15, 50

[Interview with Benyamin Gur-Arie, advisor on Arab affairs to the Prime Minister, by Haim Raviv, date and place not specified]

[Text] "When I hear on the radio about a dog fight between a Jewish pilot and an Arab pilot, I find myself in a quandry and I don't know whether to pray that the Jewish pilot return safe to his base, or for the Arab pilot"--These were the words of an Israeli Arab trying to explain to Benyamin Gur-Arie, Arab affairs advisor to the Prime Minister, his feeling of frustration, caused by a dual loyalty, as a member of an ethnic minority living in the State of Israel. The advisor had a ready answer for the Arab. "I told him," he recalls, "that I know whom he should pray for and that it is only natural. I told him that all we expect of him is not to do anything to compromise the Jewish pilot's safety--i.e., that he should not cross the "red line."

It seems that the recent events in the Arab sector, following the Beirut massacre, have reached the threshold of the "red line," if not beyond. The scope of these events cannot be minimized: 15 settlements out of 115 were involved in outbreaks during which villages in the Galilee were cut off when main roads were closed and blockades were set up; certian services were paralyzed; Jews were beaten and their vehicles damaged; police stations were attacked; PLO flags were flown during some demonstrations and among the deomonstrators were figures considered to be moderates.

The political arena in the Arab sector has, over the last few years, witnessed the rise of new nationalist waves easily influenced by outside, antagonistic forces. Affiliation with the PLO long ago crossed the boundaries of the political area and found its expression in terrorist activites as well. Suffice it to say that since the Six-Day War around 1,000 Israeli Arabs have been apprehended due to activities of this sort. The voice of the silent majority within the Israeli Arab population is hardly heard at all. The ability of moderate figures or groups to act is limited and they do not have the power to garner support form the majority or to put a stop to the radical elements--whence the recent outbreaks which threatened to ignite a full-scale confrontation.

Certain elements in the Arab sector are trying to calm the situation down and claim that this was an isolated protest. Others see it as an expression of a radicalization process which began on 30 March 1976, on Land Day, the roots

of which are perhaps even deeper. Undoubtedly, the Beirut massacre awakened honest feelings of pain and empathy, but these feelings were exploited by radical elements to incite violence.

What implications might these recent events have on the web of relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel? How does this image of IDF and Israeli immunity influence the Arabs in Israel? What should the government's policy be following these events? To try to clarify these questions and others, we met with the Prime Minister's advisor on Arab affairs, Benyamin Gur-Arie, in his Jerusalem office and he presented us with a broad view of the problems of the Arab minority in Israel. His words carried a clear message both to those who support peaceful co-existence and those who incite and break the law.

[Question] What is the root of the problems in the Arab sector, in light of the recent events?

[Answer] Israeli Arabs are in a unique situation, as compared with other minorities in the world: They live in a country surrounded by a majority of their own people, who are in a constant state of war with their country. This creates a dilemma for every Israeli Arab, a problem of dual loyalty--loyalty to his people and loyalty to the country in which he resides. In times of peace, it is easy for the Israeli Arabs to find a balance between these two loyalties. But in times of war or conflict, he is frustrated, or worse, in his search for identity within the context of trying to define his position in the State. We are often witness to a rise in the Israeli component of dual loyalty: but often we see it decrease as the Palestinian-nationalist side of the duality takes on more importance.

Therein lies the source of the problem. The rest of the problems are actually related to all citizens, including Jews--housing, education and employment--although for many Arabs these problems are more acute.

[Question] What political waves exist today in the Arab sector and to what degree do they set the tone?

[Answer] First, I'll address the small radical groups--three in number. The first is called "The Village Sons" (Abna' al-Balad) and is actually a direct outgrowth of the al-Ard movement which in its time was outlawed. Having learned from that experience, the Village Sons today are careful not to overstep their boundaries, but anyone who reads their publications would easily reach the conclusion that they are part of the resistance front and that their greatest desire is to destroy the State of Israel and establish a secular state occupying the entire territory now belonging to Israel.

[Question] How many members does this group have?

[Answer] I have no reliable figures. I don't even think the leaders of the group themselves know the number. There are dispersed groups, each with a local character, which have not organized in the framework of a single association. A second group, even more radical than the Village Sons, is the Progressive Arab Nationalist Movement [Telem], whose activities are centered on university

campuses. This movement, comprised of students and graduates, has the same goals as the Village Sons with one difference: According to Talam, the Village Sons are all talk and do not do anything concrete to advance their goals, while Talam is actively working toward fulfilling their objectives.

[Question] Have there been signs of Telem's activities in the region?

[Answer] Around 3 years ago, seven members of Telem, on their own initiative, went to Spain. There they made contacts with the resistance front and were sent to Iraq for military training. Upon their return they were responsible for two terrorist activities. They were apprehended and sentenced to varying terms...

The third group is the Muslim Brotherhood, which appeared in the Arab sector 3 or 4 years ago. They were active mainly in the southern part of the triangle, and unlike the other groups, they believed that by using the "Jihad" theme, they would be able to achieve the goal of destroying the State of Israel and establishing a Muslim state under their control. It should be noted that this plan is not just theoretical. There were attempts to implement their theories. The Muslim Brotherhood has been responsible for 50 acts of terror in the country.

[Question] What methods did they use?

[Answer] They grew beards and wore traditional dress and made it their business to go to Mosques and openly speak out against the state. They recruited young, highly motivated people whom they divided into two units: an open group called the "Religious Family" and an underground group called the "Jihad Family." This latter was headed by a "general leader" under whom were several regional commanders. The main point was that they worked in the original framework of the Muslim Brotherhood as we know it in the Arab world, and that they had as a goal the implementation of activities against economic targets. When they completed their training, they would go into Jewish fields to conduct their initiation ceremony and "as long as they were at it," they burned the field or tore out the crops. They also engaged in other types of activities but they were not well-trained and therefore met with frequent failure. About one year ago, they were arrested and the "general leader" was sentenced to a 15-year term.

Those are the three most extreme organizations which have rallied to destroy Israel and establish a secular or religious Arab state on Israeli territory.

[Question] Of what significance, in your opinion, is Rakah's activity in the Arab sector?

[Answer] Rakah, in my opinion, is much more dangerous than the three small groups I just discussed. These groups demand sacrifices from their people--fighting against the establishment and the very fact that they have to be willing to openly engage in activities that are against the law, exposing them to the authorities. Rakah is more dangerous because, by using ostensibly legal methods, it creates conditions which allow, when the time comes, the implementation of the right to self-determination for Israeli Arabs. Rakah works indefatigably toward the establishment of institutes and bodies in the Arab sector which

parallel existing institutions in the country. Thus, for example, on Rakah's initiative, an organization of Arab council leaders was established which took on not only municipal functions but purely political ones as well. This was actually the body that organized the first Land Day in 1976. In the 1977 elections, a council representative was elected to the Knesset and joined the Rakah front. What's more, a year and a half ago, Rakah called for the establishment of an Israeli Arab "People's Congress." According to the plan, every delegate in the Congress would represent 500 Arabs. The ultimate goal was to establish a sort of separate Arab Knesset with its own "national pact." The activities of the Congress were halted when the group was outlawed.

It is not hard to guess what negative political consequences might have resulted had they succeeded to achieve their goals.

[Question] How would you define Rakah's position today in the Arab sector?

[Answer] Since the 1959 elections, Rakah's position has grown steadily stronger, in every election campaign held since that year, they gained another 10 percent-- in 1978, 51 percent of all the legitimate Israeli Arab votes were for Rakah, making it the leading political power in the Arab sector. And then, in the 1981 elections, support declined for the first time, to 26 percent.

[Question] Why? What caused this decline?

[Answer] I cannot say in detail, but in general I would guess that this turn-about was the result of the clear and simple policy that Rakah adopted. We told the Arabs that if they used the political tactics of the Village Sons or Telem, the Muslim Brotherhood or Rakah--the result would be an unavoidable conflict with the majority in the State of Israel, a conflict wherein the majority would always come out ahead. This clear explanation had its desired effect. Rakah, for its part, turned inward to conduct a soul-searching analysis to determine why Arab support had declined so drastically. The alternative was to become more radical, or more conservative. Rakah reached the conclusion that it would not be able to compete at the conservative level with existing conservative groups and therefore, the only solution was to change its former policy in a radical direction. There are several indications pointing to Rakah's radicalization. This is based on the events of the last Land Day in March 1982. At that time, we saw how Rakah cooperated with the extremist elements which they had until then avoided and whose participation they had previously discouraged. This was the expression of a desire to establish closer ties with the extremists in an attempt to re-establish their own organization.

[Question] What is Rakah's position on the question of a Palestinian state?

[Answer] Rakah actually has two faces. To the Jewish public Rakah claims that it supports self-determination for the Palestinians, i.e. the establishment of a Palestinian state, along side the State of Israel. They don't go into the question of borders and only hint that they mean the 1967 borders. Internally, however, they say something quite different: We must first set up the conditions for the establishment of a Palestinian State and only then will the second stage fall into place--a return to the borders of 1947, in accordance with the United Nations agreement.

[Question] Thus far you have discussed the political aspects of the Arab sector, but you have not mentioned "the silent majority." Does this majority express itself in any way?

[Answer] Most of the Israeli Arabs, around 63 percent of the total Arab population in the country, voted in 1981 for Zionist parties, which in my eyes is a most encouraging statement. The drawback of this populace is that it does not constitute a homogeneous group and it is not organized in any political framework. These people are the "salt of the earth." However, recently they have shown some leadership potential: On Land Day several leaders, the more outstanding of whom was Ahmad Abu'Utaybah, chairman of the Jat council, came out and attacked Rakah. Twenty-five council heads announced at Rosh-Gali at the time that Rakah does not represent them and they they blamed Rakah for leading Israel's Arabs into inevitable conflict with the Jewish majority, a conflict whose consequences were clear from the start.

[Question] What reciprocal influences have been created between Israeli Arabs and Arabs in the territories--who influenced whom?

[Answer] Israeli Arabs had for 19 years been cut off from their brothers in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip and the Arab world. Immediately following the renewal of physical contact between the, after the Six Day war, the Israeli component took the lead. They were proud of their material and educational gains and of the fact that they lived in a democratic society in which the individual was allowed to express himself as he saw fit. Over the course of time, family, commercial and political ties were renewed. Radical elements--both in the territories and in Israel proper--began to cooperate with each other toward organizing political events, such as Earth Day or the memorial day for Rashid Husayn.* Israeli Arabs began to be "jealous" of the Arabs in the territories because these latter did not have to deal with the dilemma of dual loyalty and the frustration involved in that. Under the influence of the Arabs in the territories, the radicalization trend grew among some Israeli Arabs.

[Question] Are there known instances in which Israeli Arabs and Arabs from the territories cooperated in terrorist activities?

* A nationalistic Arab poet from the village of Mutzmutz in the triangle, who emigrated from Israel and died in a fire in New York, where he had worked on propaganda programs with other PLO leaders. He saw himself as the "Arab Bialik" and his poems were full of anger and vengeance against the Israeli government.

[Answer] Yes. In the years between 1967-1973 there were 320 instances in which Israeli Arabs joined terrorist groups, where the initiative was taken by recruiters from the terrorist organizations, not by the Israeli Arabs themselves. They were all caught and sentenced to terms of varying lengths.

[Question] Did they operate within Israeli territory?

[Answer] Yes. Most of them never really got the chance to act, but there were those who did. In addition, there were many actions by outside terrorists involving Israeli Arabs who left the country legally or illegally, an example of which would be the incident at Ma'alot.

[Question] Do you see a hiatus in these activities today?

[Answer] I could not say for sure. It was only 2 or 3 years ago that underground Telem and Muslim Brotherhood groups were caught, and more recently, a band of 20 was apprehended in Lod, having engaged in PLO activities.

[Question] How would you describe the prevailing mood in the Arab sector during the Galilee Peace War and until the Beirut Massacre?

[Answer] The Galilee peace War was the first war since the war for independence between Israel and the Palestinians. The emotional involvement of Israeli Arabs during the war was much stronger this time. They were in shock and the defeats suffered by the PLO in Lebanon caused them much pain and frustration. This is especially true with regard to Arabs in the Galilee, since almost every Arab family in the area has relatives in Lebanon. They maintained a degree of restraint, however, and did not express their feelings publicly while the war lasted. But at the end of the war, two elements stood out in the Israeli Arab reactions: Anger toward the Arab countries which did not support the Palestinians, countries which verbally supported the option of war against Israel but when the Palestinians chose that option, stood on the sidelines and did not lift a finger to help; and a wave of frustration with the Communist party in Israel and its back-up--the USSR--which took no real steps to aid the Palestinians.

There was a drastic decline in Rakah's position, but the massacre in the refugee camps in Beirut was a God-send for Rakah. Rakah decided to exploit the situation to improve its image in the eyes of the Israeli Arabs and strengthen its position as a central political force. Rakah engaged in a vigorous campaign of incitement, especially among the youth. Thus, for example, in one pamphlet distributed to the youth it was written: "You will be the spark that will light the great fire," and we are witness to the fact that the young people were the leaders of the violence that ensued.

[Question] There are those who describe that which occurred in the Arab sector as an earthquake, in whose aftermath the relations between Arabs and Jews will never be the same.

[Answer] It does not matter how the events are described, but there is no doubt that something did come down. The tremendous influence of outside events was proven once again. The recent events were most serious. Thus, for example a barricade was set up at the entrance to Bik'a al-Rabiyah, where identity cards of people passing through were checked and Jews were beaten mercilessly;

another barricade was erected on the Vadi 'Ara road and a bus full of armed soldiers, going out of Lebanon on leave, ran into it. Only thanks to the restraint demonstrated by the soldiers, an incident did not break out and a tragedy was avoided. Four or five police stations were attacked which mainly housed Arabs. These incidents should be a warning signal to conservative leaders among the Israeli Arabs. These leaders must understand that the existence of such incidents will surely influence the Jewish populace, because it is not just an issue between the Arab populace and the State. The same Jew who was beaten at a barricade or whose car was damaged holds a deep grudge and there may awaken within him the desire to react. Thus, these leaders should have a heart-to-heart talk with themselves and with the Israeli Arab youth, to calm the turbulence and explain the serious implications which might emanate from their acts and the potential repercussions on Jewish-Arab relations.

[Question] In light of what has happened, do you expect to suggest a different or new policy toward the Arab sector?

[Answer] Our relationship to the Arab populace in Israel must address two issues: On the one hand, to try to close up the gaps and give conservative elements the feeling that they are part of the country and that the country worries about their welfare and is interested in their advancement and development. We've already said the the large majority among the Israeli Arabs are conservative and pragmatic, and interested in living and developing themselves within the State, their only desire being to have a bigger piece of the national pie and not necessarily to get involved in politics. On the other hand, it must be clear to the radical nationalist--those who want to destroy the State of Israel or disrupt law and order--that the State will not treat them mercifully and will not accept their serious acts. The State will seek justice for them.

The government of Israel's policy toward the Arab sector--and it does not matter what governemnt you are talking about--has established that the Israeli Arabs are an intergral part of the country's population. The State does not demand that they identify with all its goals and with its Zionist objectives, but allows them to live as Israeli citizens, proud of their Arab nationality. The State also assures that they will not be involved in a situation of war between us and the Arab world by not recruiting them into the IDF. Allow me to add here that the Jewish populace must understand that the Arabs in Israel are not a homogeneous group and that they must be treated like any group within which there are several opinions.

[Question] Is the situation today better then it was 10 years ago, before the Yom Kippur War?

[Answer] It is hard to talk about any kind of regular development in the Arab sector. I mentioned earlier that before the Galilee Peace War, relations between the Arab population and the State were quite good. The problem is that there are external factors influencing things--causing the barometer of relations to rise or fall to some degree or another.

In 1956, after the Sinai campaign, there was a turnabout in the general attitude of the Israeli Arabs toward the State. They were convinced that Israel's existence was not temporary and they realized that they had to reach a modus vivendi

and learn to live and make a living within the State. In 1967, the Israeli Arabs expressed this attitude when they actually cooperated in the war effort with the State, short of enlistment. They did, for example, donate blood and money. They worked in most sectors of the economy in the place of reservists and set up booths for distributing food and drink to IDF soldiers. The Arab world called them traitors. During the war, however, the Israeli Arabs saw with their own eyes how the Arab war machine went up in smoke. That affected them.

After the Yom Kippur War there was a reversal. The radical elements interpreted the result of the war as a victory for the Arabs, while the conservatives defined it as a "tie." In general, there was a feeling that a military Arab coalition could some day break the State of Israel and resolve the dispute on the battlefield. The oil embargo, the petrodollars and the rising status of the PLO in the international area --all this increased their feeling of power.

Even the rise in their numbers increased their feeling of independent security and their demanding approach, without a clear understanding of the difference between civil and national levels of demands. They were no longer a small minority of 165,000 Arabs, but a large minority of 684,000 and their expectations had changed completely.

On the other hand, the Antebbe incident, the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear plant and the war in Lebanon also caused a reversal within the Arab population: They once again realized that the IDF is still the strongest power in the Middle East.

In other words, the State's immunity is a factor likely to influence the degree to which Israeli Arabs are willing to deal with the State of Israel, militarily or in some other way.

9811

CSO: 4423/31

GAZA-EGYPT TRADE FREEZE REMAINS

EA011802 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 1 Dec 82 p 7

[Report by Dani Tzidqoni]

[Excerpt] Egypt's relations with the Gaza Strip must be measured by a different standard than that used to measure Israeli-Egyptian relations. The strip is an Arab district, which Egypt ruled for some 20 years and whose inhabitants have a strong affinity with Egypt. However, when Al-Sadat took his historic step 5 years ago, the Gaza Strip did not declare its support for his initiative as he had hoped. Only two of the strip's leaders did so, the imam of Gaza, (Hashim Huznidar) and the deputy council head of Jabaliyah, (Muhammad Abu Warda)--and they paid for this with their lives. Their deaths were a warning to others, and the renewed political romance of the Gaza Strip with Egypt was cut short with a knife and a bullet.

The strip is paying dearly for not identifying with Egypt. In the past, Egypt allowed tens of thousands of young people from the strip to study at its universities, but since Al-Sadat's peace initiative it has reduced its intake of students from the strip to a minimum.

In the Gaza Strip, it was expected that the Egyptians would stream through the Sinai on their way to visit Israel, and that the strip's moribund tourism and resort branch would revive. The owners of hotels on the beach hastened to renovate their buildings. Restaurant owners prepared themselves for customers. But, as is known, Egyptian tourism is an egg that did not hatch--neither Israel nor the Gaza Strip benefitting from it. The Gazans, whose economy and commerce are an inseparable part of the Israeli economy, believed that after the peace agreement with Egypt, Israel had provided them with an historic opportunity to be the economic link between the two countries. During those days, Gazan merchants hastened to become the agents for Israeli companies like Amcor, Carmel, and others, in order to sell their products in Egypt.

Their hope floundered on the rock of reality. These merchants or, in Arabic, wakilun, quickly found Egyptian importers who were willing to buy goods from them, but the pertinent Egyptian Government ministries refused to grant the necessary permits to the importers.

Trade usually flows in two directions. The Gazan agents thought: If we are not allowed to export we can at least import from Egypt, which is one of the chief suppliers of various goods, including rice, to Europe. Businessmen from the strip also investigated this possibility. Egypt did not oppose the purchase of Egyptian produce by Gazan merchants, but it made it clear to them that they could not do so directly by buying the produce in Egypt and transporting it overland to Israel by truck. "If you want to buy Egyptian produce," the Egyptians told the Gazan businessmen, "we will send it to you via Trieste or Cyprus, from where you can take it."

The Gazans had hoped that President Mubarak's policy of "facing the Arab world" would lead to a change in trade with the strip. But despite efforts in this regard, the freeze in economic relations between the Gaza Strip and Egypt remains.

CSO: 4400/112

BRIEFS

COMPUTER NEGOTIATING WITH CHINESE--An Israeli company in the computer field which specializes in computer programs is conducting negotiations with a Chinese company which wants to serve as a channel for the export of Israeli knowhow in this sphere to the Soviet Union. The Israeli company, called Niquv, is registered in the stock exchange and as a result, if the deal is signed, it will convey the appropriate information to the stock exchange members. Our correspondent Gad Shimron notes that one of the products which the Israeli company wants to export is a program for vehicle spare parts. [Text] [TA021145 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 2 Dec 82]

SETTLERS APPROPRIATE PRIVATE LANDS--Privately-owned land belonging to Arab villagers have been included in the area of the West Bank settlement of Shilo. On the land is a monument by sculptor Yig'al Tumarkin, which the Peace Now Movement constructed a few years ago in opposition to the settlement. Members of the regional council told our correspondent Shalom Oren that the area would not have been added to the Shilo settlement had it not been for the monument. Our correspondent reports that the members of Shilo are concerned about the maintenance of the monument. [Text] [TA301759] Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 30 Nov 82]

JORDANIAN WATER PLANT SAID A DANGER--Jordan is now completing a large water plant that is liable to harm the subterranean springs of Lake Kinneret and Israel's water resources. The plant is in the Jordan Valley, not far from (El-Hama). The plant is being built with the know-how of companies from Korea and Yugoslavia, and it includes drillings, reservoirs and a network of canals and tunnels. The work is also being done at night with the use of spotlights. Our correspondent Hayim Hecht reports that the chief of staff toured the Jordan Valley today, and viewed and was briefed on the new Jordanian plant, about 100 meters from the Israeli border. [Text] [TA300612 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 30 Nov 82]

EXPORTS TO LEBANON RISE--The Ministry of Industry and Trade has decided to prohibit the export of olive oil to Lebanon, after fears have been raised the exporting of this product is liable to hurt local Lebanese production. So far, the export to Lebanon of apples, oranges, and potatoes has been forbidden. The ministry spokesman explained that the policy of trade with Lebanon is based on mutuality and economic feasibility. In addition, steps are taken so that the economy and agriculture of that country are not harmed.

Therefore, the export to Lebanon of subsidized products--as well as of products whose sale is liable to hurt the livelihoods of manufacturers there--has been prohibited. Direct exports to Lebanon last month came to \$9.3 million, compared to \$7 million the previous month. Particular growth was noted in the export of items that had previously been imported to Lebanon from other countries. Lebanese merchants have apparently discovered Israel to be a less expensive source of supply, and Israel permits this export. At issue are mainly foodstuffs, but lately sales of textiles, plastics, exterminating agents and various metal products have increased. In recognition of the importance of reciprocal trade, imports from Lebanon are also permitted. Leathergoods and recycled tires from that country have been sold here in recent weeks. [Text] [T1300900 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 30 Nov 82 p 6]

VILLAGES SEEK DEVELOPMENT FUNDS--Our correspondent Yo'el Dar has reported that the Golan Heights Druze are asking Israel to help develop their villages. The community's notables have asked the Interior Ministry for money to build classrooms and expand the water and electricity network. Recently, the Interior Ministry transferred funds to the local councils in the Golan Heights, but the councils' representatives say these are not enough for their development plans. [Text] [TA291416 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 29 Nov 82]

POLL PROBES PERSONAL ECONOMIC SITUATION--The personal economic situation of Israelis has somewhat improved in the last 6 months and less people are complaining that their salaries are not enough "to make it through the end of the month." These are the findings of a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute and commissioned by HA'ARETZ. Some 38.1 percent now complain that the money they make is not enough "to make it through the end of the month," compared with 44.4 percent 6 months ago. Some 8.3 percent said their economic situation had improved compared to 5.5 percent who stated this 6 months ago. Pori Director Refa'el Gil points out that those stating that their situation has improved this time--unlike in the past--include menial workers and people of African and Asian origin while commerce workers and clerks complain more about the worsening of the economic situation. Some 43.5 percent declared that their personal economic situation had not changed compared to 44 percent 6 months ago. The poll was conducted on a representative sample of 1,200 men and women. [Text] [TA281346 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Nov 82 p 3]

JOURNALISTS' SOLIDARITY WITH RAMALLAH COLLEAGUES--Seventeen journalists, coming from almost all the important Israeli communications media, today visited the Arab journalists in Ramallah who are restricted to their town in order to express their solidarity with them. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports that the delegation visited the editor of AL-TALI'AH, Bashir Baghruti; a member of the AL-FAJR board of editors, Ma'mun al-Sayyid; and a member of the AL-SHA'B board of editors, Akram Haniyah. [Text] [TA271727 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 27 Nov 82]

ON ARAB AIR POWER--The Commander of the Air Force Maj Gen David Eluri says the Air Force has complete control over the skies of Lebanon. In his opinion, Israeli aircraft can attack missiles in Syrian territory but this decision is political and its implication might cause a war. Maj Gen Eluri spoke to our correspondent Shmu'el Tal. He noted that Syria has indeed learned the lessons from the destruction of its missiles in the '73-74 war, and is now speedily developing its aerial defense system. The missile fired from within its territory toward our planes was an unusual act, but it did not endanger them. The Air Force commander stressed that the Air Force now has answers to Soviet antiaircraft missiles, including the SAM-8 missiles. In his opinion the biggest challenge to the Air Force in the next few years will be the modern weapons bought by the Arab countries in the West. The biggest danger is Jordan, because its Air Force is of a high standard. [Text] [TA270829 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 27 Nov 82]

CONGLOMERATE IN AUSTRALIA--Israel and Australia have agreed in principle on a large commercial deal for the establishment of a conglomerate of industrial plants in Australia. A half billion dollars will be invested in the establishment of the conglomerate. Our correspondent Gadi Sukenik reports that the deal was agreed to during the visit of a delegation of industrialists, led by Trade and Industry Minister Gid'on Pat, to Australia. Israel will plan the plants on the basis of the know-how it acquired in industrial plants in Israel, and will provide the conglomerate with large quantities of phosphates. Australia will finance the construction of the plants. Pat and Australian representatives agreed on the establishment of a steering team this week to prepare within 4 months a profitability study and an initial plan for the conglomerate. [Text] [TA180907 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 17 Nov 82]

MILITARY AIRFIELD INAUGURATED--A new Air Force airfield, Nevatim, in the Negev, was inaugurated this morning by three Skyhawk planes landing there. The Air Force commander said at the ceremony that the force had come to the Negev to settle there, not only to fly in its sky. The director of the Ministry of Agriculture pointed out in his remarks that the evacuation of the Bedouin from the area of the base had been done in a civilized manner despite the difficulties. Nevatim is the third base to be established in the Negev after the evacuation of Sinai and it is the first to be entirely constructed by Israelis. Our military correspondent Shmu'el Tal reports that the base will be operational at the beginning of the summer. [Text] [TA231316 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 23 Nov 82]

GALILEE LAND PURCHASE--The state has purchased more than 2,000 dunam of privately-owned land in the Galilee this year, mostly from Arabs. Our correspondent Hayim Hecht reports that a special committee has been established jointly for this purpose by the Israel Lands Authority, the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency. The committee follows standard procedures, and can pay for the lands in cash or exchange alternative parcels of land. [Text] [TA260537 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 26 Nov 82]

KNESSET SECRETARY DISMISSED--Knesset Secretary Netan'el Lorch has been dismissed from his post and Shmu'el (Jacobson), his deputy, has been appointed to replace him. For several months now the house speaker, Menahem Savidor, has been trying to end his work because of differences of opinion over his working methods. This evening the dismissed Knesset secretary reacted to our correspondent Razi Barqay, saying: "I have served in the Knesset under five speakers and I never even imagined that I would end my road with dismissal." "To this day," Lorch said, "I do not know the speaker's reasons." It will be noted that the authority to appoint a Knesset secretary lies with the speaker and his deputies. [Text] [TA251817 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 25 Nov 82]

W. BANK ARAB: SENTENCED--The Ramallah military court has sentenced five residents of Husan Village, in the district of Bethlehem, who planted shoe mines on the road to the Betar Fort, in Batir Village. A soldier stepped on one of the mines when he was hiking in the area and was seriously wounded. [Text] [TA242103 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 24 Nov 82]

ARABS COMPLAIN ABOUT LAND SEIZURES--The (Husni Shawan) family of Jericho complained at the end of the week that 2 dunams of land and a building belonging to it had been seized by the Israeli authorities. A villager from Bayt Ikse in the Ramallah district claims that Israeli bulldozers entered his land in the al-Nabi Samu'il area. The military government informed him that this land had been expropriated 12 years ago. A resident of the town of 'Abisan near Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip also complained that Israeli bulldozers began plowing his land. He asked the bulldozer operators why they were doing this and they told him that oil exploration was underway in the area. [Excerpt] [TA051352 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Dec 82 p 6]

FRANCE SAID TO BREACH UNDERSTANDING--Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Chairman Eliyahu Ben-Elisar has accused France of breaching an understanding to the effect that disagreements over solving the Palestinian problem would not affect other aspects of bilateral relations. Our correspondent in Paris Gil'ad Sher reports that Ben-Elisar, who has been in France on a mission for the United Jewish Appeal, said that this understanding had been reached during President Mitterrand's visit to Jerusalem. [Text] [TA061019 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 6 Dec 82]

MONEY TRANSFERRED TO ARAB VILLAGES--'Akko, 5 Dec (ITIM)--Large sums of money have recently been funneled to minority villages in the Galilee by Palestinian aid funds in the United States and Europe. The ITIM correspondent reports that the sources of these funds are uncertain. The money is mainly devoted to cultural activities and to renovating social clubs in the Arab villages. A European church fund also awards scholarships to Arab students. The scholarships total \$1,800-\$3,000 and the students accepting them undertake to return to their villages after they have completed their studies and serve the local population. The ITIM correspondent points out that the funds are transferred to Israel via liaison men in the Arab sector who advise the directors of the funds about the extension of grants and loans. In most cases, their recommendation suffices to have the money transferred to them. [Text] [TA051359 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1345 GMT 5 Dec 82]

VENEZUELA REPORTEDLY TO BUY MISSILES--The Venezuelan Army will purchase surface-to-surface rocket-launchers produced by the Israeli military industry. This is reported by the monthly MILITARY TECHNOLOGY issued in Holland. The monthly says this is a new system which launches 160-mm rockets a distance of about 30 km. According to the monthly, the launcher has 24 barrels, and Venezuela will procure 25 such launchers at a total cost of \$3 million. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY adds that the system will be supplied to Venezuela mounted on the tanks and it is possible that AMX-type tanks possessed by the Venezuelan Army will be used for this. The monthly goes on to say that Venezuela examined similar systems produced by several other countries before deciding to purchase the Israeli-made system. Another magazine, MICROWAVE SYSTEM NEWS issued in the United States claims that Israel has improved the tow-type anti-tank missiles in its possession and managed to destroy, among other things, T-27 tanks during the peace for Galilee operation. According to this magazine a new warhead was installed in the missiles. This warhead was developed by Israel on the basis of information it received from British sources about the T-72 armor. This information was obtained by the British in Afghanistan, transmitted to the United States and from them to Israel. The magazine claims that the U.S. Army turned to Israel with an unofficial request for information about the new warhead. [Text] [TA051257 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 5 Dec 82 p 7]

WEST BANK STUDENTS ELECTIONS--In the elections held over the last few days for students' institutions and youth clubs in Judaea and Samaria, a joint Fatah-Na'if Hawatimah's Democratic Peoples' Front list won. In the student council elections at al-Najah University in Nabulus, Fatah won four seats, George Habash' list won two, and the lists of Hawatimah, Jibril and the communists won one seat each. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports that there were also similar results in the Hebron polytechnic. The Muslim Brotherhood were soundly defeated and have no representation at all. [Text] [TA011527 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 1 Dec 82]

TV COVERAGE OF WAR TO BE CURTAILED--Israel television will be far less free to roam the battlefield of any future Israeli war than it was in Lebanon, TV reporter Ehud Ya'ari said yesterday at THE JERUSALEM POST symposium on war and the media. Ya'ari said the agreement between the broadcasting authority and the Israel Defense Forces which had permitted Israeli TV and radio crews, mobilized into uniform to go virtually anywhere they chose in Lebanon, had been terminated by the authority after the war. The authority believed that the agreement limited its freedom of action because it permitted the army spokesman to view such reports even before submission to censor. In practice, Ya'ari said, the army spokesman never exercised his screening privilege, but this right was reserved, and in any future war, "Israel TV will have far less freedom of coverage." The 2-day symposium, with the participation of prominent journalists and analysts from Israel and abroad, is launching THE JERUSALEM POST's 50th anniversary celebrations. Mavor Teddy Kollek told the audience in the Jerusalem Cinematheque that the question of the world media's objectivity had been raised by the Lebanese war. "I would have thought the world, at worst, would have accused us of behaving a little like Bismarck. What they said was that we behaved like Hitler." [Excerpt] [TA020837 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Dec 82 pp 1-2]

GNP DROPS IN FIRST HALF OF 1982--Israel's gross national product [GNP] dropped by 3 percent in the first half of 1982, compared to the six previous months, the Central Bureau of Statistics announced yesterday. The decrease came after a 3 percent rise during the last half of 1981, so the latest drop puts the country's GNP back at its first half of 1981 level. The decrease was due to a 6 percent drop in the level of exports and of public consumption, together with a sharp rise in the level of interest and profits paid out overseas. But there has been a constant rise in private consumption, up by 4 percent during the first half of the present year, to a level of 7 percent above that of early 1981. A similar increase was registered in investment, which rose by 3 percent during January-June 1982, as compared to the previous 6 months, and by 6 percent since January-June 1981. Imports also registered an increase during the first half of the year, by some 2 percent, which means that since early 1981, imports have increased by some 6 percent. [Text] [TA020834 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Dec 82 p 1]

GOLAN LEADERS UNDER SOCIAL BAN--Majdal Shams--The pro-Syrian groups on the Golan Heights have refused to lift a social ban imposed on eight Druze dignitaries because of their loyalty to the State of Israel and their refusal to return their identity cards to the Interior Ministry when they were requested to do so 10 months ago. The reimposing of the social ban on the eight moderate leaders took the officials by surprise. One of the eight, Muhsin Abu Salih, chairman of the Mas'adah local council, told THE JERUSALEM POST yesterday that because of the social ban many local residents still refrain from contact with him and with the others. They also refuse to let them pray in the shrines. The pro-Syrian groups claim they cannot forgive those who refused to take part in the struggle of their brethren. In Majdal Shams, the largest Druze village on the Golan Heights, the villagers refuse to speak with two residents who are known to be very strong supporters of the Golan law. Sources at the Interior Ministry claimed that over 90 percent of the local population have already opted for identity cards and some 10 percent of over 4,500 who were required to hold identity cards accepted Israeli citizenship of their own free will. The government recently approved millions of shekels in grants to the four local councils. [Text] [TA020858 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Dec 82 p 2]

CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH ROMANIA--A cultural agreement, the first of its kind, has been signed between Israel and Romania. The agreement is in the sphere of historical research, and was signed between the Yad Vashem [the Jerusalem Holocaust Memorial Center] Directorate and the Institute of History in Romania. Our correspondent Eytan Yaqir notes that Israel has no cultural agreements with the Romanian Government, and the agreement which has now been signed may constitute a breakthrough. It will make possible access to archives in Romania and contribute to research in the history of the Jews during World War II. [Text] [TA021148 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1105 GMT 2 Dec 82]

FAMILIES TO MOVE TO SAMARIA SETTLEMENTS--Three hundred families have complied with the Center for Directing People to Development Towns' call to settle in northern Samaria, in the 'Iron region. Our correspondent Shalom Oren

reports that six regional settlements have appealed to this center since they found out that they were not in great demand and that not too many people wanted to come to them. Following the call by the center, 300 families have expressed their agreement to live in these settlements, some of which are communal. [Text] [TA011327 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 1 Dec 82]

W. BANK LAND ALLOCATION APPROVED--The Knesset Finance Committee has decided to allocate 30 million Israeli shekels to the Israeli Land Authority to preserve state land in Judaea and Samaria. Our correspondent Gid'on Zenlinger reports that the decision was made after Mk Avraham Melamed of the National Religious Party changed his position. He said he had learned most of the funds would ultimately be transferred to the Jewish National Fund and would be used for forestation--and he agrees with this. Nevertheless, our correspondent points out that the committee did not approve an allocation of 10 million shekels to the settlement of Kokhav Ya'ir. [Text] [TA011435 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 1 Dec 82]

NEW POLITICAL YOUTH MOVEMENT--A new political youth movement, called the Democratic Youth Movement, has been established in Judaea and Samaria. It was founded by the area village leagues which maintain a political dialogue between the Palestinians in the territories and the Israeli Government. Our correspondent Gil Sadan reports that the initiative for the establishment of the new youth movement emanated from Hebron, where the leader of the area village leagues in the territories, Mustafa Dudin, lives. The movement was founded in a ceremony today in the village of Bil'in in the Ramallah area, in memory of the head of the Ramallah Area Village League and his son who were murdered by terrorists a year ago. According to civilian administration sources, about 1,000 people from Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip attended the ceremony. [Text] [TA261921 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1815 GMT 26 Nov 82]

STRONGER RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL RECOMMENDED--A Knesset delegation is ending its visit to Brazil today. Our correspondent Tzvi Yisre'eli reports that in the opinion of all the delegation members, the effort invested by the Foreign Ministry in Brazil is not compatible with Brazil's importance. According to the delegation members, Brazil is a power in South America and among the developing countries in the world, and there is no doubt it will become a world power. Therefore, their conclusion is that the Foreign Ministry should boost the Israeli representation in Brazil. Only toward the end of the visit did the Brazilian communications media start covering the visit. The reports are sympathetic, although our correspondent says that in front-page coverage in the Brazilian press, one encounters a negative attitude toward Israel every day. In the capital, the delegation members conferred with a local Jewish group, and many were curious about the chances of the Knesset passing the Who Is a Jew Bill. Our correspondent reports that the Jews sighed with relief when they were told by the Knesset members that the bill does not stand a chance. [Text] [TA071846 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 7 Dec 82]

TERRORIST SQUAD CAPTURED--In Zawayah Village, near Tulkarm, security forces have arrested the members of a terrorist squad who in the course of 3 years carried out attacks in Tel Aviv, Petah Tiqwa, and Ra'ananna, in which three Petah Tiqwa residents were killed and 25 wounded. Sabotage materials were found in the possession of the terrorists. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports that the house of one of the terrorists has been destroyed, while that of another has been sealed. [TA022042 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 2 Dec 82]

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